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Power System Security Assessment through Analog Computation 
Aaron St. Leger 




 This dissertation proposes a methodology for power system security assessment 
through analog computation.  By exploiting the strengths of analog computation a more 
robust security assessment can be performed as compared to traditional methods.  
Security assessment is currently performed by power system operators utilizing digital 
computers and determines the power system structure, states and level of security based 
on telemetered data and knowledge of the system.  Ideally this process would occur in 
real time but due to the limitations of digital computers and telemetry systems the 
security assessment is currently conducted at periodic intervals of ten to fifteen minutes.  
This process requires a tremendous amount of computation for large systems.  In order to 
provide updated assessment at such time intervals, not even in real time, numerous 
assumptions and simplifications of the power system models and analyses are required to 
simplify and speed up the digital computations.  Due to its inherent speed and 
computational efficiency analog computation is proving to be a viable alternative. 
 Analog computation by definition is continuous in time and embodies an entirely 
different paradigm to computing as compared to discrete time methods.  Security 
assessment for digital computers consists of topology estimations, state estimation and 
contingency analysis.  The theory and practical approaches to these tasks through digital, 
discrete time, computational methods are fairly mature at this point in time but do not 
translate directly to analog computation.    A robust analog computation engine along 
 xvii
with corresponding computational theory is required in order to make use of analog 
methods for power system security assessment.  This dissertation provides the relevant 







 Analog computation of power systems is a continuing field of research.  Among 
the advantages analog computation possesses over traditional digital methods are 
physically realizable solutions and much faster and more efficient computation.  In prior 
research, simulation time for a two machine system were typically 104 times shorter than 
the real time phenomena [1].  In order to consummate this analog method as a viable tool 
in power system analysis accurate models of power system components and pertinent 
analog computational theory are requisite.  This dissertation explores analog 
computational theory and the development of an analog computer for the purpose of 
power system security assessment.  The focus here is on power system security 
assessment.  However, the analog computer presented here is capable of conducting other 
power system analyses.  It could be generalized as a solver of ordinary differential 
equations (ODEs).  This introductory chapter covers background information on power 
system security assessment, the problem statement, analog/digital computation methods 
in power systems, and their associated strengths and weaknesses.  Motivation for this 
research is also addressed. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
 Ideally the power system will always be operated in a safe and secure manner 
while providing electrical power to meet the current demand.  In practice this is not 
possible, but generally speaking the system can be operated in a reasonably secure 
manner.  In a paper detailing an adaptive control system [2], T. E. DyLiacco developed a 
methodology to define the power system operating state and appropriate control actions 
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based on the determined state.  DyLiacco defined three states: preventive, emergency and 
restorative.  Control objectives were defined based on which state the system is in. 
 “In the preventive state, the generation-transmission system is being operated so 
that the demands of all customers are satisfied at standard frequency and at desired 
operating voltages” [2].  The term preventive was used to indicate that the system should 
be controlled in a defensive manner to prepare for and contend with disturbances from 
the current state such that the system maintains normal operation.  The emergency 
operating state is defined when an overload is occurring, frequency is deviating 
unacceptably from nominal, or the voltage profile is beyond tolerable specifications.  The 
desired control action is to mitigate the detected problem in the system while maintaining 
the maximum, ideally all, of the system load.  “The restorative operating state is that 
condition when service to some customer loads has been lost” [2].  The control action at 
this point is to restore power supply to all customers and restore the system to the 
preventive state.  An operating state strategy is depicted visually in Figure 1 [2].  The 
arrows designate transitions from one state to another.  Solid arrows are indicative of 
desired control actions while dashed arrows show unintentional state transitions. 
 It is desirable to keep the system in preventive state at all times.  If unexpected 
outages or failures of the equipment occur then the system could transition to emergency 
or restorative state.  At this point control actions will be taken to move the system to a 
more desirable operating state.  In general, the main objective is to serve as much load as 
possible.  With this in mind, in some circumstances it may be desirable to take the system 
to emergency state while still maintaining all system load, or to the restorative state in a 
controlled manner to minimize the loss of load (e.g. load shedding).  Determining the 
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state of the system and appropriate control action can be accomplished through 
observation and detailed analysis of the system.  A more generalized term encompassing 
this analysis and control determination is power system security. 
 
 
Figure 1: Operating State Strategy 
 
  
A.J. Wood and B.F. Wollenberg define power system security by three main 
points [3]: 
 
 1.  System Monitoring 
 2.  Contingency Analysis 
 3.  Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow (SCOPF) 
 
System monitoring consists of acquiring real time measurements and data from the 
system along with analysis of this data.  Data such as bus voltages, transmission line 
currents and power flows, circuit breaker status, transformer tap settings and load and 
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generation levels are measured.  Typical analyses of this data consist of topology 
estimation, state estimation and system limitation checks. 
Contingency analysis is a process in which the effect of a component failure in the 
system is analyzed.  For example, to investigate the effects of a transmission line loss a 
simulation is run on the system at its current state without the transmission line.  Analysis 
of the resulting simulation provides insight to the system response to such a line loss.  
This is typically conducted for numerous failures to identify dangerous scenarios which 
would result in system limit violations or blackouts.  This analysis helps determine which 
state the power system would move to in the event of a component failure or multiple 
failures.  SCOPF is a tool that attempts to keep the system operating in the preventative 
state. 
 A security constrained optimal power flow is a process which incorporates 
contingency analysis, optimal power flow and economic dispatch.  The end result, or 
goal, of SCOPF is to specify how the system should be operated in the most economical 
manner (minimizing cost) while not violating any constraints during contingencies.  In 
other words, allow the system to remain in the preventive state in the event of 
contingencies.  Power system security assessment as presented in this dissertation is 
defined as a subset of power system security.  More specifically, it consists of system 
monitoring and contingency analysis. 
 Presently security assessment of the power system is conducted via digital 
computers.  Digital computers are also utilized for most other power system analyses that 
require computation.  This was not always the case.  Historically, analog computation 
was prevalent in power systems as well as other fields.   Before the advent of low cost 
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and highly programmable digital computers almost all computationally intense problems 
were performed in analog form.  The following sections provide an overview of analog 
and digital computation in power systems as well as a comparison between the two 
methods. 
1.2.1 COMPARISON OF ANALOG AND DIGITAL COMPUTATION 
 Currently digital computers, mainly due to the low cost and ease of use, dominate 
computation.  Although through advancements in circuit technology analog computers 
are gaining attention once again.  The main reason for this is that in certain applications 
analog computation is desirable due to inherent strengths in the methodology.  The main 
difference between analog and digital computation is that analog computation is 
continuous in time while digital computation is discretized.  Due to the discrete nature 
and architecture of digital computers they rely on a clock, with a finite rate, and memory 
whose quantity and bandwidth are also finite.  In direct comparison an analog computer, 
or machine, inherently has memory embedded in the system where required.  This results 
in no corresponding memory bandwidth limitation.  In addition, the continuous nature is 
equivalent to an infinite clock rate.  Further analysis has been conducted regarding the 









Table 1: Strengths and Weaknesses of Analog and Digital Computation 
Digital Computation Analog Computation
Highly programmable Computation can be performed faster or slower than real time
Low cost
Computation time independent 
of system size and model 
complexity
Ease of use High Efficiency
Precise solutions Numerically stable
Robust computation theory 
already exists
Extremely proficient at 
computing non-linear systems
Computation time dependant on 
system size/number of variables Calibration required
Discretization of models 
required
Historically not easily 
programmable
Simplification of models 
required to speed up 
computation
Measurement is required to 
obtain solutions
Numerical instability and 
convergence problems
Expensive and typically not easy 
to use
Slow computation of non-linear 
systems








 A stark contrast between digital and analog computation methods can be seen 
from Table 1.  Digital methods are very sophisticated, and the technology mature.  Due to 
these factors the technology exhibits low cost, high programmability and easy operation.  
In addition, they are very precise in contrast to analog methods.  The digital methods run 
into problems specifically with large non-linear systems.  These systems require time 
intensive iterative computation methods such as Newton-Raphson or Gauss-Seidel.  
Inherently many of these methods also result in numerical instability.  In these instances 
no solution can be obtained.  In addition, the discretization and simplification of the 
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models can lead to, albeit precise, inaccurate results.  With current state of the art 
technology the analysis of large scale non-linear systems with these digital methods is not 
feasible.  In contrast analog methods can overcome some of these deficiencies.  
 Analog methods inherently exhibit true parallel computation resulting in 
computation time independent of system size and model complexity.  Non-linear models 
are easily implemented and computed without numerical stability issues.  The presence of 
any instability in analog computation is inherently instability of the system being studied.  
Theoretically utilizing analog, a vastly complex non-linear system of an arbitrary size can 
be computed in real-time, or even faster than real-time.  However, certain weaknesses of 
analog computation have prevented such an implementation in the past.  Analog 
components require constant calibration and historically programming was very time 
consuming and required manual intervention (e.g. manual adjustment of jumper and 
potentiometer settings).  This has hindered online applications of analog computers.  
Most realizations have been limited to offline studies.  In addition, analog computers are 
traditionally expensive to implement and a measurement system is also required to 
extract solutions.  Due to these limitations digital computers have been chosen widely in 
favor of analog counterparts.  However, there has consistently been a niche where analog 
machines are utilized because of their inherent strengths.  Recent advancements in 
technology and analog computing techniques have begun to alleviate many of the 
disadvantages and make the method feasible for more applications. 
 The main advantage of analog computation can be summed up by computational 
efficiency.  Computational efficiency can be quantified by time, space and energy.  A.H. 
Kramer provides insight into computational efficiency [4].  He states “This added 
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efficiency [in analog computation] may be expressed in terms of computational density: 
by providing an implementation that is more than an order of magnitude more dense than 
a digital implementation, analog techniques may allow for realization on a single chip 
what requires an entire board using digital techniques” [4].  This assertion alludes to the 
physical size of the hardware although it is applicable to energy efficiency and 
computation time as well.  Kramer concludes in the article that “Analog implementations 
have higher design complexity and scale less easily than mainstream digital techniques, 
so they must offer a one to two order of magnitude efficiency gain over competing digital 
technologies to maintain a niche” [4].  Through time scaling techniques [5-7] it is clearly 
seen that a significant computation time advantage can be had utilizing analog methods.  
This is specifically true in cases where digital methods cannot feasible compute in real 
time, for example analysis of large non-linear systems.  Very high energy efficiency has 
also been shown in analog hardware in comparison to traditional digital approaches [8].  
In addition, with the advent of very-large-scale integration (VLSI) technology the spatial 
efficiency of analog computers is comparable to digital computers.  While for general 
purpose computing it would be very inefficient to utilize an analog computer it would be 
tremendously beneficial to make use of analog computers in specific applications where 
they exhibit a large gain in efficiency over digital methods.  Both analog and digital 
computers have been utilized in power systems and analog methods have historically 
been implemented when they were more efficient. 
1.2.2 ANALOG COMPUTATION IN POWER SYSTEMS 
 Analog computation in power systems is certainly not a new endeavor.  It is also 
used in a limited capacity today.  In the late 1800’s during the construction of his first 
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electric power transmission network Thomas Edison commissioned the design and 
manufacture of an analog computer [9].  He oversaw the development of a miniaturized 
version of a power network by Francis R. Upton, Charles L. Clarke, and Samuel D. Mott 
that was employed as a computer for the actual network.  This was for a direct current 
(DC) system.   Alternating Current (AC) Network Analyzers (NA) were first developed 
in the 1920’s to model and solve problems associated with power distribution systems 
[10].  They were later applied to transmission systems.  These analyzers were essentially 
miniaturized power systems built with passive components such as resistors, capacitors 
and inductors.  Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL), Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) all actively developed and 
researched analog computing applications at some point in time.  Development and use of 
analog computation grew throughout the twentieth century.  Power system analyses were 
conducted exclusively in analog until digital computers came into the mainstream in the 
1970’s.  In a short period of time digital methods overtook almost all analog computers 
for power system studies.  They were much more precise and were easily programmable 
in comparison to their analog counterparts.  The analog computers at that time required 
manual configuration of jumpers, potentiometers and other parameters for each 
computation.  This required manual intervention and lengthy setup time for complex 
problems.  Despite these shortcomings up through the 1960’s analog computers were 
commercially available and considerably successful and efficacious.  Many examples of 
these machines can be seen in [11].  Despite the fact that analog computing lost the 
commercial war to its digital counterpart there were still niche applications in power 
systems. 
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In 1990 the Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) constructed a fully analog 
power system emulator.  It is currently one of the largest in the world.  This system was 
constructed with passive elements modeling major components of the power network.  
The emulator consists of 30 generators, 304 transmission lines, 20 loads, HVDC 
transmission facilities, and static var compensators [12].  This analyzer is based on a real 
world system and epitomizes some recent development for analog computation in the 
power systems field.  One major application of this, and other NAs still in use, is for relay 
testing and coordination.  These analyzers were built to operate in real time and provide 
an excellent test bed for relay systems.  In addition, old analog network analyzers no 
longer in use are being utilized for undergraduate and research efforts in power systems 
[13]. 
 Current and future development of analog computation looks to take advantage of 
associated strengths and overcome if not all then some of the historically congenital 
obstacles.  Namely some major encumbrances are the large size of analog circuits, poor 
programmability/reconfigurability, and limited computational precision and measurement 
problems.  An example of an older computational tool for power systems is shown in 
Figure 2 [14].  The figure shows the control panel for an analog transmission line 
simulator used for testing relays.  This was a very powerful tool for its time but suffered 
from the drawbacks previously mentioned.  New technological developments and 










 Recently, there has been a major thrust toward computational systems on a chip 
(SoC).  These systems can allow for reconfiguration and programmability without the 
need of manually changing wires or settings.  This push for SoC is being done with both 
analog and digital computational methods.  Some examples are Field Programmable Gate 
Arrays (FPGA) and Field Programmable Analog Arrays (FPAA) [15]. 
 Current research in the analog field is pushing towards VLSI implementation of 
various analog technologies to realize a SoC.  This technology is well suited for power 
system analysis [1, 16-19].  Development in complimentary metal-oxide-semiconductor 
(CMOS) technology, the integration of bipolar junction transistors into CMOS 
technology (BiCMOS) and advancement of other analog VLSI technologies are paving 
the way for large-scale integration and accuracy for analog designs.  Literally thousands 
of analog components can be fabricated on a wafer the size of a pushpin.  In the older 
network analyzers the components were exceedingly large in comparison to 
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microelectronics.  As the system to be represented by the analyzer grew in size so did the 
analyzer itself.  A realization of large systems with thousands of components is simply 
not feasible through a traditional NA.  VLSI is the solution.  Neural network computation 
methods is a VLSI example being studied [16, 17] along with Evolvable Hardware (EH) 
[18].  In this thesis, the main analog components for modeling of power systems in 
analog hardware are Operational Transconductance Amplifiers (OTAs).  OTAs are 
fundamental building blocks of VLSI circuits.  OTA technology specifically lends itself 
well to fabrication on a large scale and allows for remote reconfiguration via a 
controllable gain.  This technology is paving the way toward programmability in a large-
scale analog emulator for power systems. 
1.2.3 DIGITAL COMPUTATION IN POWER SYSTEMS 
Initially digital computers were limited to offline studies and simulated power 
system phenomena much slower than real time.  Despite this limitation they became 
immensely popular due to easy use, programming and automation.  As the technology 
matured and became more powerful, research into digital network analyzers began [23-
26].  These efforts were moving towards real time digital computation.  This has resulted 
in the release of commercial real time simulators by RTDS Technologies [19] and 
HyperSim [20] by Hydro-Quebec.  These analyzers are essentially a collection of 
processors in parallel.  They show promise but are arguably more complex in comparison 
to analog network analyzers and still have problems associated with digital computation. 
The basic approach to achieve parallel computation in power systems with this 
method is to associate an independent processor or process with each power system 
component (transmission lines, generators, loads, etc.) or a set of components.  Other 
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methods dedicate a processor to each bus in the power system [21].  In contrast to an 
analog approach these digital methods require a vast array of complex devices 
(processors) sharing resources (memory) to construct and simulate a power system.  In 
addition, these methods are approaching and/or reaching real time by increasing the 
incremental step size of computation and are not continuous mathematically as analog 
methods are.  Currently available real time simulators are extremely expensive even for 
small system simulation.  With current technology this approach is not viable for an 
online application, such as power system assessment, for a large system. 
1.3 MOTIVATION 
 An overview of power system operation is shown in Figure 3.  This is a closed 
loop process with human (system operators) intervention.  The process is commonly 
referred to as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA).  The system 
operators dispatch generation, control circuit breakers and switches based on detailed 
system information.  This detailed information is provided through system measurement 
and analysis which is currently done through digital computers.  Due to limitations of 
digital computers the information provided is typically incomplete (e.g. limited 
contingency analysis) and sometimes in the worst case absent all together (e.g. state 
estimator fails to converge).  The failure of a state estimator was a leading cause of the 
August 2003 blackout in North America [22].  Based on the findings in this report it is 
evident that if better information is provided to system operators the system can be 
controlled in a more secure and efficient manner.  Due to high computation efficiency an 
analog method could provide more robust power system security analysis hence 
providing system operators with better information.  A more ambitious possibility would 
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 Presently digital computers analyze the power system security through state 
estimation, contingency analysis and SCOPF.  Ideally state estimation would be 
conducted in real time and a thorough contingency analysis, including dynamic stability, 
be performed.  Current digital computer technology cannot achieve this.  State estimation 
is not done in real time; limited contingencies are studied and are restricted to static 
analysis.  No online dynamic stability analysis is performed.  Analog computation could 
potentially achieve the desired analyses and increase the reliability and security of the 
power system. 
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 For the most part the power grid is extremely reliable.  The majority of power 
outages are alleviated quickly and do not result in any major problems.  Unfortunately the 
outages that are not alleviated quickly or easily tend to cause more serious problems 
especially economically.  In addition, with the interconnection present in the power grid 
cascading failures are becoming more and more common and are of great concern in 
planning and operation stages.  These failures affect large areas of power transmission 
and distribution systems and require significant time to fix the problems and bring 
equipment back online.  A study published in 2004 by Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (Berkeley Labs) estimated that power outages result in monetary losses of 
eighty billion dollars annually [23] in America.  With economic effects of that magnitude 
the motivation to push for even higher reliability of electric power is warranted.  Some 
companies are so sensitive to power outages they build and operate their own power 
generation stations (cogeneration) to supplement utility power and to provide for critical 
loads in the event of a utility blackout.  This is popular in manufacturing facilities where 
hours of downtime result in millions of dollars in losses of revenue.  Table 2 [24] details 
the revenue loss in dollars per hour of operation and per employee-hour for different 















 Improving grid reliability makes sense economically.  Better reliability can be 
achieved by improving the infrastructure of the power system along with maintenance of 
the current system.  The most critical component is in power system operation.  This is 
where faster computation can lead to improved reliability.  Power system operators want 
to economically dispatch electrical energy while allowing for system faults 
(contingencies) without loss of power to customers.  This particular analysis requires 
massive computational efforts specifically related to contingency analysis and dynamic 
stability.  Furthermore, this problem is growing even worse with the trend of 
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deregulation.  Prior to deregulation each utility locally operated their power system with 
minimal or no interaction with other utilities.  The analysis was mainly limited to a single 
utility’s power system.  Now Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO), such as PJM, 
operate huge sections of the power grid and are required to run these analyses on systems 
with tens of thousands of nodes or buses.  It is not feasible with current digital 
computation technology to run all the desired analysis while operating the system.  
Simplifying assumptions are made along with approximations on failure modes to speed 
up the processes and meet the demands of power system operation.  If real-time 
computational tools are developed more thorough analyses could be conducted without 
the need for as many assumptions and shortcuts.  Properly applied this increase in system 
analysis for real-time operations would allow better power system operation and higher 
reliability. 
1.4 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 The objective of this work is to develop necessary analog computation theory and 
methodology to utilize an analog computer for power system security assessment.  In 
addition, for benchmarking and proof of concept, an analog emulator is designed and 
prototyped.  Particularly it is desirable that the analog hardware be fast, accurate, 
remotely reconfigurable, and scalable for large system modeling and have the capability 
to be implemented into a VLSI design.  These characteristics are necessary for an online 




1.  Analog computation theory and methodology for power system security 
assessment 
2.  Power system models and hardware for analog computation 
3.  Computational algorithms and software for running the proposed analog 
computer 
 
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
 Information and theory for current methods of power system security assessment 
are provided in chapter two.  Chapter three details the proposed method of analog power 
system security assessment and associated analog computation theory.  Chapter four 
covers the methodology, power system models, and hardware of an analog power system 
emulator.  Chapter five encompasses the proposed methodology for analog power system 
security assessment.  Examples, results and analysis are presented in chapter six.   In 
conclusion chapter seven summarizes the work presented in this dissertation and 
highlights the major contributions.  In addition, future research paths are discussed. 
 19
2 POWER SYSTEM SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
 This chapter provides an overview on power system security assessment.  
Included is a summary of the theory and implementation of digital methods.  The power 
system models, measurement models, computation methods, and limitations are 
presented.  The modeling and theoretical information was gathered from [3, 25, 26].  A 
diagram detailing the current process of power system security is shown in Figure 4 [25].  
 Power system security is divided into three distinct tasks.  Specifically these tasks 
are network model building (system monitoring), contingency analysis and secure 
optimal dispatch of generation.  The inputs to this process are measurements acquired 
from the system.  From these measurements, and knowledge of the power system 
structure, the current status of the system, both structurally (breaker/switch status, 
component status, etc.) and electrically (voltages, currents, power flows), is estimated.  
The estimation process consists of several subtasks. 
 In order to accurately estimate the electrical status of the system the physical 
structure, or topology, of the system must be known, the measurement data must be 
accurate, and the states to be estimated must be observable.  The topology processor 
models the structure of the system based on knowledge of the system and measurement 
data.  For example, if a line power flow is measured to be zero it could be reasonable to 
assume the line is not in service and eliminate it from the topology of the system.  
However, this line could still be in service and simply not transmitting any power based 
on the current operating point of the system.  The topology processor needs to decide 
whether or not this line, and other components, is in service or not.  In addition, there are 
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external systems which are interconnected to the system being operated.  These must also 
be accounted for in the topology processor.  Typically information from external systems 
such as parameters and structure are not easily obtained.  The external system is often 
modeled through an equivalent circuit at the bus, which interconnects the two systems.  










 Before the states are estimated the system is first checked for observability.  If all 
states are observable, the state estimator provides an estimate of the system states.  Bad 
data is detected through post processing of the state estimator output.  If bad data is 
detected it is removed and the state estimator is run again.  Once a good estimate is found 
contingency analysis and secure optimal dispatch are conducted.  This overall process 
requires tremendous computational power for a large nonlinear system and has certain 
limitations due to the current methods and technology. 
2.2 DIGITAL METHODOLOGY 
 The power system is inherently non-linear and solution routines require iterative 
numerical methods.  This results in an exponential increase in computation time as the 
system being analyzed increases in size.  In addition, numerical instability can also arise.  
Much research has been conducted to decrease the computation time necessary to 
conduct power system security assessment.  This includes, but is not limited to, limiting 
the number of cases being studied, decreasing the size of the system being examined and 
linearization/simplification of system models.  Linearization of the power system models 
in particular results in a drastic increase in computation time but the accuracy of the 
results is insufficient for the purpose of security assessment.  For example, the DC load 
flow methodology does not provide information on bus voltage magnitudes which is an 
important metric in evaluating system security. 
2.2.1 POWER SYSTEM MODELS 
 Power system models can be separated into two classes, specifically dynamic and 
steady-state.  Power system dynamics are typically modeled by non-linear ordinary 
differential equations (ODEs).  Traditional digital methods for solving such equations, for 
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example Euler’s method, discretize the process and solve the equations for numerous 
points in time.  The solution is then an estimate of the trajectory, or response of the 
system variables.  Due to the nature of digital computation the step size of these solutions 
methods is finite.  This is generally perceived as an approximate solution with errors and 
potential numerical instability.  As step size decreases more accurate results can be 
obtained.  However, a smaller step size increases computation time.  With these 
techniques, current digital methods are not fast enough to perform dynamic analysis of 
large systems online.  In order to speed up power system assessment a steady-state model 
of the power system is used for most analyses.  In particular, power flow analysis is 
predominating in the security assessment procedure. 
 The basic power system model for power flow analysis is broken up into two 
main parts, the power system network and the power injections into the network.  The 
network consists of transmission lines and transformers while the power injections are 
generators (positive injection of power) and loads (negative injection of power/power 
consumption).  To further simplify analysis the system is often modeled with one phase 
instead of three.  The assumption is that the system is balanced, or near balanced, across 
all three phases.  A one line diagram of a five bus power system is shown in Figure 5 
which is indicative of the single phase model of the power system.  The generators are 
modeled as power injections, GiS , where i is the bus number where the generator is 
injecting power.  In a similar fashion the loads are modeled as power injections DiS .  The 





Figure 5:  Five Bus Power System 
 
 
 The network of transmission lines and transformers transmit electrical power 
through the power system.  A common method of analyzing the steady-state behavior of 
the network is through parameterization and modeling of the lines and transformers.  
Typically, each component of the network is modeled as a two-port network of passive 
components.  The passive components used in this modeling approach are resistors, 
capacitors and inductors.  The quantity of these parameters depends mainly on the 
conductors used and the physical or geometrical configuration of the lines and 
transformers.  The conductors themselves will have certain characteristics, such as series 
resistance and reactance and shunt impedances from the terminals to electrical ground.  In 
addition, there is inherently mutual inductance, or coupling, of the lines with respect to 
each other and in the transformers between the cores as they are bundled together or 
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placed in close proximity to one another in a multi-phase system.  With the power system 
normalized to a per-unit system both transformers and transmission lines can be modeled 
as impedances between two buses as shown in Figure 6.  By modeling the network as an 
interconnection of impedance elements a bus admittance matrix can be used to 








 The nodal currents are related to the nodal voltages through the bus admittance 
matrix as follows: 
 
 busI  Y V=  (2.1) 
 
where for an n bus power system: 
I   n x 1 vector of injected node currents 
Ybus   n x n bus admittance matrix 
V   n x 1 vector of node voltages 
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The power system network can also be modeled as an impedance matrix (inverse of the 
admittance matrix).  However, for most analyses the Ybus representation is used.  For 
details in building admittance and impedance matrices refer to [26]. 
 Generators and loads are modeled as power injections into the network.  
Generally speaking generators are modeled as PV buses.  More specifically they maintain 
constant power injection (P) and constant bus voltage magnitude (V).  Assuming a 
generator has not reached its reactive power limits this is a fairly accurate model for 
steady-state analysis.  Underlying assumptions are that there is sufficient regulation of the 
electrical power output and voltage magnitude through the mechanical input power 
(prime mover), and terminal voltage through the exciter.  The Loads on the other hand 
are modeled as PQ buses indicating constant real (P) and reactive (Q) power.  
Numerically the analysis is usually conducted in polar coordinates.  Each voltage and 
current is represented by a magnitude and a phase.  The phase in particular requires a 
reference point.  Usually one bus in the system is defined as the reference, or slack, bus.  
This bus is modeled as a voltage source with a known voltage magnitude and phase.  
Power flow methods are formulated based on this model or slight variations.  The basic 
power flow problem is defined as the determination of system voltages and currents 
based on known power injections.  For further details on power flow and iteration 
schemes, such as Newton-Raphson and Gauss-Seidel, refer to chapter 10 in [26].  The 
other class of power system modeling comprises dynamic models. 
 There exist many rich models for dynamic analysis of power systems.  These 
models incorporate machine dynamics for generators and motor loads along with electro-
magnetic dynamics for the network.  Typically system dynamics are completely 
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neglected for static security assessment.  When system dynamics are incorporated for 
dynamic security assessment the electromagnetic and load dynamics are generally 
neglected to speed up computation.  Only generator dynamics are included in the system 
model.  The generator dynamics are modeled using the swing equation relating 
mechanical power input from the prime mover, MP , to the electrical power output eP : 
 
 ( )e MM D P Pδ δ δ•• •+ + =  (2.2) 
 
where: 
  δ   phase angle of the internal generator voltage 
  M   generator inertial coefficient 
  D    generator damping coefficient 
 
The resulting model of the power system consists of dynamic power injections from the 
generators dictated by equation (2.2) and steady-state line and load models as previously 
outlined.  The measurement equipment embedded in the system is also modeled. 
2.2.2 MEASUREMENT MODELS 
 Limited sets of measurements from the power system are provided to the system 
operators.  Economically it is not feasible to measure every state in the system so a state 
estimator is used to estimate all the states of the system based on the system structure and 
measurements.  The measurements obtained are inherently noisy and contain errors.  
Some measurements may contain very large errors if there is a problem with the sensor 
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itself.  The presence of error in measurement will naturally result in errors in state 
estimation.  To mitigate the effects of measurement error, a detailed model of 
measurements, including error, are required.  This section provides an overview of a 
measurement model which is utilized in state estimation. 
 Measurements obtained from the power system can be categorized as one of two 
types, measurement of an electrical quantity or the status of a switching element.  The 
latter is discrete in nature, while the former is continuous.  The status of a switching 
element is simply modeled as on or off.  Errors in switch status measurement are also 
discrete.  An error would be reporting incorrectly the status of the switch.  For example, a 
measurement indicating a switch is open when in the system it is actually closed.  
Continuous quantities require a more advanced measurement model that accounts for 
uncertainty. 
 A continuous measurement will never be precise and will always contain some 
error.  The concept of “random measurement error” has been used to formulate a detailed 
measurement model [3].  Assuming the measurement device provides a reading that is 
close to the true value and contains some unknown error the following model has been 
derived: 
 
 meas truez z η= +  (2.3) 
 
where: 
  measz    value of the measurement received from a measurement device 
  truez    unknown true value of the quantity being measured 
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  η    random measurement error 
 
The random measurement error, η , represents the uncertainty present in measurement.  
Typically, it is assumed that there is no bias present in the measurement.  With this 
assumption the probability density function (PDF) of η  can be chosen as a Gaussian, or 









⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=  (2.4) 
 
where σ is defined as the standard deviation and 2σ the variance of η .  With these 
parameters the model can be tuned to the specific measurement device.  For example, a 
device which has a large measurement error will have a relatively large standard 
deviation as compared to a very accurate measurement device.  This PDF is depicted 
graphically in Figure 7.  Other PDFs could be chosen to model the uncertain 
measurement error but “normal distribution is commonly used for modeling measurement 
error since it is the distribution that will result when many factors contribute to the 
overall error.” [3]  Another factor which is important when conducting security 
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Figure 7: Gaussian Probability Density Function 
 
 
2.2.3 TOPOLOGY PROCESSING 
 Topology processing is a procedure for determining the structure of the power 
system.  This process determines the connectivity of the network (location of 
transmission lines, loads, generators, etc.), meter locations, and the status of switches and 
circuit breakers.  Correct determination of topology is critical to other tasks in power 
system security assessment.  Inherently if the topology of the power system is incorrectly 
identified, all further analysis based on the topology is flawed.  For example, an accurate 
state estimate may never be found as topology errors can appear as measurement errors in 
post processing of state estimation.  In addition, contingency analysis specifically 
examines the system response to a list of topology changes.  With an incorrect initial 
topology the pre contingency and post contingency topologies will be incorrect resulting 
in erroneous solutions. 
 Topology processing is a difficult task due to the complex structure of an 
interconnected power system.  Figure 5 is a simplified one line electrical diagram of the 
physical structure of the power system.  This simplified diagram, with the addition of 
meter types and locations, is the output of the topology processor.  In order to determine 
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the topology, and the corresponding one-line diagram, a more detailed bus-
section/switching device view of the system is required as proposed in [27].  An example 








 This example system consists of five nodes (numbered on through five), two 
measurement devices, four switching devices (numbered S1 through S4) which represent 
physical switches or circuit breakers, along with a generator and transmission line.  
Physically the number of possible switch states is 2n  where n  is defined as the number 
of switches.  For this example there are 24, or 16, potential physical configurations.  The 
possible electrical configurations of the system are a subset of the physical 
configurations.  For example, if all switches are closed the electrical configuration would 
result in a two bus system as shown in Figure 9.  Through inspection it can be determined 
that if any three switches are closed the same two bus electrical configuration would 
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result.  Examining all sixteen switching states yields twelve potential electrical 
configurations.  Graph theory can be utilized to determine how many unique electrical 




Figure 9: Electrical Configuration 
 
 
 The power system topology is determined based on the known bus-
section/switching device diagram and system measurements.  The topology is not always 
easily determined.  In certain cases insufficient measurements can result in multiple 
potential topologies.  In addition, erroneous data could lead to incorrect identification of 
topology.  Data is preprocessed and checked for consistency to help correctly determine 
the topology.  Basic tests on the data include verification of operating limits, checking for 
non-zero flows in open switches and for non-zero voltage difference across closed 
switches.  These tests can help identify erroneous or inconsistent data and lead to more 
accurate topology processing.  State estimation is performed after the topology is 
determined. 
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2.2.4 STATE ESTIMATION 
 The purpose of state estimation is to approximate the state variables of the system 
based on measurements.  In power systems the state variable are usually defined as the 
magnitude and phase of nodal voltages.  This is a statistical process due to the nature of 
the measurements.  There are numerous statistical criteria that could be applied such as 
maximum likelihood, weighted-least-squares (WLS) or minimum variance.  WLS is one 
of the more common criteria and is presented here.  This derivation was obtained from 
[3]. 
 The WLS state estimation problem is formulated as a minimization “of the sum of 
the squares of the difference between each measured value and the true value being 
measured (expressed as a function of our unknown parameter)” [3].  The difference of 
squares is “weighted” based on the measurement accuracy.  More specifically they are 
weighted by the variance of the meter error.  The minimization expression when 
estimating a single parameter is: 
 











−=∑  (2.5) 
where 
  if    function relating the state to the ith measurement 
  2iσ    variance of the ith measurement 
  ( )J x    measurement residual 
  mN    number of independent measurements 
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  measiz    ith measured quantity 
 
This formulation is easily expanded for estimating any number of states.  For estimating 
Ns states with Nm measurements: 













z f x x x
J x x x σ=
−=∑  (2.6) 
 
This can be written in the following form 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1min meas measz f x z f x
x
J x R−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (2.7) 
 













⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
#  (2.8) 
















⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
#  (2.9) 
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⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
%  (2.10) 
 
 If ( )f x  is linear it can be put in the form ( ) [ ]f x xH=  where [ ]H  is an Nm by Ns 
matrix containing the coefficients of the functions ( )xif .  In linear form equation (2.7) 
can be solved directly for the estimate of the states.  The states resulting in the minimum 
( )J x  can be found by setting the gradient of the residual equal to zero and solving for 
the states.  Expanding equation (2.7) and taking the gradient yields: 
 
 ( ) [ ] [ ] [ ]1 12 2measx z xT TJ H R H R H− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∇ = − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (2.11) 
 
With ( ) 0xJ∇ =  the estimates states estx can be solved for by: 
 
 [ ] [ ] [ ]11 1est measx zT TH R H H R−− −⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  (2.12) 
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 It is clear that in order to solve equation (2.12) that the inverse of 
[ ] [ ]1TH R H−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  must exist.  The inverse exists if the states being estimated are 
observable.  If the states are not observable a singularity will be present and the state 
estimate cannot be found.  In practical terms, so long as there are a sufficient number of 
non-redundant measurements observability will be maintained.  If observability of the 
system cannot be maintained a subset of the system can still be estimated.  Those states 
that are unobservable need to be removed from estimation procedure.  Often times if 
there are not sufficient measurements pseudo-measurements can be implemented to gain 
observability.  A pseudo-measurement is an unmeasured value determined based on 
knowledge of the system.  For example, the generator power output is typically 
maintained very close to the dispatched value.  Assuming this generator is operating 
properly the real power injection can be used as a pseudo-measurement in the state 
estimator without measurement.  Typically in power systems the state estimation problem 
is overdetermined.  More specifically the number of measurements is greater than the 
number of states being estimated ( )m sN N> .  This allows for a better and more robust 
estimate as compared to completely determined or underdetermined cases. 
 A closed form solution for estimation only exists for linear systems, or more 
specifically when the functions ( )f x  are linear.  For AC power systems the functions 
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( )xJ  terms for real and reactive power flows across a transmission line from bus i to 
bus j  would then be: 
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and 
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⎡ ⎤− − + − − −⎣ ⎦  (2.15) 
 
 Due to the nonlinear nature of ( )xJ  a closed form solution to equation (2.6) 
does not exist.  To solve this equation iterative approaches, such as Newton’s method, are 
required.  The process is similar to that of solving AC power flow.  Initial conditions are 
specified for estx and updated each iteration until it converges to a feasible solution that 
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The Jacobian of ( )f x  is defined as: 
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equation (2.16) can then be written as: 
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⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥∇ = − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦
#  (2.18) 
 
 This form is analogous to equation (2.11) and can be solved by using an iterative 
method.  The state estimation procedure as shown here assumes that the system topology 
is correct and that the measurement data is good.  If this is not the case the resulting 
estimate will be poor.  Post processing of the state estimation result can provide insight 
and determine if bad data is present or topology errors exist. 
 A simple check for measurement accuracy is to examine the residual of each state 
based on the estimate as shown in equation (2.19).  If the measurement measiz  is bad the 
resulting residual, ( )iJ x , will be large.  A hypothesis testing approach can be applied to 
detect the presence of a bad measurement.  Topology errors will also cause large 
residuals and can be incorrectly identified as bad measurements using this technique.  It 
is difficult to discern between bad data and topology errors without adjusting the 
topology, re-estimating the states, and processing the results again.  It would be 
advantageous to have a technique which can easily identify the source of the error. 
 








−=  (2.19) 
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2.2.5 CONTINGENCY ANALYSIS 
 Contingency analysis analyzes the power system response to an outage of a 
component or multiple components.  Typically an outage of a single device per 
contingency is investigated.  This is commonly referred to as ‘n-1’ contingency analysis 
where the system consists of n devices and analysis is performed with the loss of one 
device.  Contingencies consisting of multiple outages can be handled in a similar fashion 
but the discussion here is limited to n-1 contingency analysis.  Due to the number of 
simulations required for n-2 contingency analysis it is hardly ever conducted during 
system operation.  Sometimes a select few multiple outage contingencies are examined, 
but not a full analysis.  A flowchart for a typical contingency analysis procedure is 
outlined in Figure 10.   
 The initialized system model is obtained from the topology processor and state 
estimator.  This initialized system is simulated numerous times for the loss of any single 
generator or any single line.  The results of each contingency are analyzed for stability 
and line flows/voltage levels are checked against predefined limits for violations.  If any 
violations or instabilities are present they are flagged and further analyzed during 
SCOPF.  Contingency analysis is historically broken up into two distinct types.  Dynamic 
contingency analysis, commonly referred to as Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA), and 
steady-state contingency analysis. 
 It is desirable to simulate a detailed power system model in the time domain for 
each contingency.  This provides the best and most accurate information concerning 
system stability.  However, due to computational constraints this cannot be performed 
during system operation.  Much research has been conducted to develop methods for 
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contingency analysis suitable for real time [28-32].  Numerous methods have been 
developed to allow for faster computation.  Popular techniques are outlined below: 
 
  1.  Run a limited number of selected important contingencies [28-30] 
  2.  Utilize faster, non-time domain dynamic simulation techniques (e.g. 
       Energy function methods) [31] 
  3.  Utilize steady-state simulation techniques and neglect dynamic   
       stability [28, 29] 
  4.  Run time domain simulations on a subset of the whole system or for a  
        short time frame [30]  
 
 Contingency selection, or screening, is a technique which attempts to identify 
contingencies that are most threatening to system operation and only conduct analysis on 
this limited set of cases.  Inherently this is a subset of all system contingencies.  If this 
subset can be identified with a degree of accuracy then only a small number of actual 
contingencies are required to be computed for security purposes.  This results in a 
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Figure 10: Contingency Analysis Procedure 
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 The basic premise of contingency selection is to perform some quick, 
approximate, analyses for each contingency and rank them according to severity.  
Performance indices (PI) have been introduced for this purpose.  An overload 














  flowP A    power flow on line A  
  maxP
A    maximum power flow on line A  
  n    parameter for the performance index 
 
 The PI is computed for each contingency and the contingencies are ranked based 
on this index.  The power flow on each line can be approximated quickly by either 
linearized DC power flow or by a single iteration of an AC power flow method.  Once the 
contingencies are ranked a decision needs to be made on which contingencies are further 
analyzed.  Those contingencies with a relatively high PI will be run but it is a cost benefit 
decision to determine the cutoff point where cases are no longer simulated.  Many other 
performance indices can be formulated and defined.  For example, bus voltage magnitude 
could be incorporated into the index although this would require AC analysis.  Through 
contingency selection computation time is substantially reduced.  However, important 
contingencies could inadvertently be filtered out based on the definition and robustness of 
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the performance index, and the quality of the fast approximate analysis performed to 
quantify the index.  In practice this screening technique is utilized heavily in both 
dynamic and steady-state contingency analysis. 
 Steady-state contingency analysis performs all computation using a steady-state 
model of the power system.  All dynamics are neglected.  A basic approach is to 
incorporate the contingency into the power system model and perform a power flow.  The 
result is then analyzed for limit violations.  A full AC power flow technique is preferable 
although DC power flow and linear sensitivity techniques based on partial derivatives are 
often used to speed up computation.  This steady-state analysis provides little information 
on power system stability.  Low voltage magnitude results from an AC power flow are 
indicative of voltage stability problems but further analysis is required verify system 
stability. 
 The main objective for dynamic contingency analysis is to determine if the system 
maintains stability for a given disturbance, or contingency.  A power system stability 
definition has been proposed as “the ability of an electric power system, for a given initial 
operating condition, to regain a state of operating equilibrium after being subjected to a 
physical disturbance, with most system variables bounded so that practically the entire 
system remains intact” [33].  The most accurate way to determine stability is to perform a 
full time domain simulation on the system.  For dynamic contingency analysis it is not 
feasible to conduct a full time domain simulation of a large system.  Specific tools have 
been developed in order to speed up this process.  These tools analyze subsets of the 
overall problem of dynamic stability. 
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 Dynamic stability of power systems has been recently defined with three forms of 
stability [33]: 
 
1. Rotor Angle Stability (Transient Stability): refers to the ability of 
synchronous machines of an interconnected power system to remain in 
synchronism after being subjected to a disturbance. 
2.  Voltage Stability: refers to the ability of a power system to maintain steady 
voltages at all buses in the system after being subjected to a disturbance from 
a given initial operating condition. 
3.  Frequency Stability: refers to the ability of a power system to maintain steady 
frequency following a severe system upset resulting in a significant imbalance 
between generation and load. 
 
 This classification is a subset of the broad problem of power system stability.  
State of the art tools for fast dynamic contingency analysis examine transient stability and 
voltage stability.  Frequency stability is usually not examined during operation.  For 
small disturbances a linearized analysis through eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the 
system yield approximate results very quickly.  This analysis is sufficient for small 
disturbances but inaccurate for larger disturbances.  For large disturbances energy 
function techniques have been proposed [31] with some success.  However, the energy 
methods are limited to single swing analysis and do not always correctly determine the 
stability of the system.  As for voltage stability techniques, the fast approximate methods 
utilize quasi-dynamic time domain simulations. 
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2.2.6 COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE AND LIMITATIONS 
 As outlined in this chapter the overall computational procedure for power system 
security assessment consists of topology estimation, state estimation and contingency 
analysis.  This process requires numerous calculations which increase in number as the 
system being studied increases in size.  In addition, the computation time for each 
calculation increases with system size.  For example, the solution time of the Newton-
Raphson algorithm is a quadratic function of system size.  The computation time is so 
significant due to the nonlinear nature of power systems.  Listed below are some specific 
limitations of state of the art methods of power system security assessment: 
 
 1.  Iterative solution methods are required. 
 2.  Numerical instability exists in solution methods. 
 3.  Simplified power system models are required in many analyses. 
 4.  Limited number and types of analyses are performed due to time constraints. 
 5.  Many solutions are approximated with linearized/fast solution methods. 
 
 Despite these limitations the operation of the power system remains fairly secure 
and the reliability very high.  This is generally achieved by operating the power system in 
a conservative manner.  With this in mind, there is much room for improvement in 
security assessment.  Many of the existing limitations can be overcome by a drastic 
increase in computational resources.  There is a great deal of research and development 
of large parallel processing and cluster computing systems to yield more computational 
power.  However, for operation and security of large power systems (thousands of buses) 
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this is simply not economically feasible to implement such a system at this time.  In 
addition, numerical stability issues will remain.  Another approach, which is proposed 
and investigated in this dissertation, is to apply a different computational methodology to 
the problem.  The next chapter provides an overview of the theory and methodology 
pertaining to the application of analog computers to power system security assessment. 
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3 ANALOG METHOD FOR POWER SYSTEM SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
 This chapter provides an overview of the proposed approach to power system 
security assessment by means of analog computation.  A summary of theory and 
progression of analog computation is included.  Some of the concepts for analog 
computation are similar to those of digital methods, for example, the requirements of 
initial conditions for integration.  Other concepts are unique to analog methods.  New 
analog computation concepts necessary for this work are clearly defined and explained in 
this chapter.  In conclusion, the necessary requirements, both theoretical and 
computational, to implement an analog approach to power system security assessment are 
identified. 
3.1 ANALOG COMPUTATION THEORY 
 Historically analog computation has been limited mostly to offline applications in 
power systems.  Generally speaking, with the exception of analog controllers, analog 
computation has never been utilized as an online tool.  However, new advancements and 
research are indicating it is possible to apply analog methods in online applications.  
Specifically, advancements in microelectronics, such as remote control, reconfigurability, 
and VLSI, are paving the way for future analog computation applications.  However, 
unlike digital computation, analog methods do not have the benefit of mature 
computational theory. 
 In the infancy of computation theory, long before digital computers, Alan Turing 
and Alonzo Church provided some basic theoretical framework.  Turing went so far as to 
clearly define an abstraction of a computer called a “Turing machine” which was used 
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heavily in his efforts in computation.  Turing’s work paved the way for subsequent 
computation techniques and theories. 
 A Turing machine is purely conceptual.  There have been many examples and 
refinements over time but the machine was never meant to be constructed, or for that 
matter viewed as a practical computational tool.  In retrospect, the basic Turing machine 
is essentially a finite state machine operating in a sequential manner.  Turing’s main 
purpose for the machine was thought experiments.  These thought experiments allowed 
for the development and refinement of rich computation theory. 
 Turing published much of his work on computation in a publication titled “On 
Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.” [34]  Turing 
deduced that “Logical computing machines (i.e. Turing machines) can do anything that 
could be described as rule of thumb or purely mechanical” [35].  In related work, Church 
developed a definition to ascertain the computability of a function.  He defined a function 
as “effectively calculable” if there is an effective method for calculating the values of the 
function.  This led to a combined Church-Turing theory.  This theory states that if an 
algorithm exists then an equivalent Turing machine for this algorithm also exists.  In 
other words any problem in which a solution method can be defined recursively through 
an algorithm is intrinsically computable.  With this theory, in addition to the development 
of computers, it can be deduced that a computer can be constructed to solve any 
effectively calculable function.  In the work presented here an analog computer has been 
constructed to emulate the behavior of a power system. 
 Emulation is defined as “When one system performs in exactly the same way as 
another, though perhaps not at the same speed” [36].  The emulator developed here 
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represents a large jump from the thought experiment Turing machines.  Due to inherent 
differences, and the application to power system security assessment, some new terms 
and theory are introduced for analog computation and system emulation.  The first 
definition deals specifically with computability in analog computers: 
 
Analog Computable:  A function, or set of functions is analog computable if for a given 
set of input(s) an analog method can provide a correct output. 
 
 This is a more general definition, which is applicable to any function and any 
form of analog computation.  For example, this can be applied to a mechanical 
differential analyzer, a general purpose analog computer, or an analog emulator as in this 
work.  Generally speaking, this definition states that for a predefined function, or set of 
functions, and given input(s), the value(s) of the function(s) can be provided by the 
analog method only if the problem is analog computable.  In other words a set of m  
functions with n  inputs as shown in equation (3.1) is analog computable if it can be 
evaluated and solved with an analog method.  The correct output is defined as an output 
of the analog method that satisfies the defined function(s) based on the input(s).  An 
answer, or correct output, can be unique in the case of many-to-one or one-to-one 
functions or multiple solutions can exist for multiple-valued functions.  Computability 
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 Analog computability can be determined for any arbitrary set of functions and 
inputs for any analog method.  The evaluation of computability is deterministic.  The 
problem is either computable or not computable.  Specifically in this research the focus is 
on analog computation of power systems.  The following lemmas clarify the concept of 
analog computability as applied to power system analysis. 
 Power system analysis is traditionally separated into static, or steady-state, and 
dynamic analyses.  Static analysis provides information at an equilibrium point of the 
system.  More specifically, it is assumed that the states of the system are not changing 
with time and averaged values of states are used.  Root-mean-square values of voltages 
and currents are used in power system analysis.  Dynamic analysis provides information 
on the behavior of the power system over an interval of time where the states are 
changing.  The following two lemmas elucidate computability for power systems in both 
static and dynamic cases respectively. 
 
Lemma 1:  Analog computability in a steady-state sense is determined based on the static 
functions modeling the power system and the set of inputs to the analog computer. 
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 The functions that model the power system are derived from the power system 
structure, parameters, and component models.  For example, for an n  bus AC power 
system the current injections can be modeled as a function of bus voltages: 
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  ii   the complex current injection into bus i  
  iv   the complex voltage at bus i  
  ijy  the complex element of the Ybus matrix in row i , column j  
 
Generally speaking the power system states are known if all voltage and current 
injections are known.  In this formulation the power system is computable if all n  bus 
voltages (2n inputs as these voltages are complex) are provided as an input to an analog 
method that has an output proportional to the function ( )1 2, ,..., nf v v v .  More specifically, 
the output of the analog method should be linearly proportional based on the time and 
magnitude scaling, if present, between power system values and analog method values.  
However, this formulation of steady-state computability of the power system is not 
unique.  The following representation is equivalent to equation (3.2) and computable if 
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all the current injections are provided as an input to an analog method that has an output 
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 Another formulation of power system steady-state behavior is to relate current 
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  is   power injection into bus i  
  ijv   element of the bus voltage matrix in row i , column j  
 
The bus voltage matrix is defined based on the complex power flowing through a branch 
of the power system network: 
 
 *ij ij ijS V I=  (3.5) 
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where 
  ijS   the power flowing from bus i to bus j  
  ij i jV V V= −  
  ijI   the current flowing from bus i to bus j  
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For diagonal entries: 
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 Equation (3.4) expresses current injections into the power system as a function of 
power injection.  This formulation is analogous to the traditional power flow problem.  
Traditionally, the power flow problem is defined as solving for voltages based on power 
injections.  However, solving for currents is analogous to solving for voltages as 
previously shown in equations (3.2) and (3.3).  Similar to power flow equation (3.4) is 
computable in a digital sense.  An iterative approach such as Newton-Raphson could be 
used to solve the equation.  The problem is computable in an analog sense if all the power 
injections are provided as an input to an analog method that has an output proportional to 
( )1 2, ,..., nf s s s .  A more general computability formulation for steady-state power system 
analysis can be formulated if the analog method for computation is more clearly defined. 
 If an analog method that behaves, or has the same functional behavior, like the 
power system network exists, then question of computability can be determined by 























This representation handles the relationship of current to both voltages and power 
injections.  Computability for an n  bus system requires a total of n  voltages and power 
injections as inputs ( )m q n+ = .  Another specification for computability is that there 
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exists only one input per bus.  In other words, either a voltage or power injection at each 
bus is required as an input.  This equation reduces to equation (3.2) if the only inputs are 
voltages and equation (3.4) if the only inputs are power injections.  An analogous form of 
this equation can also be written in which current and power injections are inputs and bus 
voltages the output.  It is also common in power system analysis to have inputs that are 
only a component of the bus voltage or power injection.  For example, a generator bus is 
often modeled as a PV bus in which the voltage magnitude and real power injection are 
specified.  This type of input can be handled with the following representation of the 
power system where the inputs are m  bus voltage magnitudes, r  bus voltage angles, 
p real power injections, and  q  reactive power injections: 
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  V   an m x 1 vector of bus voltage magnitudes 
  θ  an r  x 1 vector of bus voltage angles 
  P   a p  x 1 vector of real power injections 
  Q   a q x 1 vector of reactive power injections 
  VY   an n  x m  matrix relating current injections to bus voltage   
  magnitudes 
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  Yθ   an n  x r  matrix relating current injections to bus voltage   
  angles 
  PV   an n  x p  matrix relating current injections to real power injections 
  QV   an n  x q  matrix relating current injections to reactive power   
  injections 
 
Computability in the steady-state sense is achieved if: 
 
 2m r p q n+ + + =  (3.11) 
 
It is clear that the set of inputs to yield computability is not unique.  Many different sets 
of inputs can be defined which result in computability.  The next lemma deals with 
analog computability for dynamic cases. 
 
Lemma 2: Analog computability in a dynamic sense is determined based on the 
differential equations modeling the power system and the set of inputs to the analog 
computer.  An nth order system that can be represented in canonical form is computable 
in an analog sense if and only if a computable set of n first order differential equations 
can be obtained. 
 
 Power system dynamics are typically modeled by non-linear ordinary differential 
equations (ODEs).  Traditional digital methods provide approximate solutions with errors 
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and potential numerical instability.  Computability becomes hard to identify when 
approximate solutions are obtained.  The following are questions often linked with digital 
computability: How much numerical error is required before the solution is deemed 
incorrect, and hence incomputable?  How do you insure the instability of a system during 
simulation is not due to numerical instability?  Intrinsically analog techniques integrate 
continuously and do not have this particular problem.  This is analogous to an infinitely 
small step size in digital methods. 
 Analog computability can be determined by simply analyzing the differential 
equations and inputs to the system.  For example, a second order generator model has 
been shown in equation (2.2).  This equation can be solved by analog methods by direct 
integration (in this case D=0): 
 
 ( )( )1 M EP P dtdtMδ δ= −∫ ∫  (3.12) 
 
This is computable in an analog sense if the initial conditions, MP , and ( )EP δ  are 
specified and the analog method can operate based on these inputs and functions.  The 
initial conditions requirement is the same for digital methods.  The form of the analog 
method is shown in Figure 11.  This is a double integrator circuit with feedback for 
( )EP δ , an input for MP , and the capability of setting initial conditions on the output of 
the integrators.  This circuit will naturally solve for the dynamic response of the generator 
angle by direct integration.  This is a major advantage over the discretized nature of 
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digital integration techniques.  Analog integration experiences no numerical instability.  
However, in practice analog techniques do have some unique limitations. 
 Most limitations of analog techniques are due to non-ideal behavior of analog 
hardware.  In certain instances this can cause the emulator to behave differently than the 
system being emulated.  For example, if the slew rate of the emulator is less than the rate 
of change of the system variables then the result of integrating equation (3.12) in the 
emulation hardware will be different than the actual system.  The variables in emulation 
will not change as quickly as the real world system if the slew rate is not as fast as the 
system being emulated.  In addition, in steady-state saturation of components in the 
emulator could yield incorrect results.  In practice, the following are additional questions 
that must be addressed when determining analog computability:  How do you insure the 
instability of a system during emulation is not due to saturation or failure of analog 
devices?  How much measurement error is required before the answers obtained are 
deemed incorrect or inaccurate?  These questions must be addressed in the design and 
operation of the analog emulator.  More specifically, through proper scaling of the system 
into analog hardware many of the issues can be resolved.  More details are provided 
concerning the specific emulator in this work in chapter four. 
The power system consists of numerous generators and other dynamic 
components.  All of these dynamics can be modeled by a set of differential equations.  
Computability for this system model is achieved if computability for all the differential 
equations holds.  Generally speaking if an nth order system can be represented in 
canonical form, the system can be represented by n 1st order differential equations.  The 
power system models used in this work can be represented in such a canonical form.  As 
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a direct result, computability of the system can be determined by analyzing computability 
of each first order differential equation individually.  If each first order differential 
equation is computable then the nth order system is computable through equivalency to 
the n first order differential equations.  Likewise, if the nth order system is computable it 
is equivalent to a system of n first order differential equations which is by equivalency 
also computable.  Larger order equations must be examined to determine computability 
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 Lemmas 1 and 2 dealt with steady-state and dynamic computability of power 
systems.  Often times these two concepts are analyzed concurrently.  One method in 
power systems is to model machines dynamically and the network statically.  This is 
done by setting algebraic constraints (based on the network model) on the differential 
equations.  Analog computability for such a method can be determined by analyzing 
computability in the steady-state sense for static models and the dynamic sense for 
dynamic models.  Computability in both the static sense and dynamic sense is required 
for such analysis.  If the algebraic constraints are not computable then the constraints on 
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the differential equations will yield an incorrect steady-state result in the analog 
computer.  This incorrect result yields an incorrect answer to the algebraically 
constrained differential equations which negates computability.  The lack of dynamic 
computability will affect static computability in the same fashion.  In summary, in order 
to compute algebraically constrained differential equations by an analog method steady-
state and dynamic analog computability are required.  This relates directly to power 
systems as these types of equations are often used to represent the system. 
 The concept of analog computability in power systems was examined through a 
definition of analog computability and associated lemmas.  These lemmas described the 
requirements for analog computability.  Essentially, for analog computability, an analog 
method must provide a correct response of the defined function based on the input(s).  
The inputs and/or functions are arbitrary in this definition.  Power system emulation, or 
more generally system emulation, is examined next.  Emulation was previously defined 
as “When one system performs in exactly the same way as another, though perhaps not at 
the same speed.”  A more specific term for this work, system emulation, is now defined 
as follows:   
 
System Emulation:  The process of emulating the behavior of a system at a specified 
point in time at equilibrium or for a specified interval of time. 
 
It is clear that in order to emulate a power system, or any system for that matter, with an 
analog method that computability is required.  However, computability alone is not 
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necessarily sufficient in order to emulate the behavior of a given system.  Theorem 1 
outlines the necessary requirements for system emulation through analog computation. 
 
Theorem 1:  System emulation can be performed by an analog method if and only if all 
the following criteria are met: 
 
 1.  A correctly defined functional description of the system is known. 
 2.  Correctly defined input(s) to the system are known. 
 3.  The system is computable in the analog sense. 
 
 The requirements for system emulation are much stricter than those for analog 
computability.  Analog computability is based upon an arbitrary set of inputs and 
functions.  Depending on the particular problem, the inputs may or may not be arbitrary.  
For example, if the objective is to emulate the behavior of the power system in real time 
the inputs to the emulator are required to match the real world system in real time.  In 
addition, the functional behavior of the emulator must also match the real world system.  
If the system is computable, and the inputs are correct, the emulator will output the result 
dictated by the functional description of the system.  However, the analog computer may 
not behave like the system being emulated if the functional description of the system is 
not adequate.  If it is assumed that the functional description, or model, of the system is 
correct, and the inputs are known, or specified, then determining if system emulation is 
possible reduces to determining computability.  However, for some applications these 
assumptions will result in large deviations between the emulator behavior and the actual 
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system.  The result in these cases is an emulator that is not behaving like the system being 
emulated.  Generally speaking system emulation is dealing with a specific real world 
system.  To get an analog emulator to behave exactly like, or close enough within 
specified tolerances, the real system, the models and inputs to the system are not 
arbitrary.  As a result, the question of correctly modeling the system and determining the 
inputs is not necessarily deterministic. 
 Models can be developed, verified, and analyzed for accuracy.  Strictly speaking a 
model will never be perfect but it can be justified based on testing, benchmarking and 
validation.  In order to emulate a system the model has to be deemed acceptable, or in 
other words correctly defined.  The inputs to the system must also be correctly defined in 
order to emulate a system. 
 In many applications the inputs to the system are not explicitly known.  For 
example, in power system state estimation the inputs are measurements with noise and 
errors.  This noise can be modeled and accounted for.  Errors can be detected and 
eliminated from the analysis.  The result is that the inputs are estimates of the actual 
system values.  For the purpose of analog computation, these estimates can be accepted 
as correctly defined inputs in cases where the inputs are not explicitly known.  This 
approach is used in this work for power system security assessment with analog methods.  
The inputs to the emulator are estimated from measurement and system data.  Details on 
the determination of these inputs are in chapter five.  In addition, due to the uncertain 
nature of analog computation, the system emulation process is not deterministic.  This is 
in contrast to digital emulators. 
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 Throughout the development of digital computers many processors, 
microprocessors and different computing architectures have been created.  Often times 
compatibility issues arise when a software package or process is ported to a different 
architecture.  One way to deal with these incompatibilities is to emulate the older 
architecture on the newer architecture.  This can be a deterministic process because the 
architectures operate within a strictly defined framework.  For example, the instruction 
set of a processor is specifically defined.  Any processor can be made to operate just like 
another processor if the full instruction set can be performed or emulated. 
 With this overview Theorem 1 can be proven: 
Assuming that the system can be emulated the three requirements are verified by 
contradiction: 
 
 1.  If the system model is incorrect the result obtained from the analog method 
will deviate from the system behavior.  This contradicts the assumption that 
the system can be emulated. 
 2.  If the inputs to the analog computer are not correct the results obtained 
from the analog method will deviate from the system behavior. This 
contradicts the assumption that the system can be emulated. 
 3.  If analog computability is not maintained the results obtained from the 
analog method will deviate from the system behavior.  This contradicts the 
assumption that the system can be emulated. 
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Conversely, assuming that the three conditions are true it is shown that a system can be 
emulated: 
 
1.  Based on the definition of system emulation the analog method must 
reproduce the behavior of the system 
2.  The behavior of a generic system can be described as shown in equation 
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3.  The system consists of m  functions , ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 2,  , , mf f f⋅ ⋅ ⋅"" , and n  
inputs, ( )1 2, , , nx x x"" . 
4.  Assuming a correctly defined function of the system is known an analog 
method can correctly evaluate the functions describing the system. 
5.  Assuming the inputs are correctly defined they can be applied to the analog 
method. 
6.  Assuming the system is computable, the analog method will evaluate the 
functions and provide the correct output for the correct inputs. 
7.  The analog method will then behave exactly like the definition of the 
system satisfying system emulation requirements.. 
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 Theorem 1 states that the inputs to the emulator must be correct in order to 
emulate the system.  This is a general requirement.  This requirement for steady-state and 
dynamic system emulation is refined by the next two theorems.  These theorems focus on 
the input requirements.  It is assumed that the models are correct and the system is analog 
computable: 
 
Theorem 2:  If a set of inputs for an analog computer are correctly defined for a specified 
equilibrium point then the system can be emulated in a steady-state sense at the specified 
equilibrium point. 
 
This theorem is proven by contradiction: 
 
1.  Assume the system cannot be emulated in a steady-state sense. 
2.  It is assumed that the functional description of the system is correctly defined. 
3.  It is assumed that the system is analog computable in the steady-state sense 
(lemma 1). 
4.  From theorem 1 the system is emulatable if the correct values of inputs are 
known. 
5.  By definition of steady-state analysis the only values of inputs required are 
those at the specified equilibrium point. 
6.  The system is emulatable in steady-state since the inputs are known at the 
equilibrium point. 
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7.  This contradicts the assumption that the system is not emulatable in steady-
state sense. 
 
 Steady-state analysis by its nature assumes that the states of the system are not 
changing in time.  In other words there is no dynamic behavior in the system.  In reality 
this is not the case.  The system is always evolving and moving dynamically.  One way to 
view steady-state analysis is assuming the system is in equilibrium.  For a specified 
moment in time the system states can be analyzed and are not in motion.  In order to 
emulate a system for a moment in time the inputs must be synchronized.  The inputs must 
all be correct or known for the same instant in time.  If the inputs are not synchronized 
then the output will not represent what the system did or is doing at that moment in time.  
This result is particularly important in power system analysis which relies on telemetered 
data.  In order to properly emulate the behavior of the system at a point in time the data 
must be synchronized, or at the very least very near synchronous with some level of 
tolerance that can be deemed acceptable.  Theorem 3 deals with system emulation in the 
dynamic sense. 
 
Theorem 3:  If a set of inputs for an analog computer are correctly defined for a specified 
interval in time then the system can be emulated in a dynamic sense for the specified 
interval of time. 
 
This theorem is a natural extension of theorem 2.  It is proven by contradiction: 
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1.  Assume the system cannot be emulated in a dynamic sense for an arbitrary 
time interval: 0 0t t t τ≤ ≤ +  for 0τ ≠ . 
2.  It is assumed that the functional description of the system is defined correctly. 
3.  It is assumed that the system is analog computable in the dynamic sense 
(lemma 2). 
4.  From theorem 1 the system is emulatable if the correct values of inputs are 
known for the time interval 0 0t t t τ≤ ≤ +  for 0τ ≠ . 
5.  By definition of dynamic analysis the values of inputs required are across the 
specified time interval. 
6.  The system is emulatable in the dynamic sense across the time interval since 
the inputs are known across this interval. 




This result is important to analysis of power system dynamics.  To accurately emulate the 
dynamics of the system information on inputs to the system over the entire interval of 
time to be analyzed is required.  Theorems 2 and 3 focused on the inputs applied to the 
emulator.  It was assumed that the functional description of the system was correct and 
that the system was computable.  In a similar fashion, the requirements for a functional 
description of the system and analog computability could be defined and proven. 
 Within this framework a system emulation process has been defined.  In order to 
properly emulate the system the procedure for system emulation must evaluate 
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computability and whether or not the system is emulatable.  A general process of system 









 In order to emulate a system, it is first defined.  This definition is formulated from 
system data.  This system data consists of system parameters, models, known data, 
measured data, system structure, etc.  Computability can then be determined through 
analysis of this system definition and the desired outputs from the emulator.  With a 
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correct definition of the system and appropriate inputs, the system can be emulated if it is 
computable.  If it is not computable then the system must be redefined in order to emulate 
it.  For example, if not enough inputs are known the system can not be emulated.  
However, with the provided inputs a subsystem may exist that is computable and 
emulatable.  Another important factor in this analog computation theory is the physical 
limitations of the analog emulator or method. 
 Emulation can be performed by a variety of different methods such as a 
mechanical process, electrical process, etc.  The domain (temporal) and range (spatial) of 
operation are finite for all methods.  This finite nature results in some restrictions to 
computation.  If the system is emulated in the time domain then the limitations consist of 
slew rate of the analog hardware and reasonable time to solution.  The slew rate of the 
analog hardware must be greater than or equal to the system being emulated.  If not the 
emulator response will be slower and different than the system being emulated.  The 
analog method must also yield a solution in a reasonable time.  Emulation of slowly 
occurring phenomena in real time may result in long computation time.  For example, it 
would take approximately 75 years to emulate one period of Halley’s Comet in real time.  
The typical solution to this problem is to incorporate time scaling factors in the emulator.  
The process can be emulated along the same range but at a fraction of the time period.  
The behavior can then be solved for and monitored in a reasonable fashion.  A similar 
scaling process can allow for proper handling of a system’s range in emulation. 
 The range of the analog hardware is finite.  This is due to device limitations, 
saturation effects, etc.  For example, if emulating an electric transmission system which 
operates at 765kV it would be unreasonable to emulate this within the same range with a 
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CMOS circuit.  It is not physically possible to maintain or create 765kV in such a device.  
However, a magnitude scaling factor can be introduced to scale the range of the real 
world system to a level appropriate for the emulator.  For example, one volt in the CMOS 
circuit could be equivalent to the nominal 765kV level of the transmission system.  A 
similar, although different, process is used for per unit normalization of power systems.  
 It is clear that the physical limitations of the analog hardware could result in 
incorrect results in emulation.  In fact, the analog emulator could even be destroyed if the 
limits of the devices are surpassed during emulation.  Theorem 4 addresses the physical 
limitations of an emulator and how these limitations pertain to system emulation.  It is 
assumed that the requirements of theorem 1 are satisfied. 
 
Theorem 4:  If there exists a linearly scaled one-to-one mapping between the system 
being emulated and the emulator then a system can be emulated. 
 
This theorem is proven through contradiction: 
 
1.  Assume that the system cannot be emulated. 
2.  A linearly scaled one-to-one mapping between a generic system and a generic 
emulator can be defined as follows:  
 
 ( ), , emulsys sys emul tf x t g xα τ⎛ ⎞= ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (3.13) 




  sysx   a vector of states of the system to be emulated 
  syst   time of the system to be emulated 
  ( ),sys sysf x t   functional description of the system to be emulated 
  α   a row vector scaling the states of system into the range of emulator 
  τ   a scalar time scaling factor that scales the system domain into the 
  emulator domain 
  emulx  a vector of states of the emulator 
  emult   time of the emulator 
  ( ),emul emulg x t   functional description of the emulator 
 
3.  It is assumed the requirements of theorem 1 are satisfied. 
4.  By definition of emulation an emulator defined by equation (3.13) will emulate 
the system. 
5.  This contradicts the assumption that the system is not emulatable. 
 
 The emulation process presented here is distinctly different than well established 
simulation techniques.  Well established simulation techniques determine the behavior of 
the system through a process which does not function like the system being simulated.  
For example, a numerical simulation can integrate functions using a trapezoidal rule and 
provide an output of the results.  This method is numerically based and at no point 
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mimics the behavior of the system being simulated.  However, the output, assuming the 
correctness of the model and numerical solution technique, will be the same as the actual 
system.  Computation time for simulation and emulation also differ. 
 The computation time for digital techniques is clearly defined.  This time is based 
on the frequency of the system clock and how many clock cycles it takes to complete the 
simulation.  Many factors, including finite memory and latency, effect simulation time of 
digital methods.  The process of analog emulation is much different.  A clear definition 
for analog computation time is required.  In comparison to digital techniques an analog 
emulator operates as if there is an infinite clock rate with no memory limits or latency.  
These properties are what allow for very fast computation.  However, there are other 
limiting factors that must be accounted for when defining computation time. 
 Assuming the system can be emulated, the process of emulation comprises three 
steps as shown in Figure 13.  The emulator must first be configured and initialized based 
on system inputs and parameters.  At this point emulation begins through actuation of the 
emulator.  Lastly, data must be extracted from the system to provide results.  The overall 
computation time is defined as the summation of time spent on these three steps: 
 
 comp conf emul acqt t t t= + +  (3.14) 
where 
  conft    time required to configure and initialize the emulator. 
  emult    time required to emulate the system. 
  acqt    time required to acquire the desired data from the emulator 
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 For an online application, such as power system security assessment the 
computation time, or emulation time, of the analog emulator, emult , should be able to be 
comparable if not faster than the time required for an equivalent digital technique.  If this 
is not the case there is not much merit in implementing an analog system.  The next 
section provides an overview of the proposed analog emulation approach to power 
system security assessment and highlights requirements for viability as an online tool. 
3.2 ANALOG METHOD FOR SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
 The digital method for power system security assessment consists of building a 
network model and conducting contingency analysis as shown in Figure 4.  A similar 
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process for analog power system security assessment is shown in Figure 14.  This process 
consists of emulating the power system based on telemetry, knowledge of the system and 
contingency/stability analysis. 
 The process of system emulation in steady-state produces a similar result to the 
network builder but is performed in a different manner.  The network builder consists of a 
topology estimator and a state estimator.  The network builder also handles bad data 
detection.  The steady-state system emulation process configures and runs the emulator 
such that it is operating in the same fashion as the real power system based on the scan of 
system measurements.  In order to accurately emulate the system in steady-state the 
requirements of theorems 1, 2 and 4 must be satisfied.  The measurements should be 
time-stamped so they may be synchronized.  When the system emulation is complete it 
essentially represents the operating point of the power system at the time when the 
system telemetry was acquired.  This operating point is then used as initial conditions for 
contingency and stability analysis.  This process is run via dynamic system emulation. 
 Similar to state estimation, performing security assessment via an analog method 
is not deterministic.  Once the system is declared computable the steady-state system 
emulation process determines the correct structure of the power system, identifies and 
eliminates bad data, and configures the emulator based on the statistical properties of the 
measurements.  The correct functional description of the system and inputs to the 
emulator are determined by quantifying the probability that the emulation state is correct 
based on the available information.  Different inputs and/or topologies can be examined 
and correctness quantified through probability theory.  Correct steady-state system 
emulation is defined as the configuration with the highest probability of being correct.  
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Contingencies to be emulated dynamically are defined beforehand and run once the 
system is emulated in the steady-state. 
 
 




Contingency and Stability 




Figure 14: Analog Power System Security Assessment 
 
 In order to accurately emulate the system dynamics the requirements of theorems 
1, 3 and 4 must be satisfied.  The contingency and stability analysis is performed on the 
emulator by perturbing or making changes to the system.  Lines, generators and loads can 
be removed to represent the loss of a component.  The emulator will respond in a similar 
manner as the system being studied.  Results are obtained by simply observing the 
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behavior of the emulator.  Information concerning stability and limit violations can be 
extracted through measurements from the emulator.  In addition, due to the fact that 
system dynamics are represented in the emulator, transient stability analysis is performed 
on the selected contingencies.  Analysis of faults and the response of the system can also 
be investigated.  In addition, through various perturbations and monitoring the stability of 
the emulator the boundaries of stability for the system can be found for a given operating 
point.  This method has some distinctive advantages over the traditional digital approach. 
 The advantages of this analog approach include very fast contingency/stability 
analysis through emulation.  The emulator is modeled in the time domain hence the 
output is equivalent to a full time domain simulation.  Through the application of time 
scaling the dynamics of the system are emulated much faster than real time.  This enables 
the analog approach to run large sets of contingencies very quickly.  In addition, transient 
stability is determined for each contingency.  The approach also does not exhibit 
numerical instability. 
 The emulator will always converge to a solution and emulate the system so long 
as it can be emulated.  Even if a non-computable or non-emulatable system is emulated a 
result will still be found, albeit incorrect.  Evaluating if a system is emulatable will ensure 
that the solution the emulator is providing is indeed correct.  If a system is not emulatable 
a subsystem may exist that is emulatable.  This is in contrast to the digital approach 
which exhibits convergence issues and can fail to estimate states in the event that 
observability is not maintained.  These advantages exhibit an improvement over the 
traditional approaches.  However, there are also limitations to this proposed technique. 
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 One particular limitation is the requirement of measurements.  Results cannot be 
obtained unless they are measured or observed from the emulator.  The measurement 
process increases computation time.  In addition, measurement techniques inherently 
affect the system and will thus introduce some error into the results.  Noise and other 
parasitic effects also contribute to errors.  Due to these limitations the analog method will 
not have a comparable precision to digital techniques.  However, by incorporating better 
models, at no cost to computation time, a more accurate, albeit not as precise as digital 
methods, representation of the system can be achieved through analog emulation.  As a 
result, more accurate solutions can be obtained from this method.  With these limitations 
in mind requirements for an analog emulator for the purpose of security assessment are 
defined. 
3.3 REQUIREMENTS FOR ANALOG SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
 The aforementioned lemmas and theorems provided insight into analog 
computability and system emulation with analog computers.  The theorems were 
generalized for applicability to a nonspecific analog computer.  The proposed process of 
power system security assessment through analog computation was then developed from 
the theorems.  Based on this proposed method for security assessment and practical 
implications of an online tool, the requirements for an analog emulator are enumerated 
below: 
 
 1.  A detailed power system model 
 2.  Emulation theory and methodology 
 3.  A fast and accurate power system emulator 
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 For an analog method to be viable the power system model and emulation 
methodology should be at least as detailed as current digital methods.  In addition, the 
computation time should be comparable or faster than digital methods.  The results 
should also exhibit similar, if not better, accuracy than current methods.  The following 
chapter provides details on the power system emulator. 
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4 ANALOG POWER SYSTEM EMULATOR 
 This chapter provides detailed information on the power system emulator design 
and operation.  More specifically, the focus is placed on the modeling of a power system 
in analog form and the methodology of analog computation.  These items addresses the 
functional description requirement for system emulation in theorem 1 and functional 
relationship, or mapping, between the emulator and the power system outlined in theorem 
4.  Chapter five covers the additional requirements necessary for power system security 
assessment.  First an overview of the emulator structure and functionality is provided.  
This is followed by details on the emulation methodology and power system models.  
Next the associated hardware, scaling and software of the emulator are presented. 
4.1 POWER SYSTEM EMULATOR 
 The power system emulator consists of both analog and digital components.  A 
diagram of the emulator is shown in Figure 15.  The emulation is conducted via analog 
hardware and a digital computer interfaces with the analog hardware.  The digital 
computer is used primarily for data acquisition and control of the emulation hardware. 
 
 
Figure 15: Power System Emulator Diagram 
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 The control of the emulator consists of two main stages: configuration, 
reconfiguration and actuation.  The emulator parameters are first configured, or 
reconfigured if changes are required for subsequent computation, and then when all 
parameters have been set the computation is actuated.  During actuation the integrators 
are turned on and the response of the emulator provides the solution.  For a given system 
the configuration is only required once and henceforth multiple computations can be 
conducted with minimal reconfiguration of the system.  For example, the line parameters 
once set will not need to be changed every time a power flow case is run.  Line or 
generator outages can be emulated by simply turning off the specified line(s) or 
generator(s) and leaving the rest of the system alone. 
 The control of the analog hardware is handled via a digital computer.  An 
illustration showing the control method and interaction between the digital and analog 
hardware is shown in Figure 16.  It is shown that the digital computer feeds data into an 
analog-to-digital (D/A) converter, which is then routed into a de-multiplexer (DEMUX) 
to the analog components of the emulator for configuration.  For a single D/A converter 
and DEMUX combination, this is a serial process.  The computer provides a single signal 
to configure a device and the DEMUX is controlled directly by the computer to select 
which analog device to configure.  The DEMUX latches the outputs to maintain the 
proper configuration as it cycles through the devices.  Multiple D/A converters and de-
multiplexers can be implemented in parallel to speed up this process.  The actuation of 
the analog hardware is accomplished through a digital signal that turns on the integrators.  
In summary there are three sets of digital signals.  The digital signals feeding into the 
D/A converter specify parameters and values for the analog hardware.  The digital 
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DEMUX control specifies where the current analog control signal is to be routed.  The 
digital control of integrators goes directly to the analog emulator to turn integrators on, 
off, and sets initial conditions.  The system has the capability of individually actuating 



























































Digital Control of Integrators  
Figure 16: Emulator Control 
 
 The data acquisition scheme is shown in Figure 17. The analog data acquisition 
hardware provides conditioned signals from the analog emulation hardware for 
measurement via the digital computer.  The conditioned signals are routed through an 
analog multiplexer before the analog-to-digital (A/D) conversion takes place.  This 
process can be sped up via incorporating parallel combinations of D/A converters and 
multiplexers.  Most of the time required for computation is spent acquiring data.  This 
could potentially create a bottleneck on computation time for large systems. 
 It has been shown that as system size increases the emulation time remains the 
same [37].  No discernable increase in emulation time is exhibited.  However, both the 
data acquisition and configuration time will increase linearly with system size.  This 
increase in time can be mitigated though additional data acquisition hardware.  For 
example, assuming sufficient memory bandwidth, doubling the number of A/D 
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converters, and subsequently operating them in parallel, will cut acquisition time in half.  
Another method for saving time is to only acquire data that is necessary for each 
computation.  For some analyses very little data is actually required.  For example, when 
conducting contingency analysis a digital flag can be used in hardware to indicate a 
system violation (e.g. over current, under voltage, etc.).  Data acquisition is then 
conducted only when this digital flag indicates a violation; otherwise the system is 
































































Figure 17: Emulator Data Acquisition 
 
4.2 EMULATION METHODOLOGY AND MODELING 
 There are numerous different approaches to modeling and emulating a power 
system.  Historically, the behavior of power systems was emulated using AC techniques.  
For example, transient network analyzers built the AC power system on a small scale and 
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operated the miniaturized model in the same fashion as the real power system.  In this 
work a DC emulation approach is utilized. 
4.2.1 DC EMULATION 
 Power system computation in many digital applications is conducted in polar 
coordinates.  The power system states are represented by a magnitude and angle.  In the 
analog DC emulation technique used in this work, the computation in the network is 
performed exclusively in rectangular (Cartesian) coordinates.  All power system 
parameters and values are represented in rectangular and/or converted from polar form to 
rectangular form when necessary for application in the emulator.  Figure 18 is a 











Figure 18: Polar and Rectangular Coordinate Comparison 
 
 The polar form representation contains two components, a vector magnitude and 
phase.  It can be represented in the following manner: 
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 V V θ= ∠  (4.1) 
 
where 
  V   complex voltage 
  V   magnitude of the complex voltage V  
  θ   phase of the complex voltage V  
 
The Cartesian coordinate representation consists of two magnitudes.  One is purely real 
and lies on the real axis and the other is purely imaginary and lies on the imaginary axis.  
This representation is related to the magnitude and phase by equation (4.2) where ReV  
and ImV  are the real and imaginary vector components respectively. 
 
 ( ) ( )Re Im cos sinV V jV V j Vθ θ= + = +  (4.2) 
 
The rectangular form can easily be transformed into polar form by equation (4.3).  Note 

















 The specifics of the previously proposed DC emulation method were first 
introduced in [38] and highlighted and expanded upon here.  The method roots itself in 
solving the network matrix equation in rectangular coordinates.  This equation relates the 
current flowing through a network of impedances to a voltage applied to the network: 
 
 [ ] [ ] [ ]I Y V= ⋅  (4.4) 
 
The admittance matrix,[ ]Y , is a nodal admittance matrix based on the power system 
topology and impedances of the power system network.  Solving equation (4.4) in 
rectangular coordinates with a complex admittance and a complex voltage yields: 
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⋅ = + = + ⋅ +





 The real and imaginary components in equation (4.5) are labeled with subscripts 
Re and Im respectively.  For this case, considering complex network impedances, there 
are a total of four current components.  Each current component is computed by 
multiplying an admittance magnitude by a voltage magnitude.  This calculation is 
identical to the resultant current flow based on a voltage drop across a resistor.  This is 
how DC emulation is conducted.  Resistive networks represent the admittances and DC 
voltages are applied to the resistive networks to induce current flow.  Utilizing four DC 
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networks, one for each of the components in equation (4.5), the network equation can be 
solved.  The solution is specifically the voltages and currents flowing in these DC 
networks.  This information needs to be extracted, or measured, from the analog circuits.  
The four networks are defined as follows: 
 
 




  network 1
                 network 2
               network 3
               network 4










These four emulation networks and their associated current components are depicted 






Figure 19: DC Emulation Networks 
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 From a circuit viewpoint all the nodal voltages can be measured directly in 
rectangular coordinates, one imaginary voltage magnitude and one real voltage 
magnitude.  Obtaining the rectangular current magnitudes is not as straight forward.  Four 
currents must be measured and added together to obtain the branch current flow or 
injections in rectangular coordinates.  Specifically the summation of currents in networks 
one and two equal the real current value and the summation of currents in networks three 
and four equate to the imaginary current component.  More generally for any size system 




{ } { }
{ } { }
{ } { }













Re Re   
Im Im   
Im Re   



































where { }Re ijY  and { }Im ijY  are the real and imaginary network admittances between 
nodes i and j , and { }Re jV  and { }Im jV  represent the real and imaginary voltage 
magnitudes at bus j  respectively.  The formulation in equation (4.7) is for an n  bus 
system with ( )1n + nodes with the inclusion of ground as a node.  The key to 
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implementing this emulation technique is to develop accurate representation of the power 
system components to operate in the DC networks.  The next section delves into the 
details of the power system model used in DC emulation. 
4.2.2 POWER SYSTEM MODEL 
 A component based modeling approach was taken for the power system emulator.  
This model comprises of an interconnection of generators, transmission lines, 
transformers and loads.  An example of such an interconnection is shown in Figure 20.  
The system is modeled in per unit utilizing per phase analysis.  This framework assumes 
balanced system operation.  Mathematically speaking the power system is modeled as a 
system of algebraically constrained ordinary differential equations (ODEs): 
 
 ( ) ( )( )( )( )
,
, 0









  x   set of the state variables of the system 
  u   set of system parameters and inputs 
  f   set of ordinary differential equations 
  g   set of algebraic constraints 
 
 The power system network is represented as a set of algebraic constraints.  This 
network, consisting of lines and transformers, is modeled with impedances.  Electro-
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magnetic transients are not incorporated into this model.  The power injections, 
generators and loads, into the network are modeled dynamically.  They are represented 
by a set of nonlinear ODEs.  More specifically, a state space averaging technique is used 
to model the dynamics of the system. 
 
 
Figure 20: Power System Emulation Network 
 
 
 There has been extensive development of state space averaging, or dynamic 
phasor, techniques in power system analysis [39-41].  The method has been applied 
primarily to machines and power electronic converters.  In the application here it is used 
to model the dynamics of generation and load.  “The generalized averaging method is 
based on the fact that the waveform ( )x •  can be approximated on the interval ( ],t T t−  
to arbitrary accuracy with a Fourier series representation of the form [39]:” 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )sjk t T sk
k
x t T s x t e ω − +− + =∑  (4.9) 
 
where the summation is performed over all integers k, 
2
s T
πω = , ( ]0,s T∈ , and 
( )kx t  are the complex Fourier coefficients of ( )x • .  Each Fourier coefficient can be 
defined by [39]: 
 




jk t T s
k
x t x t T s e ds
T
ω− − += − +∫  (4.10) 
 
Differentiating equation (4.10) with respect to time yields [39]: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )sk k
k
d dx t x t jk x t
dt dt
ω= −  (4.11) 
 
The ordinary differential equations which model the load and generator dynamics in this 
work are based on phasor dynamics of the form in equation (4.11).  This expression is an 
approximation and assumes that sω  is time invariant.  It has been shown that this 
approximation also holds for slowly varying sω  [39].  In this work it is assumed that the 
frequency is dominated by the fundamental component (60 Hz) and that this frequency is 
maintained fairly constant.  These assumptions allow for using only one Fourier 
component, and thus one differential equation, for each state variable. 
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 The generator is modeled as a constant voltage source, GE , behind internal 
impedance, GZ .  This is sometimes referred to as the classical generator model shown in 
Figure 21 [42].  For the application in DC emulation the generator maintains a PV bus 
behavior in steady-state.  The mechanical power input, mP , and the generator terminal 




Figure 21: Classical Generator Model 
 
 The swing equation quantifies swings in the power angle δ  during a transient: 
 
 ( )e mM D P Pδ δ δ•• •+ + =  (4.12) 
 
where  
  M   generator inertia coefficient 
  D   damping coefficient of the generator 
  ( )eP δ   electrical real power output of the generator 
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  mP   mechanical input power from the prime mover 
 
A transient occurs when there is a difference between electrical power output and 
mechanical power input to the machine.  In steady-state 0δ δ•• •⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  the electrical power 
output is equal to the specified mechanical input power.  If damping is neglected solving 
equation (4.12) for the power angle results in the double integral shown in equation 
(4.13): 
 
 ( )( )1 m eP P dtdtMδ δ= −∫ ∫  (4.13) 
 
 With the solution of the power angle and a specified generator voltage magnitude 















=  (4.14) 
 
The load is represented in a similar fashion as the generators. 
 The load dynamic behavior is described by a decoupled exponential recovery 
model based on the operation of induction motors [43, 44].  Within this model, bus 
voltage magnitude and angle are expressed as functions of complex power flow, complex 
























  V   load voltage magnitude 
  θ   load phase angle 
  LQ   specified load reactive power 
  ( ),eQ V θ   reactive power injection into network 
  QK   voltage magnitude time constant 
  LP   specified load real power 
  ( ),eP V θ  real power injection into network 
  PK   phase angle time constant 
 
 For the aggregate load model, however, injection may be dependent on several 
factors including the current injection or load impedance at a given operating point.  The 
electrical power injection, eS , into a bus i as defined by the popular ZIP model, is shown 
in [45]: 
 




  iS   load power injection at bus i 
  iI   load current injection at bus i 
  iY   load impedance at bus i 
 
 The power system network model consists of an interconnection of transformers 
and transmission lines represented by complex impedances.  The transmission line 
portrayal is based on the pi equivalent model shown in Figure 22.  In order to translate 
this model into the DC emulation scheme the line parameters are separated into real and 
imaginary components.  This yields the resistor values for the DC emulation networks.  






























  ijY   transmission line series admittance 
  ijR   transmission line series resistance 
  LijX   transmission line series reactance 
 95
 
The shunt resistive elements are determined by: 
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  ,jk ikY   transmission line shunt admittance 
  jkr   transmission line shunt resistance 
  
jkC
X   transmission line shunt reactance 
 
 The emulation networks can be constructed based on the line parameters and 
equations (4.17) and (4.18).  The topology of each DC network will mimic the topology 
of the power system.  For example, for the pi model shown here the analogous section 
DC emulation network will have a pi form.  For a network of many transmission lines the 
required resistance values and network topology are developed in the same fashion.  










Figure 22: Pi Equivalent Transmission Line Model 
 
 There are two types of transformers modeled for the emulator.  Tap changing and 
non tap changing.  The tap changing transformer model is shown in Figure 23.  It consists 
of an ideal transformer with a turns ratio of t  and a series impedance R jX+ .  
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 A pi equivalent circuit can be developed for this transformer from (4.19) so long 
as the tap setting t  does not have a phase shift.  If a phase shift is present the off diagonal 
entries become unequal and an equivalent circuit will no longer be realizable.  The pi 
equivalent model of the transformer is shown in Figure 24.  For a transformer without a 
tap changer (t=1 in a per unit normalized system), the shunt element are removed and the 









Figure 23: Tap Changing Transformer Model 
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Figure 24: Pi Equivalent Tap Changing Transformer Model 
 
 The resistor values for the DC emulation networks can be determined by the 
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 The network components in this emulation scheme are purely resistive and the 
sizing of the resistor values is dependant upon operating frequency.  By modeling the 
emulation networks with fixed resistances the operational frequency of the power system 
is assumed to be constant.  With the automatic generation control systems implemented 
today this is a reasonable assumption.  The variance in operating frequency is quite 
minimal.  Faults and circuit breakers are also modeled within this framework. 
 Any balanced fault can easily be translated into the emulation approach so long as 
it is modeled with impedances.  A similar derivation as previously shown will allow for 
determination of appropriate resistance values for the DC emulation networks.  Circuit 
breakers are modeled as ideal switches.  They are either on or off.  This behavior of the 
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circuit breakers is handled directly via the hardware realization of the power system 
network.  No additional components or switches are required in the emulation networks. 
4.3 ANALOG HARDWARE 
 The analog hardware was designed to accurately represent the power system 
based on the aforementioned models and also to allow for remote control and 
configuration.  The control of the hardware was achieved through the use of operational 
transconductance amplifiers (OTAs).  The OTA is the fundamental building block of the 
power system emulator. 
 The OTA is classified as an operational amplifier although it differs from the 
traditional operational amplifier, or op-amp.  Usually when referring to an op-amp it is 
with regards to a voltage controlled voltage source (VCVS).  Essentially this is a voltage 
amplifier.  The input and the outputs are both voltages and ideally the open-loop gain is 
infinite.  An OTA in contrast is a voltage controlled current source (VCCS).  The input is 
a voltage and the output is a current.  The transfer function is dependant upon the OTAs 
transconductance gain ( )mg  which is finite and controllable via an external bias current 
( )abci .  This bias current is the key element which allows for reconfiguration and remote 
control of the emulator. 
 A diagram of an ideal OTA is shown in Figure 25.  The amplifier has a 






Figure 25: Ideal OTA 
 
 
For an ideal OTA the output current is a linear function of the input voltage and 
transconductance gain: 
 
 o m ini g v=  (4.23) 
 
While the transconductance gain is a function of a biasing current abci : 
 
 ( )m abcg f i=  (4.24) 
 
However, the basic circuit design of the OTA is highly nonlinear.  The nonlinearity of the 
OTA and how it relates to analog computation has been dealt with in prior publications 
[42, 47, 48].  It has been shown that through proper scaling the OTA can operate in a 
linear fashion, albeit within a limited range.  In addition, numerous circuit designs have 
developed highly linear OTAs [49-52].  However, these circuits were not implemented in 
this work as the hardware designs were restricted to commercially available parts. 
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 A block diagram of the analog hardware for a generator is shown in Figure 26 
[53].  The difference between the computed electrical power output of the generator and 
the specified mechanical power input is integrated to solve for the power angle and the 
appropriate voltages are applied to the DC emulation networks.  The solution for the 
terminal voltage in this model is obtained in polar form and is then converted into 
rectangular components via sine and cosine shaper circuits in order to interface with the 
DC networks. 
 The analog hardware consists of reconfigurable OTA based integrators to 
compute the swing equation, reconfigurable voltage sources to specify mP  and E , 
analog adders, multipliers and current sensors to compute eP  as shown in equation (4.25).  
The hardware also incorporates voltage controlled current sources (VCCS), voltage 
controlled voltage sources (VCVS) and current controlled voltage sources (CCVS) to 
condition the signals as necessary.  In addition, integration can be remotely controlled to 
on/off states and initial conditions can be set and applied to the integrators.  Details on 
these circuits can be seen in [54]. 
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 The process of computation consists of initializing the integrators with initial 
conditions, applying voltages to the DC emulation networks and then turning on 
integration.  Ground faults can be created at the generator terminal via the switch shown 
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in the diagram.  By opening the switch the electrical power in the feedback loop goes to 
zero simulating a ground fault at the generator terminal.  The construction of the load 
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Figure 26: Analog Generator Module for DC Emulation 
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 A block diagram of the load emulation hardware is shown in Figure 27.  It is a 
compilation of four sub-circuits, of which the first is the network interface.  The second 
sub-circuit utilizes the current flows and load bus voltage supplied by the interface to 
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 The third sub-circuit utilizes this power flow in conjunction with the user defined 
power injection to update the voltage at the load bus, through integration as defined in 
equation (4.15).  The fourth sub-circuit takes this updated voltage and, using a set of 
cosine and sine shapers, converts it from a polar to a rectangular form, as required by the 
network interface. 
 The load hardware allows for the remote configuration of integration parameters 
and gains, as well as load parameters based on the ZIP model in equation (4.16).  The 
load circuitry can also be turned on and off remotely.  Initial conditions can be specified 
and integration can be controlled remotely.  The hardware design for the power system 




Figure 27: Analog Load Module for DC Emulation 
  
 In circuit form a network of resistors, or potentiometers, would require manual 
intervention to configure and alter the emulator for a given computation.  There is also a 
requirement for negative resistance when modeling shunt capacitive elements of the 
transmission lines. A hardware design with active devices that achieves remote 
reconfigurability and negative resistance has been developed. The circuits are OTA-based 
reconfigurable variable positive and negative resistive circuits. 
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 A double ended OTA variable resistor [55] is shown in Figure 28.  This circuit 



























Figure 28: OTA Variable Resistor Circuit 
 
The effective resistance of this circuit (Reff), which is the resistance seen between the 
terminals 1V  and 2V  is determined by: 
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 A negative resistance circuit was developed with the same design by switching 
the polarity of the OTA inputs, which results in reversing the current flow.  The power 
system network is represented in hardware by constructing the four DC emulation 
networks with these variable resistive circuits.  The network parameters are fully 
controllable and reconfigurable via the transconductance gain of the OTAs.  Line outages 
and circuit breaker openings can also be represented by setting the bias current to zero for 
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all OTAs representing the line out of service.  Additional hardware was incorporated into 
the emulator for data acquisition and control. 
 Analog isolation and signal conditioning was provided between the emulation 
hardware and the digital computer/analog to digital converters.  All control signals are 
conditioned and isolated.  This was to ensure no disturbances or failures in the analog 
hardware could adversely affect the digital hardware.  In addition, measurement and 
signal conditioning hardware was included within the emulator to process data before 
data acquisition.  For current measurement instrumentation amplifiers measure and 
conditioned voltages across current sensing resistors embedded in the emulation 
networks.  These current sensing resistors are lumped within the network model as to not 
induce error into the emulation.  Instrumentation amplifiers were also used to condition 
voltages measurements before analog to digital conversion.  Other parameters such as 
electrical power injections, power angles, and other state variables are also conditioned in 
the analog hardware. 
 The complete power system emulator is shown in Figure 29.  A National 
Instruments PXI chassis is used.  This chassis includes a fully integrated digital computer 
including CPU, graphics card, PXI slots, SCXI slots, USB ports, etc.  A keyboard, mouse 
and monitor are attached directly to this chassis.  This allows for user interface and 
software development.  Data acquisition and control hardware were incorporated via the 
PXI interface.  PXI is an open industry standard developed for instrumentation.  It is 
similar to PCI architecture but includes some additions specifically for instrumentation.  
In this work analog-to-digital converters, digital-to-analog converters, and digital 
counters/timers are attached via the PXI slots.  This hardware is connected via cabling in 
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front of the chassis directly to the analog emulation hardware.  The analog emulation 
hardware was developed in modular fashion to interface with the PXI chassis. 
 
 
Figure 29: Complete Power System Emulator 
 
 Modules for the analog emulator were designed to interface with the SCXI slots 
in the chassis.  The generator module is shown in Figure 30.  This module emulates one 
generator.  The analog isolation module, load emulation module, and network emulation 
module are shown in Figure 31.  The load module emulates a single load and the network 
module consists of twelve variable resistance circuits.  These variable resistive circuits 
can be configured to be either positive or negative resistance and interconnected in any 
fashion.  These modules slide directly into the SCXI slots and have three connectors. 
 Each module has a 24 pin connector to that receive unregulated power from the 
chassis.  Onboard power supplies regulate and supply the required power for each 
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module.  A 50 pin connector provides interface to all data acquisition and control 
circuitry via a backplane in the PXI chassis.  The interconnection of emulation modules is 
accomplished via a 96 pin connector.  The emulation system as shown in Figure 29 
emulates a three bus power system.  This system consists of three transmission lines, two 
generators and a single load.  In this configuration there still exist twelve additional SCXI 
slots for expansion.  The software for the emulator was developed to control the three bus 
system.  However, the software was designed in a modular fashion which allows for 
interface to a larger system. 
 
 
Figure 30: Generator Module 
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Figure 31: Network, Load, and Isolation Modules 
 
4.4 SCALING POWER SYSTEM PARAMETERS FOR EMULATION 
 Scaling of parameters is an essential part of the analog computation and system 
emulation processes.  The scaling requirements for system emulation detailed in theorem 
4 are satisfied by the scaling process presented here.  System parameters must be scaled 
and configured (historically manually) in relation to the real world system it is 
representing.  In the scaling process the limitations of the hardware, namely linearity and 
stress, are addressed.  The hardware must be configured to allow proper emulation of the 
system without violating the constraints of the circuitry. 
 Historically the components of analog computers (resistors, op-amps, etc.) are 
highly linear in a large operating range, specifically, levels of 10 or 100V. In the DC 
emulation hardware the levels are much lower due to nonlinear devices.  For example, the 
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linear operating range of a BJT based operational transconductance amplifier (OTA) is 
±25mV [56] and ±1mA [55].  Signal fidelity must also be maintained to ensure 
measurability of the solutions, which are analog voltages and currents.  Most literature on 
the subject of scaling [5-7, 57, 58] separates scaling into two main components: time and 
magnitude. 
 Time scaling allows analog computers to calculate in real time and faster or 
slower than real time.  Magnitude scaling is defined as “the process through which a 
linear relationship is established between the voltage at any reference node and the 
variable represented by it” [6].  Magnitude scaling factors are utilized to scale the 
parameters (line impedance, power injections, etc.) to appropriate levels which the analog 
hardware can represent.  For example, the analogous resistance values in the DC 
emulation networks must fall within a range achievable via the OTA based resistor 
circuits.  Magnitude scaling is typically performed in a linear fashion as follows: 
 
 PS HW bX x X= ⋅  (4.28) 
 
where 
  PSX   physical quantity related to the power system 
  HWx   analogous physical quantity in the emulator 
  bX   magnitude scaling factor 
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 Time scaling is conducted in a similar linear fashion.  Generally speaking the 
relationship between the time of the power system under study and the analog emulation 
can be represented by: 
 
 PSHW
tt τ=  (4.29) 
 
where 
  PSt   power system time 
  HWt   analogous time in the emulator 
  τ   time scaling factor 
 
For 1τ ≥  the emulator will run faster than the real phenomena being emulated.  A value 
of 1τ ≤  will result in emulation slower than real time and 1τ =  will result in real time 
computation.  For power system analysis it is desirable to speed up the computation as 
much as possible but there are limitations to doing so. 
 The main limiting factors to time scaling are the analog hardware itself and the 
data acquisition.  The analog hardware is comprised of many active and passive 
electronic elements and has associated frequency responses.  Generally the responses will 
drop off once the frequency increases beyond a certain level.  In order for accurate 
emulation the transients being emulated must be below these frequencies.  In addition, 
the sampling frequency for data acquisition must be higher than the frequency of the 
fastest transient to be emulated. 
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 The scaling process traditionally involved a trial and error approach.  “Rough 
estimation of maximum values and fine tuning gains for small/large values” [58] until the 
analog computer is within operating regions (i.e. no overloads) and acceptable noise 
levels for measurement.  In the past “a large simulator is often setup in a number of 
stages” [58].  The scaling approached formulated for this work involves linear scaling of 
magnitude and time and has been automated to allow for fast configuration of the 
emulator. 
 One application of this emulator is transient stability analysis.  With trial and error 
methods, it is not possible to ensure operation within linear regions.  The approach taken 
here is to ensure all stable cases fall within linear regions.  If this is accomplished 
saturation of the electronic devices may be used as an indicator for instability.  In the 
scaling process used in this work a one-to-one mapping of the power system states and 
parameters to the analog hardware states and parameters is developed.  This mapping is 
constrained based on the analog hardware limitations and measurement requirements.  
The power system states and parameters are quantified and described using intervals.  For 
example an interval for a generator voltage magnitude iGV  is defined as: 
 
 [ ] i i{ }, : |G G G G G G GV V V V V V V= = ∈ ≤ ≤⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ \  (4.30) 
 
where 
  [ ]GV   interval of iGV  
  GV   supremum of iGV  
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  GV   infimum of iGV  
 
 The intervals for all power system parameters (e.g. moment of inertia, line 
impedances, etc) can be determined from power system data.  Determining the intervals 
for power system states (e.g. voltages, currents, etc.) requires further analysis.  In this 
approach a linearized analysis of the power system dynamics is utilized to estimate the 
intervals of the power system states.  Refer to [48] for further details.  The intervals 
describing the analog hardware are determined based on properties of the hardware.  
With these intervals the scaling process was defined as follows: 
 
 [ ] [ ]
[ ]max
min




















  K   row vector containing all magnitude scaling factors 
  [ ]PS   vector of power system state and parameter intervals 
  [ ]HW   vector of analog hardware state and parameter intervals 
  maxτ   maximum speedup factor of analog hardware 
  [ ]K   vector of analog hardware gain intervals 
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  SNRM   vector of signal-to-noise ratios of emulator measurements 
  minSNR   minimum required signal to noise ratio 
 
 The result of this scaling process is the determination of the time and magnitude 
scaling factors such that the analog hardware can properly emulate the system.  More 
specifically, a linearly scaled mapping is created between the power system and the 
power system emulator.  This behavior satisfies the requirements for system emulation in 
theorem 4.  The emulator is configured based on one single time scaling factor.  All 
dynamics are scaled identically in time.  This is necessary to properly emulate the system.  
The time scaling factor is constrained to a maximum value determined by the operation 
of the analog hardware.  The magnitude scaling factors are constrained based on the 
limitations of analog hardware.  For example, the OTA gain while controllable has a 
finite interval on which it can be adjusted.  This interval results in an associated interval 
for the scaling factor which maps a network impedance to the variable resistor circuit.  
Determination of the power system state intervals and signal-to-noise ratio of 
measurements requires running a linearized analysis of the power system for 
predetermined cases.  If the set of predetermined cases is insufficient, or the resulting 
errors from the linearized analysis grow large the results from this scaling process will 
not be precise.  Generally speaking the system is scaled in a conservative manner to try 
and accommodate any such errors. 
 It should be noted that the scaling process is defined based on a few hard 
constraints.  With this definition a feasible solution space may not exist.  In the event this 
occurs the constraints can be made to be soft by incorporating penalty factors for 
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constraint violation.  This will ensure a solution can be found.  The quality of this 
solution can be post processed to determine feasibility.  In addition, the scaling process 
can be defined as an optimization problem.  The power consumption of analog hardware 
could be minimized, signal-to-noise ratio maximized, or optimized to other objectives.  
The strength of the scaling approach presented here as compared to historical scaling 
methods is that it is flexible and can be automated via software for an arbitrarily sized 
system. 
4.5 SOFTWARE FOR DATA ACQUISITION AND CONTROL 
 An overview has been provided on the hardware configuration, control and data 
acquisition of the power system emulator.  This section details the functionality of the 
software interface.  The software interface is where the end user operates the emulator.  
This software was developed with National Instruments LabVIEW [59]. 
 The main panel of the interface for the three bus power system emulator which 
has been constructed is shown in Figure 32.  From this main panel the system topology 
can be seen which consists of three transmission lines, two generators (one slack) and a 
single load.  Basic operation of the emulator is conducted via this interface.  System 
parameters are entered and can be adjusted in real time during emulation.  Data is also 




Figure 32: Emulator Graphical User Interface 
 
 Scaling and power system parameters are entered into the software interface.  For 
the generator user input information is real power output in MW, voltage magnitude in 
per unit, system frequency in Hz, generator moment of inertia and initial condition for the 
generator angle.  The boxes labeled Pe, Qe and angle 2 are measured values from the 
emulator.  For the generator these are real and reactive power output and generator angle, 
respectively.  In a similar manner system parameters are entered and data acquired for the 
load and transmission lines.  The control panel at the bottom of the screen allows the user 
to control emulator actuation (turn the emulator on and off), set initial conditions on 
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integrators, and also create system faults.  The type of fault, duration of the fault and the 
clearing time of the fault can all be specified and controlled.  Waveforms from the 
emulator can also be captured and displayed via the user interface as shown in Figure 33.  
Specifically this screen capture shows the generator angle response to a ground fault at 
the generator terminal. 
 The functionality explained thus far allows for the user to run and control the 
emulator manually.  The software can also run in batch mode.  For example, a set of 
predefined cases can be entered into the software and run in succession automatically.  
The cases could include different faults, contingencies, or even different system 
topologies.  The user can also specify what data to acquire for each case. 
 
 
Figure 33: Waveform Acquisition Screen 
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 This chapter has provided detailed information on the power system emulator 
design and operation.  This emulator is the analog computer in which the proposed 
method power system security assessment is performed.  With the analog computer 
clearly defined the generalized theorems from chapter three can be applied specifically to 
the security assessment process and this analog computer.  The following chapter 
provides an overview of performing security assessment with this analog computer. 
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5 ANALOG POWER SYSTEM SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
 This chapter provides details of the proposed method for analog power system 
security assessment.  The goal is to first emulate the power system in steady-state by 
satisfying the requirements of theorems 1 and 2.  Steady-state system emulation is based 
on power system information (mathematical models, system structure, and parameters) 
and a set of measured data.  Dynamic contingency and stability analysis is then 
conducted once the system is emulated in the steady-state sense.  This is accomplished by 
satisfying the requirements of theorems 1, 2, and 3.  The result is a detailed analysis of 
the system security at the current operating point of the system. 
5.1 STEADY-STATE POWER SYSTEM EMULATION 
 The formulation of steady-state power system emulation presented here assumes 
that the mathematical models and parameters of the system are known and correct.  The 
model of the power system presented in chapter four is deemed acceptable for this 
application.  As a result of this, and theorems 1 and 2, the steady-state system emulation 
problem is formulated in two parts.  Namely, determining the correct power system 
topology and estimating the inputs to the emulator.  By doing so, all the requirements for 
steady-state system emulation are satisfied.  In this case the inputs are determined from 
measurements, or a subset of the measurements, taken from the power system and 
associated statistical information.  The power system can be emulated in steady-state by 
identifying the correct topology and applying the estimated inputs to the emulator.  While 
this formulation assumes the parameters are known it should be noted that in most 
applications these parameters are not explicitly known.  Parameter estimation is required.  
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Parameter estimation utilizing analog techniques is left for future work.  The next section 
addresses topology identification. 
5.1.1 TOPOLOGY IDENTIFICATION 
  The process for determining the power system topology is shown in Figure 34.  
First the power system structure is modeled as a graph.  Graph theory is utilized to 
identify potential topologies of the power system.  Unlikely topologies can be discarded 
and not examined.  For example, a topology in which no transmission lines are present 
need not be examined.  Potential topologies are then tested with the analog emulator and 
measurement data.  A performance index is defined and used to quantify, based on 
probability and measurement statistics, how well a particular topology matches the power 
system measurement data.  Poor performance indexes are indicative of bad data and/or 
incorrect topologies.  Bad data is identified and removed from the process.  Once bad 
data is removed the correct topology is chosen as the one with the best performance 
index. 
 The process begins by defining the system as a bus section/switching device 
structure.  An example of this system representation is shown in Figure 35.  Based on the 
status of the switching devices and power system components numerous different 
topologies can be realized.  The number of possible topologies can be large but is 














Figure 34: Topology Determination Process 
 
 




 A graph, G , is defined by a set of vertices and a set of edges as follows [60]: 
 
 ( ),G V E=  (5.1) 
 
where V is a set of vertices, or nodes: 
 
 { }1 2, ,..., nV v v v=  (5.2) 
 
and E  is defined as a set of edges, or lines, which link the vertices: 
 
 { }1 2 2 3,...,E v v v v=  (5.3) 
 
A power system is easily represented as a graph from a one-line diagram.  For example, a 
five bus system and the associated graph are shown in Figure 36.  Each bus is defined as 
a vertex and each transmission line or transformer connecting two buses is defines as an 
edge.  Buses one through five are denoted in graph form as the set of vertices 
{ }1 2 3 4 5, , , ,V v v v v v= .  The lines connecting the buses are denoted in graph form as the set 
of edges { }1 2 1 4 2 3 2 4 3 4 3 5 4 5, , , , , ,E v v v v v v v v v v v v v v= .  For example, the line connecting buses 
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Figure 36: Graph Definition for Five Bus System 
 
 Many different topologies can be formed for this five bus system.  Four examples 
of connected topologies are shown in Figure 37.  The graphs are connected if a path 
exists connecting every distinct pair of vertices.  Topology I corresponds to the system 
shown in Figure 36.  Topology II would represent the same system if the line between 
buses two and four were removed or taken out of service.  During operation the power 
system is typically connected.  It is designed and operated as an interconnected system.  
However, in certain situations islanding can occur.  Examples of such situations are 
blackouts or a loss of a transmission line interconnecting two parts of the power system.  
In the absence of a large failure the system will typically remain connected.  As a result, 
in this work all connected topologies are identified as potential topologies.  The potential 
topologies of the power system are then a small, connected, subset of all possible 
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Figure 37: Potential Topologies for Five Bus System in Graph Form 
 
 Analyzing connectedness on all possible subgraphs of the power system graph 
identifies the set of potential topologies.  There exist numerous techniques for analyzing 
connectedness.  Some examples are depth-first-search (DFS) [61], breadth-first search 
(BFS) [62] or Floyd-Warshall algorithm [61].  BFS and DFS are search techniques which 
traverse the graph from a specified root node.  The Floyd-Warshall algorithm defines 
shortest paths between nodes in the graph.  This is performed via dynamic programming.  
Specifically, the Floyd-Warshall algorithm is designed for use on weighted directed 
graphs.  In this application the graph is neither directed, nor weighted and connectivity 
determination does not require the determination of the shortest path.  A modified Floyd-
Warshall algorithm was used here to determine connectedness.  This algorithm was 
chosen because it is well documented and relatively simple to implement as compared to 
other methods. 
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 The modified Floyd-Warshall algorithm that was implemented is detailed in [61].  
The algorithm accepts the power system graph in the form of an adjacency matrix as an 
input and computes the transitive closure of the graph.  The transitive closure determines 
if a node can be reached from another node by traversing the edges of a graph.  This is 
determined for all nodes in the graph.  In an unconnected graph there is no method to 
traverse from some nodes to others.  This information is obtained from the transitive 
closure.  Connectivity of a given topology is obtained by analyzing the output of this 
algorithm.  The power system graph used for this test contains all possible vertices and 
edges representing power system components.  This graph is defined as: 
 
 { },PS PS PSG V E=  (5.4) 
 
where 
 PSG   a graph representing the power system containing all possible edges and 
vertices 
 PSV   a set of all possible vertices of the power system 
 PSE   a set of all possible edges of the power system 
 
 By definition the actual topology of the power system at any point in time is a 
subset of this graph. Depending on the bus section/switching device structure of the 
system nodes can be created or eliminated based on the status of switches.  Due to this 
PSG  is most likely not unique if it is formed directly from a one-line diagram of the 
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power system.  A unique PSG  can be defined for any system based on the bus 
section/switching device diagram and including the switches as edges in the graph.  In a 
subgraph of PSG  the presence of an edge representing a switch indicates the switch is 
closed and an absence of this edge indicates an open switch. 
 A PSG  representing a power system structure can be said to consist of n  vertices 
and m  edges.  The number of subgraphs of PSG , or possible topologies of the power 
system, is then 2m .  The modified Floyd-Warshall algorithm is performed on all 2m  
subgraphs to identify connectedness.  The algorithm can also identify the number of 
islands present in unconnected graphs.  For an unconnected graph the algorithm will 
output subsets of nodes that exhibit finite costs to reach each other.  Each one of these 
subsets is an island. 
 This algorithm is performed using a digital computer.  While this algorithm, or 
others, could have been implemented with analog techniques this was not examined in 
this work.  The time complexity of the process is proportional to the number of vertices 
in the graph.  More specifically, the algorithm will complete in a finite number of 
operations proportional to the number of vertices of the graph.  This particular algorithm 
is proportional to the number of vertices due to the nature of transitive closure.  Each 
vertex of the graph must be examined to determine transitive closure.  For large power 
systems where many graphs need to be analyzed this can be a time consuming process.  
However, it is only required to be performed once for a given power system to identify 
all potential topologies.  Only when a structural change to the system occurs (e.g. a 
construction of a new transmission line) is it required to run this algorithm again.  Once 
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all potential topologies are identified the emulator is utilized to test these topologies and 
identify the correct one. 
 Each potential topology is tested by the analog emulator.  Steady-state analog 
computability is required for each test as outlined in lemma 1.  Each topology is assigned 
a performance index based on the test results.  This index is indicative of the likelihood 
that the topology is correct.  This process requires redundant measurement data and 
analog computability for every topology/measurement set to be tested.  For this work, the 
power system model for the emulator consists of power injections (generators and loads) 
and the power system network.  The measurements are assumed to be one of six types, 
real power injection ( )P , reactive power injection ( )Q , bus voltage magnitude ( )V , bus 
voltage angle Vθ , injected current magnitude ( )I , or injected current phase Iθ .  Other 
measurements and/or models for the power system can be used but the formulation for 
computability will be slightly different. 
 From lemma 1, a given topology is computable in DC emulation if the network 
currents can be emulated correctly based on the inputs to the emulator.  In other words 
[ ] [ ][ ]I Y V=  must be solvable based on the inputs.  The measurement data from the 
power system is used directly as inputs to the analog emulator.  For example, if all the 
measurements are voltages, then all bus voltage angles and magnitudes must be measured 
in order for a given topology to be computable.  The computability formulation can be 
stated in a more precise form similar to those shown in chapter 3. 
 Any potential topology can be viewed as a network with n  nodes which requires 
a minimum of 2n  measurements to be computable.  At each node there are a total of six 
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variables: complex power injection ( ),P Q , voltage ( ), VV θ , and complex current 
injection ( ), II θ .  Figure 38 shows a generic node, or bus, in the power system.  The 
node is shown as bus i and has a power injection and a connection to the network.  Of the 
six variables only two are required to be specified.  The other four can be solved for by 
the emulator.  For example, if the power injection is a PQ load connected to the network 
the load circuit applies the applicable voltage to satisfy the specified PQ and resulting 
current flow in the network.  Essentially the network is solving for the current variables 
and the load is solving for the voltage variables.  So long as any two variables are 
measured at every bus the potential topology is analog computable by this emulator in the 











Bus i  
Figure 38: Power System Bus 
 
 It is assumed redundant data exists in order to test a topology.  Multiple 
computable sets of inputs to the emulator exist with redundant measurement data.  The 
computability requirements and the number of measurements available determine how 
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many computable sets exist.  For a given topology where k  is defined as the number of 
measurements and 2n  the number of measurements required for computability.  The 
degree of redundancy (DoR) is defined as: 
 
 2DoR k n= −  (5.5) 
 
If 
  0DoR ≤  topology is not computable 
  0DoR =  topology computable with one set of inputs 
  0DoR ≥  topology computable with multiple sets of inputs 
 
With redundant data the number of computable sets (ComputSets) of data can be 
determined by: 
 
 ( ) ( )2
!




n n k n
⎛ ⎞= = =⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠  (5.6) 
 
A test can be conducted for each one of these combinations, or a subset of these 
combinations, in order to calculate the performance index of each topology.  For testing 
purposes the following assumptions are made: 
 
 1.  The inputs to the emulator are correct. 
 2.  The variances of the power system measurements are known. 
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 3.  The variances of the emulator measurements are known. 
 4.  All measurements are normally distributed.  
 5.  The random errors in measurement are statistically independent variables. 
 
 Taking one computable set of data and applying it to the input of the emulator 
conducts the test.  This will bring the emulator to a steady-state operating point based on 
the data from the computable set.  Measurements are then taken from the emulator at this 
operating point.  Specifically, these measurements are taken at the points where 
redundant data that is not in the computable set exists.  The performance index is 
calculated by comparing this measured data from the emulator to the measured data from 
the power system.  The procedure is similar to the process used in detection theory. 
 Ideally if the inputs to the emulator are correct, all power system measurements 
correct, and the topology correct, then the measurement from the emulator would 
precisely match the measurement from the power system.  However, due to errors and 
noise in both the power system and emulator measurements this will not be the case.  As 
long as these measurement errors are relatively small they will only cause slight 
differences between the power system measurement and emulator measurement.  Bad 
data and topological errors will yield very large deviations in these two measurements.  
This property allows for detection and elimination of bad data.  The performance index is 
designed and calculated based on these properties.  For each redundant measurement not 
in the computable set the probability of the measurement being correct for the given 
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Figure 39: Likelihood Test 
 
 
 The probability of measurement measiz  from the power system being correct is 
quantified by the overlap of the probability density functions of the measurement measiz  
and the measurement of the same point from the emulator emuliz .  The probability density 
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The probability of the power system measurement being correct, ( )measiP z , is quantified 
by the shaded region in Figure 39.  This area can be computed numerically by: 
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This probability is computed for each redundant measurement.  From these probabilities 
the probability of all measurements being correct for a given computable set m  is 
computed by a weighted average of the individual probabilities: 
 


















Each individual probability is weighted with the variance of the measurements.  This 
allows for more accurate measurements to have more impact on the probability.  ( )P m  is 
computed for each computable set of data for the topology.  The performance index for a 
given topology is based on these probabilities.  Numerous different performance indices 








= ∑  (5.11) 
 
where 
  csn   the number of computable sets used in testing a topology 
 
With this performance index a low probability will result in a large PI.  Topologies with 
very large PI are discarded as incorrect.  A low PI is indicative of a topology that closely 
matches the acquired data from the power system.  A PI is computed for each potential 
topology.  The correct topology is chosen as the one that exhibits the lowest performance 
index.  This procedure is shown as a block diagram in Figure 40. 
This process identifies the topologies through testing.  Topological errors will 
come through the process as a high PI.  However, bad data measured from the power 
system will also result in a high PI.  It is essential to distinguish where the error is coming 
from, either topological or measurement error.  This process is well suited for identifying 
the source of errors.  For a given measurement analyzing ( )measiP z  will provide 
information on measurement and/or topology errors: 
 
• If ( )measiP z  is consistently low for all topologies tested then the 
measurement data is most likely bad. 
• If ( )measiP z  is low for one, or multiple similar topologies then this error is 
most likely due to errors in those topologies. 
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Figure 40: Topology Testing Procedure 
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 In the event of topological errors those topologies are thrown out as incorrect with 
a high PI.  In the case of measurement errors the performance indices are recalculated 
excluding any data related to the bad measurement data.  Input identification is performed 
once the correct topology is identified. 
5.1.2 INPUT IDENTIFICATION 
Given a set of good data and the correct topology, the power system can be emulated 
in steady-state by identifying the correct inputs to the emulator.  From theorem 1, two out 
of the three requirements have been met.  The system is analog computable (this was a 
requirement for topology identification) and the functional description of the system is 
known (correct topology and correct functional description from accepted models).  Once 
the correct inputs are identified the system can be emulated in steady-state.  In this case 
the inputs are not explicitly known.  As a result, an estimate of the actual inputs derived 
from measurements from the system is assumed to be the correct input to the analog 
computer.  The basic approach taken here is to adjust the inputs in a method to achieve 
the highest probability that the inputs are correct for a given topology.  The computable 
set of inputs from the topology identification process that yields the highest ( )P m  is 
taken as a starting point for input identification.  From this point the inputs are adjusted in 
order to achieve the highest probability. 
The probability for input identification is slightly different than in topology 
identification.  Specifically the difference is that more individual probabilities are 
required to compute ( )P m .  Since the emulator inputs will be altered to estimate the 
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power system inputs the emulator inputs should also be used when computing ( )P m .  
The computation is carried out as follows for n  measurements: 
 

















To save time in computing this probability for a given set of inputs, the inputs can be 
taken as pseudo measurements and not explicitly measured from the emulator.  Doing 
this assumes that the inputs are being applied to the emulator correctly.  With this method 
only the redundant data is required to be measured from the emulator.  Numerous 
techniques could be utilized in adjusting the inputs to maximize ( )P m . 
One approach to find a high ( )P m  is to perform Monte Carlo style emulations.  
Many different sets of inputs can be randomly generated and applied to the emulator.  
The probability is computed for each set.  The set of inputs that yield the highest 
probability will then be chosen as the correct set of inputs.  A good estimate of the inputs 
can be found by performing numerous emulations.  However, as the number of emulation 
runs increases so does the computation time necessary to emulate the power system.  A 
different approach could yield a good estimate of the system inputs in a shorter time 
frame.  One such approach is to use heuristics to alter the inputs towards values that 
achieve a higher probability. 
The basic idea in utilizing heuristics is to alter the inputs in a direction that raises 
( )P m .  For example, if a measurement of real power injection in the emulator is lower 
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than the analogous power system measurement altering an input to the emulator could 
raise the power injection and hence raise ( )P m .  More specifically, if the voltage angle 
at the injection point is an input to the emulator it could be changed to raise the real 
power injection.  In a similar fashion voltage magnitudes could be raised to increase 
reactive power injections.  Conversely, if power injections are inputs to the emulator, real 
power inputs can be changed to change voltage angles and reactive power injections 
changed to change voltage magnitudes.  A generalized iterative scheme for adjusting an 
emulator with n  inputs is as follows: 
 
 [ ] [ ]
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1 1 1













⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= = + = +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
# # #  (5.13) 
 
where 
  xi   the input vector at step i 
  1xi+   the input vector at step i+1 
  α   a scalar parameter dictating how much to adjust the input vector 
  σ   a vector weighting input adjustments based on measurement   
  standard deviations 
  [ ]D   diagonal direction matrix dictating which direction to adjust inputs 
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 This scheme can be run numerous times to achieve different operating points in 
the emulator and different probabilities ( )P m .  The changes in inputs are weighted based 
on the standard deviation of the power system measurements.  This is done because 
inputs with larger standard deviations can be changed more with less effect on ( )P m  in 
comparison to more accurate measurements with small standard deviations.  The scaling 
factor α  is a parameter specified which dictates how large of a step from the prior 
iteration should be taken.  If the step is too large the process will take the emulator to an 
operating point far from the actual power system operating point.  If α  is too small it will 
take many steps to improve ( )P m .  Heuristics are utilized to determine the direction 
matrix D. 
 The direction matrix is a diagonal matrix.  This assumes that the covariance 
between any two measurements is zero.  If measurement covariance is modeled this 
matrix will not be diagonal.  The non-zero off diagonal entries will be proportional to the 
measurement covariances.  The diagonal entries in the direction matrix are either one, 
negative one, or zero.  The values are determined based on heuristics.  For example, if the 
input is a real power injection and heuristics dictate this should be raised to improve 
( )P m  then the corresponding entry in the D matrix is one.  A positive value dictates that 
input should be increased from the previous value.  The value should be negative one if 
the input should be decreased.  If it is determined that a change in the input will not 
improve ( )P m  then the entry should be zero.  This heuristic evaluation is required for all 
emulator inputs.  It should be noted that the process in equation (5.13) does not converge 
to a maximum.  It is designed to find a high quality solution in a faster manner than a 
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Monte Carlo type method.  It should be run until a relatively close match between the 
emulator and the power system measurements is found.  In addition, noise in the analog 
emulator will affect this process. 
 Noise on the emulator inputs and noise in the emulator measurements will limit 
the precision of the analog solution.  As a result there will be a minimum value of α  for 
which the emulator can produce a discernibly different solution from the prior iteration.  
This minimum value will depend on the noise in analog hardware and the sensitivity of 
any given measurement to the inputs being changed each iteration.  It is not a 
straightforward process to define a minimum α  as it will vary on a case-by-case basis.  
However, it is easy to identify if a given α  value is too low during emulation.  If a 
noticeable change in the measurements, and likewise ( )P m , is not observed from one 
iteration to the next the value chosen for α  is too small.  The value should be increased 
before another iteration is made.  In addition, if the emulator is providing very noisy 
measurements, data can be sampled multiple times to gain confidence in the results.  
Inherently this will result in additional computation time.  An example of the input 
identification process is demonstrated on a small two bus example. 
 The example two bus system is shown in Figure 41.  It consists of a generator, a 
lossless transmission line, and a load.  The true values and measured values are also 
shown.  The real power injection from the generator, 1P , load bus voltage magnitude, 
2V , and load bus voltage angle, 2θ , are measured.  Bus 1 is designated as the slack bus.  









θ=  (5.14) 
 
where 12 1 2 2θ θ θ θ= − = − . 
 
 Given equation (5.14) and the known slack bus values, two measurements are 
required as inputs to compute the function.  The degree of redundancy is one.  With three 
measurements this yields three different computable sets.  These three computable sets 
were used and the ( )P m  calculated for each set of data.  For this example the emulator 
solution is assumed to be equivalent to equation (5.14).  The results are tabulated in Table 
3. 
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Table 3: Results of Three Computable Sets 
Inputs to 
Emulator Emulator Solution P(m)
Heuristic
0.504 lower P, raise V
0.527 raise angle, lower P
0.762 raise angle
1 2 , P V
1 2 , P θ
2 2 , V θ
2 31 332 .θ = − D
2 1 09 .V =
1 0 477.P =  
 
 ( )P m  was computed for each computable set as per equation (5.12).  For this 
example, 0 1.P Vσ σ= =  and 3 0.θσ =  for both the power system and emulator 
measurements. The third case provided the best result while the first and second had 
relatively lower ( )P m  values.  The final column of the table details the heuristics for the 
given computable set to raise ( )P m .  The last computable set was taken as the starting 
point for adjusting the inputs to find the best estimate of the system operating point. 
 From the emulator solution of case 3 the power injected into bus one from the 
generator is 0.477 per unit.  This is lower than the measured value of 0.52 per unit.  In 
order to raise this power injection, and hence raise ( )P m , the voltage magnitude at bus 
two could be raised and/or the angle at bus 2 changed.  Changing the voltage angle will 
result in raising the power injection more than voltage magnitude based on the standard 
deviations of the measurements and equation (5.14).  The angle was changed in steps and 
the results are tabulated in  
 
Table 4.  For this example 0.1α =  and only the angle was adjusted.  It can be seen from 
the results that a fairly high quality solution was obtained at step 28.  ( )P m  was 
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computed to be 0.984 for a 1 0 52.P = , 2 1 0.V = , and 2 31 3.θ = − D   These values are close 
to the true values and a significant improvement over the measured values.  This example 
is a basic case in which only one input was changed to achieve good results.  These 
results could be improved further by adjusting the other inputs.  For larger cases changes 
to more than one input are required to find a high quality solution. 
 
 
Table 4: Input Identification Results for 2 Bus System 
Step P(m)
0 1 -28.5 -0.477 0.769
1 1 -28.6 -0.479 0.779
2 1 -28.7 -0.480 0.783
3 1 -28.8 -0.482 0.795
4 1 -28.9 -0.483 0.799
5 1 -29.0 -0.485 0.809
6 1 -29.1 -0.486 0.813
7 1 -29.2 -0.488 0.823
8 1 -29.3 -0.489 0.828
9 1 -29.4 -0.491 0.838
10 1 -29.5 -0.492 0.842
11 1 -29.6 -0.494 0.852
12 1 -29.7 -0.495 0.857
13 1 -29.8 -0.497 0.867
14 1 -29.9 -0.498 0.872
15 1 -30.0 -0.500 0.883
16 1 -30.1 -0.502 0.893
17 1 -30.2 -0.503 0.898
18 1 -30.3 -0.505 0.908
19 1 -30.4 -0.506 0.913
20 1 -30.5 -0.508 0.923
21 1 -30.6 -0.509 0.928
22 1 -30.7 -0.511 0.938
23 1 -30.8 -0.512 0.943
24 1 -30.9 -0.514 0.953
25 1 -31.0 -0.515 0.958
26 1 -31.1 -0.517 0.969
27 1 -31.2 -0.518 0.974
28 1 -31.3 -0.520 0.984
29 1 -31.4 -0.521 0.978
30 1 -31.5 -0.522 0.972
31 1 -31.6 -0.524 0.961
32 1 -31.7 -0.525 0.955
33 1 -31.8 -0.527 0.944
34 1 -31.9 -0.528 0.938




 Generally speaking the set of inputs with the highest ( )P m  during this process is 
chosen as the correct set of inputs for steady-state power system emulation.  A decision is 
required as to when the inputs are sufficient or of a high enough quality.  Defining a 
threshold for ( )P m  could handle this determination.  Once this threshold is reached the 
current inputs are selected as the estimates for steady-state emulation.  At this point the 
topology and inputs have been identified.  The emulator is configured based on this 
information and steady-state power system emulation is achieved as per theorem 1.  The 
emulator is functioning at an estimated operating point based on the measurements from 
the power system.  Contingency and stability analyses are performed at this operating 
point. 
5.2 CONTINGENCY AND STABILITY ANALYSIS 
The contingency and stability analysis procedure in analog form is similar to the 
digital contingency method outlined in Figure 42.  The main difference is that the analog 
hardware provides a time domain representation of the system and measurements are 
required in order to analyze the performance of the system for each contingency.  Due to 
the time domain representation of the system, faults can be emulated and transient 
stability determined.  The procedure for analog contingency and stability analysis is 
shown in Figure 43. 
In order to perform dynamic system emulation the requirements in theorems 1 and 3 
must be satisfied.  The inputs to the emulator over the time interval to be emulated need 
to be specified for each contingency emulated.  The stead-state emulation point is used as 
initial conditions to all integrators.  Specifics on the contingencies to be analyzed and 
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inputs to be changed are defined by the user.  These inputs are relatively arbitrary and can 
be defined as correct inputs for satisfying theorems 1 and 3. 
The power system is first emulated in steady-state.  At this point a contingency or 
fault is selected and the system is actuated to emulate the power system.  Actuation is 
handled by turning on the integrators with a digital signal.  Measurements are then taken 
and data analyzed to determine if the system is stable and within operating limitations.  
All contingencies and faults specified are run in a serial manner until all cases have been 
emulated.  The process of emulating all of these contingencies is quite fast.  For n-1 
contingencies only two changes must be made to the emulator for each case.  For 
example, if line outages are being studied going from one contingency to the next the 
line, which was just analyzed, must be added back to the system and another removed 
when running the next contingency.  Similarly faults are also emulated very fast.  The 
type of fault and fault time duration are specified and the emulator will emulate faster 
than real time based on the time scaling factor.  Data Acquisition requires the most time. 
In digital simulations all of the data is explicitly known and can be easily analyzed.  
Utilizing this analog technique data must be measured before analysis is possible.  
Measuring all the data from the emulator for each case is simply not feasible.  This would 
slow down the computation process tremendously.  However, for contingency and 
stability analysis many cases do not need to be analyzed.  Namely, cases in which the 
system is stable and operating within predefined limits do not require extensive analysis.  
The approach taken here is to utilize analog hardware to analyze stability and system 
operating limits.  Small sets of signals can be used to indicate if the system is stable or 
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operating out of limits.  More specifically, digital flags are used to indicate the status of 
the power system. 
 
 




















j = j + 1
 
Figure 43: Analog Contingency and Stability Analysis Procedure 
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 The digital flags are set by using comparators to compare the value in the 
emulator to a predetermined limit.  If the limit is surpassed the comparator output will be 
set to one.  If the limit is not exceeded the output will be zero.  One comparator, or set of 
comparators, is used to indicate stability.  Due to the nature of the analog hardware the 
devices will saturate when instability occurs.  For example, if a generator loses 
synchronism with the grid the angle will grow large and saturate the output of the 
integrator.  A similar behavior is exhibited in the loads.  The operating region of 
integrator outputs can be divided into two parts as shown in Figure 44.  There is the 
normal operating region and a saturated region.  Through appropriate scaling of the 
power system into the analog hardware the devices will only hit the saturation region 
when exhibiting instability.  A schematic for a comparator setup analyzing stability for a 
set of two generators is shown in Figure 45.  With this circuit stability for the set of 
generators can be determined for each contingency by simply measuring one digital 
signal.  If either generator goes unstable a comparator will output a one to the input of the 
OR gate.  The OR gate will then output a one indicating that they system is unstable for 
the given case.  The same circuit topology can be used to monitor line current flows.  A 









































For the monitoring of voltage magnitude the square of the voltage magnitude can 
be computed by the following: 
 
 2 2 2ImReV v v= +  (5.15) 
 
This computation can be done in analog hardware with two multipliers and an adder.  It is 
simpler to compute the magnitude squared as compared to the magnitude.  A square root 
operation is not required.  The bus voltage magnitude squared is then compared to both 
the minimum and maximum values that are predetermined.  The circuit will output a one 
if the voltage is out of range and a zero if the voltage is in range.  Many voltage 
magnitudes can be monitored with one digital flag by chaining the circuits together with 
multiple OR gates. 
For each case emulated only these digital flags require measurement to determine the 
severity of the case.  Cases resulting in overloads or instability can be quickly identified 
with this technique.  Additional measurements can then be taken to further analyze only 
the dangerous cases.  This process results in significant savings in computation time as 
minimal measurement is required for most contingencies. 
5.3 COMPUTATION TIME 
The procedure for analog power system security assessment consists of many steps 
and each must be accounted for to accurately assess computation time.  As previously 
defined the overall computation time consists of the time it takes to configure the 
emulator, emulate the system, and acquire necessary data.  These times are dependent on 
many factors. 
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System emulation time is independent of system size.  However, configuration and 
data acquisition are inherently a function of system size.  Computation time is also highly 
dependent on the system architecture.  Specifically computation time is dependent on 
how many A/D and D/A converters are running in parallel, and how many channels the 
multiplexers and demultiplexers have.  In addition, the number of potential topologies 
and degree of redundancy of data will effect how many cases are to be studied.  Likewise 
the number of contingencies to be computed will alter the computation time.  With this in 
mind the determination of computation time for the presented security assessment 
procedure is derived in a generic fashion.  This derivation is applicable to a variety of 
cases and hardware configurations. 
Computation time is found by assessing the time taken to perform specific operations 
and enumerating how many times each operation is conducted while performing security 
assessment.  The operations are defined as the time to make one data acquisition ( )1acqt , 
time to configure one device or input ( )1conft , and the time to perform one emulation 
( )1emult .  For an emulator with one A/D converter it can only acquire one piece of data at 
a time.  If an emulator consists of multiple A/D converters operating in parallel, it can 
acquire multiple points of data in this time. For simplicity the derivation here enumerates 
the number of operations required assuming one A/D converter.  This value will have to 
be scaled appropriately for the architecture of the emulator.  In a similar fashion multiple 
devices could be configured with parallel D/A converters.  Computation time required for 
topology identification, input identification, and contingency/stability analysis are 
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enumerated independently here.  Total computation time for security assessment is the 
sum of the time taken for these three processes. 
 
Topology Identification 
 The process of topology identification requires numerous different configurations 
of the power system.  These configurations consist of different topologies and different 
inputs to each topology based on the computable sets of data available.  The total 
configuration time for the topology identification process can be quantified by: 
 
 ( )11 1
1
topn
conf comp conf i i i conf
i
t n t m tα β
−
=
= ⋅ + ⋅ +∑  (5.16) 
 
where 
compn   the number of components that require configuration for the first 
topology 
  topn   the number of topologies to be tested 
  im  the number of computable sets of data for topology i 
iα  the number of operations required to configure inputs from one 
computable set to another 




During the topology identification process the system must be emulated for each 
computable set present for each topology tested.  The time for emulation is quantified by: 
 







= ∑  (5.17) 
 
Data must also be acquired for each of these emulations.  Specifically the redundant data 
must be acquired from the emulator.  The data acquisition time is quantified by: 
 
 ( ) 1
1
topn
acq i i acq
i
t m DoR t
=
= ⋅∑  (5.18) 
 
where 
  iDoR   the degree of redundancy of topology i 
 
 There are a few places where this process can be optimized to reduce computation 
time.  During configuration the order in which topologies are tested can be arranged such 
that minimal amount of operations are required to go from one topology to the next.  In 
addition, it may not be necessary to test all computable sets or acquire all the redundant 
data to eliminate a potential topology.  For example, if only a few data sets are run on a 
given topology but exhibit very poor performance this topology could be eliminated with 
no further computation.  Figure 47 shows the relationship between the number of 
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computable sets tested and the number of computation operations required for a nine bus 
power system. 
For this example, the nine bus test system consists of nine transmission lines, 
three loads, and three generators.  There are a total of seven potential topologies to be 
tested and a degree of redundancy on data of one, resulting in ten computable sets.  It can 
be seen that the computation operations required increases linearly with the number of 
computable sets to be tested.  Computation operations are defined as the summation of 
configuration, emulation, and acquisition operations required.  Actual computation time 
will be a linear combination of configuration, emulation, and acquisition operations.  By 
reducing the number of computable sets to be tested, the overall computation time for 
topology identification decreases proportionally.  The next step of the security assessment 
is input identification. 
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 The input identification does not require as much configuration as the topology 
identification.  The chosen topology must be reconfigured in the emulator.  After this is 
done the only changes in configuration are the changing of the inputs at each iteration.  
This configuration time can be quantified by: 
 
 ( ) 1conf reconf input conft n n k t= + ⋅ ⋅  (5.19) 
 
where 
reconfn   the number of operations required to reconfigure the emulator 
from last tested topology to topology chosen as correct 
  inputn   the number of inputs to be adjusted for each iteration 
  k   the number of iterations in the input identification procedure 
 
The time for emulation is directly proportional to the number if iterations taken: 
 
 1emul emult k t= ⋅  (5.20) 
 
The data acquisition time for input identification is proportional to the number of 
iterations and degree of redundancy for the chosen topology: 
 
 1acq acqt DoR k t= ⋅ ⋅  (5.21) 
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The process of input identification can be sped up by finding a high quality solution in as 
few iterations as possible.  Figure 48 shows the number of computation operations 
required in relation to the number of iterations performed for input identification.  This 
was determined based on the same nine bus example system used previously.  The 
computation operations required increases linearly with the number of iterations 
performed.  The final part of the security assessment procedure is contingency and 
stability analysis. 
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Figure 48: Computation Operations for Input Identification 
 
 
Contingency and Stability Analysis 
 The configuration time for the contingency and stability analysis is solely 
dependent on how many contingencies and faults are to be emulated.  No initial 
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configuration is necessary as the system is emulated in the steady-state once input 
identification is finished.  For n-1 contingencies 2 1n −  configurations are required.  The 
initial contingency will require one operation, for example removing a line, while 
subsequent contingencies will require two operations.  The first operation is to restore the 
component from the prior contingency and the second is to remove the component for the 
next contingency.  When emulating faults one configuration is required per case to 
configure the faulted condition.  The configuration time is quantified as follows: 
 
 ( ) 1 12 1conf conf fault conft n t n t= − ⋅ + ⋅  (5.22) 
 
where 
  n   the number of contingencies to be emulated 
  faultn   the number of faults to be emulated 
 
Emulation time is directly proportional to the number of contingencies and faults 
emulated: 
 
 ( ) 1emul fault emult n n t= + ⋅  (5.23) 
 
Data acquisition time is dependent on how many cases to be emulated and how many 
cases are deemed dangerous and require acquiring more data from the emulator.  The 
data acquisition time is enumerated by: 
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 ( )( ) 12acq fault dig bus acqt n n n n tρ= + + ⋅  (5.24) 
 
where 
  dign   the number of digital flags measured per case 
  busn   the number of buses in the power system 
  ρ   a number between zero and 1 indicating how many cases are   
  dangerous and require further data acquisition 
 
For 1ρ =  all of the cases are dangerous and require data acquisition beyond the digital 
flags.  For 0 1ρ< <  only a portion of the cases require further data acquisition.  2 busn  
measurements are required to provide all the states of the power system for a given case.  
For example, measuring the real and imaginary bus voltages are each bus will provide all 
the necessary information from the emulator for further analysis.  With this information 
line flows, power injections, etc. can be analyzed. 
 The computation time required for data acquisition can be reduced if fewer 
contingencies and/or faults are analyzed and if less information is acquired for the 
dangerous cases.  For example, if a generator exhibits instability for a given case the 
system operator may not be interested in the profile of the entire system.  Acquiring data 
from the general area where the generator is located may be sufficient to analyze the case. 
Figure 49 shows the computation operations required for contingency analysis in 
relation to the number of contingencies run on the nine bus system.  It can be seen that 
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the computation operations increases linearly with the number of contingencies 
performed.  A similar behavior is seen for stability analysis.  Figure 50 shows the 
computation operations required for stability analysis in relation to the number of faults 
performed.  This plot assumes that 10% of the cases are dangerous and require data 
acquisition beyond the digital flags.  The acquisition time changes linearly as the number 
of dangerous cases changes.  The next chapter provides simulation and hardware results 
that validate this power system security assessment method. 
 
Figure 49: Computation Operations for Contingency Analysis 
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Figure 50: Computation Operations for Stability Analysis 
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Figure 51: Computation Operations for Various Dangerous Cases 
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6 EXAMPLES, RESULTS, AND ANALYSIS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter provides results that verify the proposed method of power system 
security assessment.  Topology identification, including bad data detection and 
identification, is presented.  This is followed by input identification and then contingency 
and stability analysis.  The presented results were obtained through either software 
simulation of the analog emulator or directly from the prototype power system emulator. 
 Prior work has shown that the DC emulation method (assuming ideal hardware) is 
equivalent to AC power flow results for steady-state analysis [63].   With this in mind a 
digital AC power flow solver was utilized for simulations of cases where steady-state 
results are required.  More specifically, Matpower 3.2 was used [64] in conjunction with 
MATLAB R2007b [65]. Analog behavior modeling was utilized for simulating the 
dynamic behavior of the emulator.  This technique has been used extensively in the 
design and benchmarking of the emulator models and techniques [53, 66].  This 
simulation technique provides emulation results assuming ideal hardware.  Based on 
hardware testing the emulator prototype results are typically within 5% of digital power 
flow solvers.  The errors are due to non-ideal hardware components, noise, and 
measurement error. 
The analog security assessment method was applied to two sample power 
systems.  The first test system is a three bus power system and the second is a nine bus 
power system.  One line diagrams are used to represent these test systems.  As stated 
previously, switches and breakers can be represented in a one line diagram as a line with 
low or no impedance.  The presence of the line in the topology represents a closed switch 
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or breaker, the absence an opened switch or breaker.  The three bus power system results 
are presented next. 
6.2 THREE BUS POWER SYSTEM TEST CASE 
 The one line diagram of the three bus power system is shown in Figure 52.  This 
system consists of two generator buses, one that is a slack bus, a load bus and three 
transmission lines.  The system parameters and base case power flow results can be seen 
in the appendix.  The system parameters are enumerated in  Table 29 and the power flow 
results in Table 33 located in the appendix.  The base case results represent the “true” 
values of the system for these examples. 
 
 




 The first step of the security assessment procedure is to identify the correct 
topology.  The potential topologies for this system are defined as those topologies that 
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represent a connected power system.  The modified Floyd-Warshall algorithm was run on 
the three bus system graph to identify these topologies.  The system graph consists of 
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=  (6.1) 
 
The algorithm identified four potential topologies.  These topologies are shown in Figure 









 All four potential topologies consist of three nodes, or vertices.  As a direct result, 
the topologies have the same requirements for computability.  Six inputs are necessary to 
satisfy steady-state computability requirements for each test.  The inputs for testing are 
obtained from pseudo measurements and measurement data.  Measurement data was 
simulated by adding normally distributed random noise with a given standard deviation to 
the true values of the system.  Table 5 enumerates the true values, measured values and 
standard deviations of the measurements.  For this example it is assumed that the 
standard deviation of power system measurements and emulation measurements are the 
same.  Real power injections and bus voltage magnitudes are measured for buses one and 
two.  Reactive power injection and bus voltage angle are measured at bus three.  The 
slack bus voltage magnitude is taken as a pseudo measurement and set to one per unit.  In 
addition, the slack bus is taken as the reference point and the voltage angle is set to zero 
degrees. 
 With the slack bus angle specified and used as an input to the emulator, only five 
measurements are required for computability.  Six measurements are randomly generated 
and there is one pseudo measurement for a total of seven.  This results in a degree of 
redundancy of two.  Redundant data is only available at bus three resulting in six 
computable sets of data ( )42 6C = .  To keep computation time low it is desirable to test a 
small subset of all computable sets and still correctly identify the system topology. 
 The simulation results for this system show that only two of the six computable 
sets need to be tested in order to accurately identify the correct topology.  The correct 
topology from the base case is topology one in Figure 53.  The two test cases used are 
detailed in Table 6.  The inputs on the two generation buses remain constant and the 
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inputs for the load bus are varied from case one to case two.  In case one the load is 
modeled as a PV bus.  3Q  and 3θ  are measured during the test.  For the second case the 
load bus is modeled as a PQ bus.   3V  and 3θ are measured. 
 
Table 5: True and Measured Values for Three Bus Example 
True Value Measured Value σ
P2 1.630 1.6640 p.u. 0.05
|V2| 1.000 0.9862 p.u. 0.05
P3 2.000 2.0495 p.u. 0.05
Q3 0.750 0.7609 p.u. 0.05
|V3| 0.909 1.0022 p.u. 0.05
θ3 -6.466 -6.7273 degrees 0.50  
 
Table 6: Test Cases for Three Bus Example 
Case Measurements
1 Q3, θ3
2 |V3|, θ3|V1|, θ1, P2, |V2|, P3, Q3
Inputs
|V1|, θ1, P2, |V2|, P3, |V3|
 
 
 The simulations results for the four topologies and two cases are enumerated in 
Table 7.  The probability ( )P m  was computed for each case and the performance index 
PI  computed for each topology.  Topology one was chosen correctly as the topology 
with the lowest PI.  Topologies three and four resulted in significantly high performance 
indices while topology two was closer in performance to topology one.  If only one of 
these cases were run for this example the technique would have still correctly identified 
topology one as the correct topology.  However, the performance indices would have 
been closer between topologies.  Generally speaking, the more cases performed the more 
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discrepancies can be seen between the topologies.  This approach to topology selection 
can also identify bad data. 
 
Table 7: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus Example 
P(m1) Q3 θ3 P(m2) |V3| θ3 PI
1 0.0592 -0.4909 -6.4090 0.2393 0.901 -6.722 21
2 0.0160 -0.5907 -3.0710 0.1054 0.890 -2.867 72
3 0.0001 -0.4898 -14.5590 0.0073 0.814 -16.903 7447
4 0.0000 -0.7431 -30.1980 0.0000 1.358 170.310 > 10E6
Topology Case 1 Case 2
 
 
 For this next example, topology identification for the three bus system was 
simulated with the presence of bad data.  This bad data was specifically a measurement of 
reactive power at bus three equal to zero ( )3 0Q = .  This can occur in a situation where 
the meter is not reporting data or if the measurement was missed.  The same two cases 
were simulated for all four topologies with this bad data.  The results are listed in Table 
8.  Bad data is likely to not match any of the topologies and result in a low ( )measiP z .  For 
this example, bad data was correctly detected by observing that ( )measiP z   for 3Q  was 
consistently low across all topologies.  ( )measiP z  is approximately zero for the 3Q  
measurement across all four topologies.  PI  was recalculated once the bad data was 
identified and removed.  PI  calculations are shown for good data and bad data.  It is 
interesting to note that regardless of bad data the method identified the correct topology.  
This can be expected so long as the majority of data is good and all the data used as 
inputs for a given test case are good.  More specifically, there must be enough good data 
to maintain an adequate degree of redundancy.  This allows for a sufficient number of 
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computations to identify the correct topology.  For a given power system a minimum 
DoR  could be defined which is necessary for topology identification.  This minimum 
DoR  will be specific to the system and set of measurements.  Additional examples of 
topology identification in the presence of bad data are shown in the appendix.  This 
technique easily identifies and eliminates bad data and correctly identifies the topology.  
In some cases the correct topology is identified with the presence of bad data.  Further 
investigation is required to analyze the robustness of the technique with bad data.  
Inherently there are some limitations and aspects to consider for bad data detection with 
this technique. 
 First and foremost, to correctly identify bad data it must be one of the 
measurements for a given topology test.  To scan all measurements for bad data it is 
required to select the test cases appropriately.  In addition, once bad data is identified and 
removed the degree of redundancy and number of computable sets decreases.  If the 
current topology identification problem has a low DoR  and bad data exists it may be 
difficult to identify the correct topology.  One topology identification test has been 
presented in detail and properly identified the correct topology.  To analyze the 
robustness and repeatability of this topology identification procedure, one hundred 
topology identification tests were performed on the three bus system with randomly 






Table 8: Three Bus Topology Identification Results in the Presence of Bad Data (Q3=0) 
P(m1) Q3 θ3 P(m2) |V3| θ3 PI (bad data) PI (good data)
1 0.0590 -0.4909 -6.4060 0.6179 0.965 -6.494 18.56 3.16
2 0.0000 -0.5907 -3.0680 0.4730 0.957 -2.962 > 10E6 > 10E6
3 0.0000 -0.4898 -14.5530 0.3523 0.939 -15.186 > 10E6 > 10E6
4 0.0000 -0.7431 -30.1980 0.0074 0.815 -35.482 > 10E6 > 10E6
Topology Case 1 Case 2
 
 
 Measurement data was randomly generated for each of the one hundred tests 
performed.  This data can be seen in Table 39 located in the appendix.  The same 
standard deviations and test cases were utilized when performing these tests.  The results 
of the simulations are enumerated in Table 40.  The correct topology was identified in 
80% of the cases.  Topology two was incorrectly chosen six times and topology three was 
incorrectly identified as the topology 14 times.  However, in most of these cases when a 
topology is chosen incorrectly there are multiple topologies with very low performance 
indices.  This is indicative that the results may be questionable.  One way to improve the 
results is to run more test cases on computable sets of data.  A quicker technique that 
requires no further testing was found while scanning for bad data. 
 For this example the ( )P m  for reactive power on bus three was consistently low 
for all 100 runs.  This is picked up by the algorithm as the presence of bad data. While 
there is not bad data present in these cases these results show that the reactive power 
injection at this bus is very sensitive to other factors.  This comes through in the results as 
a very low ( )P m .  Since this ( )P m  is very low for all cases it can be disregarded as bad 
data or an unreliable result.  This data was removed and the performance indices 
recalculated for all 100 runs.  These filtered results are shown in Table 41.  Topology one 
was selected as the correct topology for 100% of the runs.  In addition, there was a 
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minimum of an order of magnitude difference between the performance index of 
topology one and any other topology performance index.  This technique has worked well 
for this three bus case in these simulation results.  However, these simulation results do 
not factor in the presence of noise at the inputs of the emulator or noise on the 
measurements from the emulator.  The power system measurements are taken explicitly 
as inputs to the simulation and the power flow results are taken as measurements from the 
simulation.  The next examples examine the effects of both input noise and measurement 
noise from the emulator. 
 The same tests were performed again on the three bus system for 100 runs.  In 
these tests randomly generated noise was added to the inputs of the emulator (power flow 
simulator).  The noise had a zero mean and standard deviation of 0.05 for voltage (in per 
unit) and power (in per unit) measurements and 0.5 for angle measurements in degrees.  
These simulations analyze the robustness of the technique in the presence of noise on the 
emulator inputs.  The results are enumerated in Table 42.  In the presence of this noise 
the correct topology was identified in 98% of the cases.  In the two cases where topology 
one was not chosen the performance indices of multiple topologies were very low.  Due 
to the nature of the performance index a large discrepancy between indices from the 
correct topology and an incorrect topology is expected.  With this property instances 
where multiple topologies exhibit low performance indices, or indices that are relatively 
close to each other, can be labeled as suspect, or questionable.  Some more simulations 
were performed to analyze this property. 
 Two more sets of 100 simulations were performed.  More specifically, the two 
test cases were tested separately with randomly generated input noise.  The results for 
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case one is shown in Table 43 and case two in Table 44.  These results show the 
performance indices for each of the 100 simulations.  These tables are located in the 
appendices.  The results of these tests and the original test with both cases are tabulated 
in Table 9. 
 As stated previously, when both test cases were run the correct topology was 
identified 98% of the time.  For the cases where topology one was not chosen, the PI  for 
topology one was low and very close to the PI of the topology that was selected.    When 
both test cases were run only 4% of the results were questionable (multiple PI  within an 
order of magnitude).  In addition, all of the incorrectly identified topology tests were 
identified as questionable.  When only analyzing one case the topology identification 
process did not perform as well. 
 When only test case two was performed the process correctly identified the 
topology in 97% of the tests.  However, 62% of the results were flagged as questionable.  
When examining only test case one the correct topology was identified in 78% of the 
tests while only 6% of the results were questionable.  This performance will vary from 
system to system and case by case.  However, more test cases will generally result in 
more reliable topology identification and less questionable results.  In addition, by 
identifying questionable results a user can determine if more test cases are required to 
gain confidence in the results.  Overall the performance of the topology identification 
technique improves when more cases are analyzed and is robust enough to handle noise 
on the input to the emulator.  Another set of runs were simulated to analyze the effect of 
emulation measurement noise. 
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Table 9: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus System 
Correct Incorrect Questionable
1,2 98% 2% 4%
1 78% 22% 6%





 In prior simulation results the value achieved from the power flow solver was 
used as the measurement value from the emulator.  In other words emulator measurement 
noise is neglected.  The last set of 100 simulations for the three bus system incorporated 
both input noise and outputs noise of the emulator.  It was assumed that the noise on the 
input is uncorrelated to the noise on the output.  In physical terms this assumes that errors 
on the input are caused solely by the actuation circuitry and the measurement error is due 
to measurement circuitry.  Random noise was added to the power flow results to simulate 
measurement error.  The noise added had a zero mean and standard deviations of 0.05 for 
voltages and power and 0.5 for angles.  The results for these simulations are shown in 
Table 45.  The correct topology was chosen for all 100 runs.  In addition, no cases were 
flagged as questionable.  The technique has exhibited strong performance in the presence 
of noise. 
 Once the correct topology of a power system is chosen, two out of the three 
requirements for steady-state system emulation in theorem 1 are satisfied.  The functional 
description of the system is known from the topology and component models.  In 
addition, the requirement of computability in steady-state has already been satisfied 
during the topology identification process.  Determining the correct inputs is all that 
remains.  The inputs to the emulator are determined through the input identification 
process.  This process is presented next.  It is assumed that the measurement data 
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provided is synchronized.  In application, the telemetered data should be time stamped to 
allow for this synchronization. 
 For the three bus system, topology one and case two were taken as the starting 
point for input identification.  This test case exhibited the highest ( )P m .  ( )P m  was 
computed as 0.8577 for this case.  Two different methods were utilized to determine the 
inputs to the emulator.  The first was a Monte Carlo type process the second was the 
heuristic process described in chapter 5.  For the Monte Carlo process the inputs were 
randomly generated by adding normally distributed noise to the inputs from case two.  
Five hundred runs were conducted with varying standard deviations for the random noise.  
The standard deviations were varied from 0.5 to 0.0001.  The best results were obtained 
with 0 001.P Q Vσ σ σ= = = .  ( )P m  was improved to 0.8636 from the starting point.  
Heuristics were used as a different approach to identifying the inputs. 
 The largest discrepancy from case two results and the measurements was with bus 
three voltage.  That resulted in the smallest ( )iP z .  In order to improve the results it 
would be desirable to increase this voltage.  In order to do this the load reactive power 
3Q  could be lowered, the bus voltage 2V  could be raised, and the load real power 3P  
could be lowered.  Specifically for this example alpha was chosen as 0.001 and the 
direction matrix entries for 2V  was one and negative one for 3Q  and 3P .  In less than ten 
iterations ( )P m  was improved to a level slightly better than that achieved with the 




Table 10: Input Identification Results for Three Bus System 
V1 θ1 V2 P2 P3 Q3 V3 θ3 P(m)
Starting Point 1.000 0.000 0.9862 1.6640 2.0495 0.7610 0.9010 -6.7220 0.8577
Monte Carlo 1.000 0.000 0.9864 1.6644 2.0495 0.7606 0.9027 -6.7147 0.8636




 The inputs were not changed that drastically from the starting point.  The starting 
already represented a decent estimate of the power system for this case.  For 
benchmarking purposes the results obtained here were compared to that of a weighted-
least-squares method of state estimation as outlined in chapter 2.  POWERGEN software 
[3] was utilized to perform state estimation on the three bus system.  The simulated 
results of the analog method are compared to the WLS state estimation results and the 
true values in Table 11.  For the most part the results are pretty comparable.  However, 
with the proposed analog technique the reactive power injections at bus one and bus two 
were much closer to the true values as compared to the WLS estimation procedure.  Table 
12 shows a comparison of the measurement residuals computed for the WLS estimation 
and the analog methods.  The overall residuals were fairly close to one another.  The 
main difference between the techniques was seen on the residual for bus three voltage 
magnitude.  The analog techniques exhibited a higher residual than the WLS method.  
However, the analog techniques provided a bus voltage magnitude closer to the true 
value.  The inputs identified are taken as the correct inputs to the power system emulator.  
All the requirements for steady-state system emulation from theorems 1 and 2 have been 
satisfied.  The next step is to emulate the power system in steady-state and perform 
contingency and stability analysis. 
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Table 11: Input Estimation Results Comparison for Three Bus System 
Monte Carlo Heuristic WLS True Value
|V1| 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
θ1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
|V2| 0.9864 0.9863 1.0237 1.0000
θ2 6.4765 6.4690 6.2020 6.4690
|V3| 0.9027 0.9010 0.9186 0.9090
θ3 -6.7147 -6.7225 -6.5810 -6.4660
P1 0.4179 0.4200 0.4352 0.4200
Q1 0.7910 0.7900 0.6052 0.7900
P2 1.6644 1.6640 1.6637 1.6300
Q2 0.4653 0.4640 0.6598 0.4640
P3 2.0495 2.0494 2.0477 2.0000
Q3 0.7606 0.7610 0.7535 0.7500
P(m) 0.8636 0.8648 x x  
 
Table 12: Measurement Residual Comparison for Three Bus System 
Monte Carlo Heuristic WLS
P2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
|V2| 0.0000 0.0000 0.5625
P3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0013
Q3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0219
|V3| 3.9617 4.0966 2.7956
θ3 0.0006 0.0001 0.0856
J(x) 3.9624 4.0967 3.4669  
 
 The contingency and stability analysis process was verified by simulating the 
analog emulator in PSpice and comparing the results to numerical integration methods.  
In order to satisfy the requirements for dynamic system emulation, as outlined in 
theorems 1 and 3, the steady-state emulation operating point is taken as initial conditions.  
The other inputs to the emulator are dictated by the contingency to be tested.  In addition, 
the time duration to be emulated is specified as the time it takes for the emulator to 
converge to a solution or exhibit instability.  These components satisfy the requirement 
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for correct inputs to the emulator for dynamic system emulation.  The functional 
description and computability requirements have already been satisfied. 
 The integration results were obtained using the true values of the system.  When 
compared to the emulation results, this comparison will show how close the results from 
the proposed analog method will match computations based on the actual system states.  
Contingency and stability analysis was performed for the loss of each transmission line 
(one at a time).  In addition, stability analysis was conducted on a ground fault at bus two.  
The purpose of this analysis was to identify the critical clearing time of the fault in order 
to maintain system stability. 
 The first contingency was performed on transmission line one.  This transmission 
line connects buses one and two.  The system was stable for this contingency for both the 
emulator simulation and integration results.  The steady-state values are enumerated in 
Table 13 for the emulator results and Table 14 for the integration results.  The emulation 
results are very close to the integration results.  The voltage magnitudes are within 0.01 
per unit, angles within 0.4 degrees, real power values within 0.034 per unit, and reactive 
power values within 0.077 per unit.  The system dynamics were also very comparable. 
 The generator angle swing for both techniques is plotted for comparison in Figure 
54.  The response obtained from the security assessment approach is tracks the true value 
very closely.  In addition, the load dynamics are also compared.  The load voltage 
magnitude is shown in Figure 55 and the load voltage angle in Figure 56.  Qualitatively 
the security assessment results match the true value results.  Quantitatively there is some 
difference due to the steady-state emulation values differing from the true values.  This 
slight deviation was expected and the results are comparable.  Contingencies were also 
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performed on the other two lines.  The contingency for line two resulted in instability.  
Results for the line three contingency are similar and can be seen in the appendix.  Next, 
a fault was simulated at bus two. 
 
Table 13: Three Bus System Analog Security Assessment Results for Line One 
Contingency 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.458 0.876 0.000 0.000
2 0.986 16.956 1.664 0.618 0.000 0.000




Table 14: Three Bus System Numerical Integration Results for Line One Contingency 
(True Values) 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.438 0.799 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 16.583 1.630 0.631 0.000 0.000
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Figure 54: Three Bus System Generator Two Angle for Line One Contingency 
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Figure 55: Three Bus System Load Voltage Magnitude for Line One Contingency 
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Figure 56: Three Bus System Load Voltage Angle for Line One Contingency 
 
 A three phase ground fault at the generator terminals was simulated.  Multiple 
fault durations were analyzed in order to find the instability point of the system for such a 
fault.  The instability point was defined as the minimum fault time duration which 
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resulted in system instability.  This point is often referred to as critical clearing time.  The 
fault must be cleared from the system before this time in order to maintain stability.  This 
clearing time was determined to be 208 ms for the true values of the system and 204 ms 
for the analog emulator results.  The slight difference is due to the different initial 
conditions and inputs to the system.  The response of the system in emulation, for both 
unstable and stable cases, is very close to the true values.  Figure 57 shows the generator 
angle results for the fault duration equal to the critical clearing time.  The next example 
tests the proposed method of security assessment on the prototype power system 
emulator. 
 

















True Value Security Assessment Value
 
Figure 57: Three Bus System Generator Angle for Ground Fault 
 
A three bus power system was constructed and tested in hardware to verify the 
proposed method for power system security assessment.  Two examples of security 
assessment in hardware are presented here.  The two examples are similar to the prior 
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simulation example and satisfy the requirement for steady-state and dynamic system 
emulation in the same fashion.  For the first example, the system parameters are 
enumerated in Table 30 and the base case power flow results in Table 34.  Both tables are 
located in the appendix.  For the purpose of topology identification the same four 
topologies were tested using the same two test cases outlined previously.  In a similar 
fashion random measurement data was generated by adding zero mean random noise to 
the true values obtained from the base case load flow.  The true and measured values are 
enumerated in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: True and Measured Values for Three Bus System I Hardware Testing 
True Value Measured Value σ
P2 2.000 2.0164 p.u. 0.05
|V2| 1.050 1.0563 p.u. 0.05
P3 2.500 2.4907 p.u. 0.05
Q3 1.000 1.0363 p.u. 0.05
|V3| 0.875 0.8577 p.u. 0.05
θ3 -10.230 -9.6345 degrees 0.50  
 
The emulator was run for all topologies and test cases.  The results are tabulated in 
Table 16.  Topology one exhibited the lowest performance index and was selected 
correctly as the topology of the power system.  A performance index could not be 
computed for topologies three or four.  These topologies exhibited instability during 
testing.  An equilibrium point could not be achieved for either of the two test cases.  This 
behavior is indicative of the topologies not matching the power system data.  As a result 
these topologies were discarded as incorrect.  In addition, topology identification was 
performed in the presence of bad data.  
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Table 16: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus System I in Hardware 
P(m1) Q3 θ3 P(m2) |V3| θ3 PI
1 0.6077 1.0700 -10.3900 0.8906 0.864 -10.130 2.77
2 0.0384 0.8900 -4.1200 0.6720 0.834 -3.740 27.55
3 x x x x x x x
4 x x x x x x x
Topology Case 1 Case 2
 
 
For the purpose of performing topology identification in the presence of bad data the 
reactive power injection measurement at bus three was set to zero.  The topology tests 
were preformed with this bad data.  The results are shown in Table 17.  The bad data was 
easily identified and removed.  For test case one, topologies three and four exhibited 
instability.  In test case two these topologies were stable.  However, the results deviated 
from the measurement substantially resulting in very high performance indices.  In 
addition, topology two had very high performance indices with or without the bad data.  
Topology one was easily selected as the correct topology, even with the bad data present.  
Similar results were obtained with bad data for 3θ .  Next, input identification and 
contingency analysis were performed on topology one. 
 
Table 17: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus System I in Hardware with Bad 
Measurement Data 
P(m1) Q3 θ3 P(m2) |V3| θ3 PI (bad data)PI (good data)
1 0.0259 1.3000 -10.8700 0.8906 0.983 -8.710 39.67 4.63
2 0.0000 1.1600 -3.7000 0.6720 0.965 -3.420 > 10E6 > 10E6
3 x x x 0.3588 0.918 -24.110 > 10E6 > 10E6
4 x x x 0.5739 0.892 -40.430 > 10E6 > 10E6




 Test case two exhibited the highest ( )P m  for topology one during topology 
identification.  This was used as the starting point for input identification.  Different 
direction matrices and values of α  were tested.  However, no discernable increase in 
( )P m  was obtained during this process.  This is due mainly to the presence of noise in 
the emulator.  From the simulation results an increase in ( )P m  was only seen very close 
to the starting point.  The result from the best test case in the topology identification 
process is taken as the operating point of the power system.    It has been shown in 
simulations that the inputs change very little in obtaining a larger ( )P m .  Within 
hardware limitations this is the best result obtained for this case and is a close 
approximation of the system states. 
The results are compared with the true values and values obtained from WLS in 
Table 18.  The results obtained from the analog technique are fairly close to the true 
values and comparable to the WLS method.  A residual comparison between the analog 
method and WLS is shown in Table 19.  The analog technique exhibited a slightly lower 
residual than the digital WLS technique.  Contingency analysis was then performed using 








Table 18: Input Estimation Results Comparison for Three Bus System I in Hardware 
Emulation WLS True Value
|V1| 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
θ1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
|V2| 1.0563 1.0493 1.0500
θ2 6.2200 6.3540 6.1800
|V3| 0.8640 0.8699 0.8750
θ3 -10.130 -10.154 -10.230
P2 2.0164 2.0165 2.0000
Q2 1.3500 1.2561 1.3100
P3 2.4907 2.4911 2.5000
Q3 1.0363 1.0377 1.0000
P(m) 0.974 x x  
 








J(x) 0.9980 1.1595  
 
Contingencies were performed on each transmission line of the three bus system.  
The generator and load responses were monitored to evaluate the stability and security of 
the system.  The system maintained stability for the line one contingency.  The response 
of the generator angle is plotted and compared to numerical integration results in Figure 
58.  The analog hardware was running at approximately 2500 times faster than real time.  
The x-axis on the plots were scaled appropriately for comparison purposes.  The 
hardware results exhibit some offset errors, but overall track the integration results 
closely.  Contingencies on transmission lines two and three resulted in instability.  The 
response of the generator angle for a line two contingency is shown in Figure 59.  The 
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generator quickly loses stability.  In the case of the line three contingency the generator 
maintained stability.  However, the load went unstable and exhibited voltage collapse.  
These results are plotted in Figure 60.  Overall the results obtained from the emulator are 
similar to those achieved by simulation of the emulator and validate the proposed method 
of security assessment.  One final example is presented to show a specific case where 





















Figure 58: Three Bus System I in Hardware Generator Angle for Line One Contingency 
 
 




Figure 60: Three Bus System I in Hardware Line Three Contingency Results 
 
The topology testing and identification process essentially tests multiple topologies 
and compares their associated electrical characteristics to the data obtained from the 
power system.  The topology which behaves, electrically speaking, most like the real 
power system is chosen as the correct topology.  The process has been shown to be robust 
in selecting the correct topology.  However, when two or more topologies exhibit similar 
electrical performance it can be hard to discern between the two with this technique.  One 
such example, as shown here, would be when a transmission line is very lightly loaded. 
The topology identification process was performed with the analog emulator for a 
case with a very lightly loaded transmission line.  The same three bus system was tested.  
The transmission line connecting buses one and two is the lightly loaded line.  The 
parameters of the system can be seen in Table 31 and the base case load flow in Table 35. 
The same testing process was performed for identifying the system topology.  Table 
20 enumerated the true and measured values of the system.  The results from the topology 
testing are shown in Table 21.  Topologies three and four were easily discarded with 
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extremely large performance indices.  However, topologies one and two both performed 
very well and a correct topology cannot be easily identified.  Electrically speaking 
topologies one and two are very similar.  More testing could be performed to try and 
clearly discern which topology is correct.  Another approach would be to perform 
contingency and stability analysis on both topologies and act accordingly based on the 
results.  The assumption would be that the system is in one of these topological states.   
 
Table 20: True and Measured Values for Three Bus System II Hardware Testing 
True Value Measured Value σ
P2 1.000 0.9287 p.u. 0.05
|V2| 1.000 1.0234 p.u. 0.05
P3 1.500 1.4819 p.u. 0.05
Q3 0.500 0.4508 p.u. 0.05
|V3| 0.899 0.9084 p.u. 0.05
θ3 -6.012 -6.2386 degrees 0.50  
 
Table 21: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus System II in Hardware 
P(m1) Q3 θ3 P(m2) |V3| θ3 PI
1 0.5364 0.4040 -6.4100 0.8543 0.922 -6.320 3.03
2 0.4913 0.4030 -5.6400 0.7992 0.922 -5.510 3.29
3 0.0000 0.0150 -14.7300 0.2231 0.826 -13.920 > 10E6
4 0.0000 0.0120 -31.6200 0.0832 0.789 -31.570 > 10E6
Topology Case 1 Case 2
 
 
This last example has identified one shortcoming of the proposed method of 
topology identification.  However, multiple topology identifications were performed for 
different loading conditions and different measurement variances and generally speaking 
the proposed technique performed well.  Even with fairly large power system 
measurement errors.  In addition, it was noted that the analog technique performed 
especially well in moderate to heavily loaded conditions.  This behavior is due primarily 
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to the dynamic emulation of the system.  In heavily loaded cases some topologies 
actually exhibited instability.  Assuming the actual power system is at a stable operating 
point these topologies can be discarded as incorrect topologies.  In the next section 
simulation results for security assessment are presented for a nine bus power system. 
6.3 NINE BUS POWER SYSTEM TEST CASE 
 The next example system used was a nine bus system.  Security assessment 
simulation results for the nine bus system are presented here.  The system consists of 
three generators, three loads, and nine transmission lines.  The one line diagram for the 
system is shown in Figure 61.  The system parameters are shown in Table 32 and the base 
case power flow results shown in Table 35.  These tables are located in the appendix.  
The base case results are taken as the true values of the system and the configuration in 
Figure 61 as the correct topology.  For topology identification the potential topologies 























Figure 61: One Line Diagram of Nine Bus Power System 
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 The Floyd-Warshall algorithm was run on the nine bus system graph.  The system 
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The algorithm identified seven potential topologies as shown in Figure 62.  All seven 
topologies consist of nine nodes.  As a direct result, the topologies have the same 
requirements for computability.  Eighteen inputs will be required to satisfy steady-state 
computability requirements for each test.  The inputs for testing are obtained from pseudo 
measurements and measurement data.  These topologies were tested to determine which 
topology is correct. 
 Measurement data was simulated by adding normally distributed random noise 
with a given standard deviation to the true values of the system.  Table 22 enumerates the 
true values, measured values, and standard deviations of the measurements.  For this test 
case the standard deviations of the emulator measurements are the same as the power 
system measurements.  The slack bus voltage magnitude is taken as a pseudo 
measurement and set to one per unit.  In addition, the slack bus is taken as the reference 
point and the voltage angle is specified as zero degrees.  Pseudo measurements are taken 
as 0P Q= =  for power injections at buses without any generation or load.  
Computability is determined based on the available measurements. 
 For this system eighteen inputs are required for computability for all connected 
topologies.  In this example, 23 total measurements are available resulting in a degree of 
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redundancy of six.  Redundant measurements are present at buses five, seven, and nine.  
The result is a total of 216 computable sets of data.  Similar to the previous example, it is 
not necessary to use all of these sets to determine the correct topology and desirable to 
test as few sets as possible to keep computation time low.  For this example seven sets of 




Figure 62: Potential Topologies for Nine Bus System 
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Table 22: True and Measured Values for Nine Bus Example 
True Value Measured Value σ
P2 1.6300 1.63294411 p.u. 0.01
|V2| 1.0000 1.00125332 p.u. 0.01
P3 0.8500 0.85714325 p.u. 0.01
|V3| 1.0000 0.98853529 p.u. 0.01
P5 0.9000 0.91254001 p.u. 0.01
θ5 -4.0170 -4.00826804 degrees 0.05
|V5| 0.9750 0.97827292 p.u. 0.01
Q5 0.3000 0.28406270 p.u. 0.01
P7 1.0000 0.99600114 p.u. 0.01
θ7 0.6220 0.73115929 degrees 0.05
|V7| 0.9860 0.98011683 p.u. 0.01
Q7 0.3500 0.35689997 p.u. 0.01
P9 1.2500 1.26290250 p.u. 0.01
θ9 -4.3500 -4.34703593 degrees 0.05
|V9| 0.9580 0.96866768 p.u. 0.01
Q9 0.5000 0.50668601 p.u. 0.01  
 








7 |V1|, θ1, P2, |V2|, P3, |V3|, P5, |V5|, P7, |V7|, P9, Q9 Q5, θ5, Q7, θ7, |V9|, θ9
|V1|, θ1, P2, |V2|, P3, |V3|, P5, |V5|, P7, Q7, P9, Q9 Q5, θ5, |V7|, θ7, |V9|, θ9
|V1|, θ1, P2, |V2|, P3, |V3|, P5, |V5|, P7, Q7, P9, |V9| Q5, θ5, |V7|, θ7, Q9, θ9
|V1|, θ1, P2, |V2|, P3, |V3|, P5, Q5, P7, |V7|, P9, Q9 |V5|, θ5, Q7, θ7, |V9|, θ9
|V1|, θ1, P2, |V2|, P3, |V3|, P5, Q5, P7, |V7|, P9, |V9| |V5|, θ5, Q7, θ7, Q9, θ9
Measurements
|V5|, θ5, |V7| ,θ7, |V9|, θ9
|V5|, θ5, |V7|, θ7, Q9, θ9
Inputs
|V1|, θ1, P2, |V2|, P3, |V3|, P5, Q5, P7, Q7, P9, |V9|
|V1|, θ1, P2, |V2|, P3, |V3|, P5, Q5, P7, Q7, P9, Q9
 
 
 The simulation results for the seven topologies and 7 test cases are enumerated in 
Table 24.  For each test case noise was simulated for the emulator inputs and emulator 
measurements by adding normally distributed, zero mean, random noise to the inputs and 
outputs of the simulation.  The probability ( )P m  was computed for each test case and 
the performance index PI  computed for each topology. Topologies two through seven 
were dismissed with high performance indices and topology one was chosen correctly as 
the power system topology.  Similar to the three bus test case the topology was correctly 
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identified in the presence of noise. ( )P m  for topology one was consistently the highest 
or close to the highest in all test cases.  For this example seven test cases were run.  
However, good results can be obtained by running as few as four.  To test the robustness 
of this technique multiple topology identification tests were simulated on randomly 
generated sets of data. 
 
Table 24: Topology Identification Results for Nine Bus Example 
Topology P(m1) P(m2) P(m3) P(m4) P(m5) P(m6) P(m7) PI
1 0.749 0.562 0.758 0.274 0.538 0.357 0.058 30
2 0.272 0.570 0.240 0.257 0.234 0.299 0.001 1192
3 0.148 0.150 0.000 0.003 0.176 0.204 0.000 > 10E6
4 0.210 0.210 0.208 0.294 0.002 0.000 0.000 > 10E6
5 0.211 0.277 0.405 0.264 0.197 0.001 0.000 > 10E6
6 0.148 0.152 0.000 0.003 0.303 0.207 0.000 > 10E6
7 0.348 0.148 0.200 0.000 0.346 0.241 0.011 > 10E6  
 
 One hundred topology identification simulations were performed on the nine bus 
system.  The measurement data was randomly generated for one hundred tests with 
0.005P Vσ σ= = and 0.05θσ = .  The emulation measurements were modeled with the 
same standard deviations.  The topology identification results are shown in Table 48.  
The correct topology was selected for 99% of the cases.  The one case where the 
incorrect topology was selected was flagged as questionable.  In addition, these same one 
hundred cases were performed with varying the standard deviation of the emulator 
measurements.  The technique was relatively robust and correctly identified the topology 
over 95% of the time with standard deviations as large as 0.1P Vσ σ= = and 0.5θσ =  for 
emulator measurements. 
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 Simulations were also conducted modeling the noise present in the emulator by 
adding random noise to the emulator inputs and outputs during simulation.  These results 
are tabulated in Table 49 where the emulation measurements had the same standard 
deviations as the power system measurements.  In these simulations the correct topology 
was selected for 99% of the cases.  The only case that the incorrect topology was 
identified was flagged as questionable.  These results are similar to those shown in the 
three bus example and further exhibit the robustness of the technique in the presence of 
noise in the analog emulator.  The results are more dependent upon the quality of 
measurements from the power system. 
 Another set of one hundred cases were simulated with random measurement data 
from the power system.  In these cases the standard deviations of the power system 
measurements where 0.05P Vσ σ= =  and 0.5θσ = .  The results for topology 
identification are shown in Table 50.  These simulations incorporated emulator 
measurement noise with the standard deviation of emulator measurements equal to the 
power system measurements.  With the larger error in power system measurements the 
correct topology was identified in 84% of the cases.  Eleven out of the sixteen incorrect 
cases were labeled as suspect.  As an end result in five of these one hundred cases the 
incorrect topology would have been selected.  Additional simulations were conducted 
with varying emulator measurement noise and similar results were obtained.  Input 
identification was performed next. 
 Topology one was selected as the correct topology.  With the topology identified, 
two out of the three requirements for steady-state system emulation in theorem 1 are 
satisfied.  Determining the correct inputs will satisfy the remaining condition.  Case three 
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was used as the starting point for the input identification process.  This test case was 
chosen because it exhibited the highest ( )P m  during topology identification.  Similar to 
the previous example, two methods were utilized to determine the inputs to the emulator.  
The first was a Monte Carlo type process and the second was the heuristic process.  Five 
hundred runs were conducted for the Monte Carlo analysis and twenty steps were 
performed for the heuristic process.  The generation of inputs for the Monte Carlo 
analysis was the same as before.  Random noise was added to the starting point inputs 
with standard deviations of 0 001.P Q Vσ σ σ= = = .  The twenty steps of the heuristic 
process are detailed in Table 51.  The results obtained from these steps are enumerated in 
Table 52.  These tables are located in the appendices.  The inputs identified by these 
methods are shown in Table 25.  The true values and values obtained with a WLS state 
estimator are also included for comparison purposes. 
 Both the heuristic and Monte Carlo approaches showed improvement over the 
starting point ( )( )0 9052.P m = .  The Monte Carlo only showed marginal improvement 
while the heuristic approach achieved a better solution in far fewer steps.  In addition, the 
results of both methods compared favorably to the WLS method and were close to the 
true values of the system.  Generally speaking, the results from the proposed approach are 
closer to the true system values than the WLS state estimator.  In particular, reactive 
power injections at generation buses and bus voltage angles for the proposed method are 
closer to the true values than the WLS estimator.  Table 26 shows a comparison in 
measurement residuals for the WLS estimator and the two analog techniques.  Both 
analog methods exhibited lower total residuals as compared to the WLS method.  With 
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the topology chosen and the inputs identified the emulator can emulate the power system 
in steady-state and perform contingency and stability analysis.  All the requirements from 
theorems 1 and 2 have been satisfied. 
 
Table 25: Input Estimation Results Comparison for Nine Bus System 
Monte Carlo Heuristic WLS True Value
|V1| 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
θ1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
|V2| 0.9960 1.0013 1.0047 1.0000
θ2 9.7658 9.7342 9.6290 9.6690
|V3| 0.9881 0.9885 0.9908 1.0000
θ3 4.9881 4.9774 4.9140 4.7710
|V4| 0.9852 0.9854 0.9865 0.9870
θ4 -2.4510 -2.4473 -2.4500 -2.4070
|V5| 0.9718 0.9721 0.9738 0.9750
θ5 -4.0857 -4.0875 -4.0950 -4.0170
|V6| 0.9948 0.9953 0.9977 1.0030
θ6 2.0580 2.0511 2.0020 1.9260
|V7| 0.9801 0.9809 0.9837 0.9860
θ7 0.7026 0.6994 0.6510 0.6220
|V8| 0.9933 0.9945 0.9974 0.9960
θ8 3.8641 3.8513 3.7840 3.7990
|V9| 0.9547 0.9552 0.9572 0.9580
θ9 -4.4266 -4.4134 -4.4210 -4.3500
P1 0.7314 0.7305 0.7320 0.7195
Q1 0.2734 0.2692 0.2512 0.2407
P2 1.6336 1.6329 1.6328 1.6300
Q2 0.1846 0.1923 0.1992 0.1446
P3 0.8574 0.8571 0.8570 0.8500
Q3 -0.0907 -0.0925 -0.0939 -0.0365
P4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Q4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P5 0.9112 0.9125 0.9124 0.9000
Q5 0.2845 0.2849 0.2834 0.3000
P6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Q6 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P7 0.9960 0.9952 0.9962 1.0000
Q7 0.3541 0.3566 0.3569 0.3500
P8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Q8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P9 1.2643 1.2621 1.2627 1.2500
Q9 0.5056 0.5075 0.5055 0.5000
P(m) 0.9067 0.9192 x x  
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Table 26: Measurement Residual Comparison for Nine Bus System 
Monte Carlo Heuristic WLS
P2 0.0042 0.0000 0.0002
|V2| 0.2760 0.0000 0.1188
P3 0.5523 0.5103 0.4900
|V3| 0.0019 0.0000 0.0513
P5 0.0167 0.0000 0.0002
θ5 2.3983 2.5121 3.0090
|V5| 0.4190 0.3824 0.2001
Q5 0.0019 0.0064 0.0044
P7 0.0000 0.0064 0.0004
θ7 0.3263 0.4038 2.5702
|V7| 0.0000 0.0064 0.1284
Q7 0.0787 0.0011 0.0000
P9 0.0204 0.0064 0.0004
θ9 2.5322 1.7617 2.1883
|V9| 1.9510 1.8138 1.3151
Q9 0.0122 0.0064 0.0141
J(x) 8.5909 7.4172 10.0907  
 
 The contingency and stability analysis process was tested in a similar fashion as 
the three bus system.  In order to satisfy the requirements for dynamic system emulation, 
as outlined in theorems 1 and 3, the steady-state emulation operating point is taken as 
initial conditions.  The other inputs to the emulator are dictated by the contingency to be 
tested.  In addition, the time duration to be emulated is specified as the time it takes for 
the emulator to converge to a solution or exhibit instability.  These components satisfy 
the requirement for correct inputs to the emulator for dynamic system emulation.  The 
functional description and computability requirements have already been satisfied. 
 Contingency and stability analysis were performed for the loss of transmission 
lines.  In addition, stability analysis was conducted on ground faults at buses two and 
three.  The contingency on transmission line number nine is presented here. 
 194
 Transmission line nine connects buses nine and four.  The system maintained 
stability with the loss of this line.  The steady-state results are enumerated in Table 27 for 
the emulator results and Table 28 for the integration results.  The voltage magnitudes are 
within 0.016 per unit, angles within 0.95 degrees, real power values within 0.018 per unit, 
and reactive power values within 0.070 per unit.  The analog security assessment method 
also correctly identified a low bus voltage magnitude on bus nine.  The system dynamics 
were also very comparable. 
 
Table 27: Nine Bus System Analog Security Assessment Results for Line Nine 
Contingency 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.795 0.050 0.000 0.000
2 0.996 -1.764 1.634 0.859 0.000 0.000
3 0.988 -2.627 0.855 0.076 0.000 0.000
4 0.998 -2.631 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.979 -6.834 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.285
6 0.985 -5.567 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.948 -9.854 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.354
8 0.948 -8.566 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000




Table 28: Nine Bus System Numerical Integration Results for Line Nine Contingency 
(True Values) 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.777 0.024 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 -1.505 1.630 0.790 0.000 0.000
3 1.000 -2.464 0.850 0.111 0.000 0.000
4 1.000 -2.566 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.983 -6.670 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.300
6 0.995 -5.427 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.958 -9.550 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.350
8 0.956 -8.205 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000





 The generators swings were plotted for both the emulator and integration 
techniques for comparison.  The swing of generator two angle is shown in Figure 63 and 
generator three angle in Figure 64.  The analog techniques results are very comparable to 
the true values.  A closer look at the initial swings for generator two is shown in Figure 
65 and generator three in Figure 66.  Contingencies for the other lines showed similar 
results.  These results are tabulated in the appendix.  Two faults were then simulated for 
stability analysis. 
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Figure 63: Nine Bus System Generator Two Angle for Line Nine Contingency 
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Figure 64: Nine Bus System Generator Three Angle for Line Nine Contingency 
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 Analysis of three phase ground faults on bus two and bus three were performed.  
The faults were analyzed separately.  In once case a fault was introduced on bus two and 
in another the fault on bus three.  Many fault durations were analyzed to determine the 
critical clearing time of each fault.  For the fault on bus two the clearing time was 
determined to be 384 ms for the true values of the system and 382 ms for the emulator 
results.  The response of the system in emulation, for both unstable and stable cases, is 
very close to the true values.  Figure 67 shows the generator angle results for the fault 
duration equal to the critical clearing time.  For the fault on bus three the clearing time 
was determined to be 252 ms for the true values and 251 ms for the emulator.  The 
generator response for the fault at bus three with a duration equal to the critical clearing 
time is shown in Figure 68.  The emulator results closely match the true values. 
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Figure 67: Nine Bus System Generator Two Angle for Ground Fault at Bus Two 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
 This dissertation provided an overview of current methods for power system 
security assessment and presented an alternative method utilizing analog computation.  
The framework for the analog method, including relevant computation theory, 
methodology, hardware, and software, was developed and presented.  The proposed 
method of security assessment was verified through simulation and hardware testing.  
The performance of this new method was verified through benchmarking against current 
methods. 
 The proposed method of power system security assessment has shown good 
results and exhibits certain advantages over traditional techniques.  Namely, errors due to 
topology and measurement errors can be identified and eliminated simultaneously in the 
topology identification step.  In addition, the process of identifying the correct topology 
also produces a decent estimate of the system operating state.  In addition, during 
contingency analysis a full dynamic analysis of the system is performed much faster than 
real time.  This provides system stability information not found in state of the art online 
techniques.  The proposed analog technique also always converges to a solution.  The 
same cannot be said for traditional numeric techniques.  Computation time for the 
proposed method was defined explicitly and will be directly related to the structure of the 
emulation hardware for actuation and data acquisition. 
 Historically analog computation was limited due to configuration and data 
acquisition times.  In addition, noise and measurement accuracy further limited analog 
techniques.  The work presented here advanced analog computation techniques and 
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mitigated many of the prior limitations.  The configuration and acquisition of data was 
fully automated via a software interface.  This allows for much faster operation of the 
analog computer.  In addition, a scaling technique has been presented that is automated 
via software.  The software interface also allows for automatic calibration of the analog 
hardware which can help offset errors due to non-ideal analog hardware.  These 
advancements move forward the concept of analog computation as a security assessment 
tool. 
 The proposed security assessment process was separated into a few parts.  
Specifically the parts are topology identification, input identification, and 
contingency/stability analysis.  The topology identification technique has been shown to 
be very robust in the presence of noise in the analog emulator and measurement errors.  
This allows for accurate topology identification in a realistic application.  Input 
identification and contingency/stability analysis, while quantitatively limited to the 
hardware performance, qualitatively perform very well.  The result is a fully analog 
technique capable of performing security assessment.  In addition, this analog method, or 
portions of this proposed method, could also be used in conjunction with traditional 
digital methods to improve current security assessment routines.  For example, the analog 
tools could be utilized as a contingency screener for digital techniques and/or a fast 
stability analyzer.  
7.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
 The work presented in this dissertation is a continuation of research in the field of 
analog computation and application in power system analysis.  The following 
contributions to this research topic have been made: 
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• Development of relevant and necessary analog computation theory on 
computability, system emulation, and computation time.  Specifically, 
computability and system emulation in both the steady-state and dynamic 
sense have been addressed. 
• Further development of an analog computational methodology for power 
system analysis (DC Emulation). 
• Development of power system models and appropriate analog hardware 
for the computation technique. 
• Development of algorithms, interface to analog hardware, and software for 
operating the analog emulator. 
7.3 FUTURE WORK 
 There is still much work necessary before implementing this approach as an 
online tool for power system analysis.  Firstly, state of the art analog hardware and 
fabrication techniques need to be analyzed to determine the feasibility of constructing a 
large scale emulator.  Size, cost, and computation time need to be addressed for specific 
hardware architectures.  Many of these issues can be addressed through the construction 
of a large scale prototype. 
A logical approach would be to fabricate a larger prototype, of the range of 
hundreds of buses, on a single VLSI chip.  Data acquisition and control methods could be 
implemented on the same chip or a separate chip interfacing with the analog hardware.  
In addition, the potential of running many of these chips in parallel to realize an even 
larger power system emulator should be examined.  Many of the aforementioned issues 
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could be addressed at least partly in the process of building such a prototype.  Further 
work could also be carried out on the presented technique for power system security 
assessment. 
There is much room for optimization in the proposed technique for power system 
security assessment.  The steps and algorithms for topology identification, input 
identification, and contingency/stability analysis could be refined for both performance 
and computation time.  The result would be faster and more accurate security assessment.  
In addition, the issue of parameter estimation was not examined in this work.  In order to 
provide a more robust technique of security assessment this should be addressed in future 
work. 
While the majority of this work focused primarily on analog computation it 
should be noted that it is not practical to implement a purely analog method.  The 
presented technique took advantage of digital technology to control the analog hardware, 
acquire data, and some post processing of the results.  However, the core computation of 
the power system was performed in analog hardware.  This synergy between analog and 
digital technology is driving the renewed interest in analog computation. 
Improvements to power system security assessment could be seen by only 
implementing some of the presented analog methods to augment the current digital 
methods.  Specifically, the presented technique for topology identification handles and 
eliminates topological and measurement errors concurrently.  State of the art digital 
methods cannot accomplish this.  In addition, faster than real time dynamic emulation, 
independent of system size, is possible with the presented analog techniques.  State of the 
art digital methods simply cannot perform this type of dynamic simulation in a timely 
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fashion.  Implementation of these two aspects alone would yield tremendous 
improvement in power system security assessment. 
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 Table 29: Three Bus Power System Bus Type and Parameters 
Bus Bus Type
1 slack Line From Bus To Bus R X B
2 PV 1 1 2 0.022 0.220 0.000
3 PQ 2 1 3 0.012 0.120 0.000






Table 30: Three Bus Power System I Bus Type and Parameters for Hardware Testing 
Bus Bus Type
1 slack Line From Bus To Bus R X B
2 PV 1 1 2 0.020 0.220 0.000
3 PQ 2 1 3 0.015 0.150 0.000







Table 31: Three Bus Power System II Bus Type and Parameters for Hardware Testing 
Bus Bus Type
1 slack Line From Bus To Bus R X B
2 PV 1 1 2 0.020 0.220 0.000
3 PQ 2 1 3 0.060 0.150 0.000





Table 32: Nine Bus Power System Bus Type and Parameters 
Bus Bus Type
1 slack Line From Bus To Bus R X B
2 PV 1 1 4 0.0000 0.0576 0.0000
3 PV 2 4 5 0.0170 0.0920 0.1580
4 PQ 3 5 6 0.0390 0.1700 0.3580
5 PQ 4 3 6 0.0000 0.0586 0.0000
6 PQ 5 6 7 0.0119 0.1008 0.2090
7 PQ 6 7 8 0.0085 0.0720 0.1490
8 PQ 7 8 2 0.0000 0.0625 0.0000
9 PQ 8 8 9 0.0320 0.1610 0.3060







Table 33: Three Bus System Base Case Power Flow 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.420 0.790 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 6.469 1.630 0.464 0.000 0.000




Table 34: Three Bus System I Base Case Power Flow for Hardware Testing 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.590 0.666 0.000 0.000
2 1.050 6.180 2.000 1.310 0.000 0.000




 Table 35: Three Bus System II Base Case Power Flow for Hardware Testing 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.586 0.414 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 2.528 1.000 0.359 0.000 0.000






Table 36: Nine Bus System Base Case Power Flow 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.720 0.241 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 9.669 1.630 0.145 0.000 0.000
3 1.000 4.771 0.850 -0.037 0.000 0.000
4 0.987 -2.407 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.975 -4.017 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.300
6 1.003 1.926 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.986 0.622 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.350
8 0.996 3.799 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000





APPENDIX B: DATA AND RESULTS FOR SECURITY ASSESSMENT EXAMPLES 
 
 
Table 37: Three Bus Topology Identification Results in the Presence of Bad Data (θ3=0) 
P(m1) Q3 θ3 P(m2) |V3| θ3 PI (bad data) PI (good data)
1 0.0000 -0.4909 -6.4060 0.1490 0.965 -6.494 > 10E6 6.10
2 0.0000 -0.5907 -3.0680 0.1054 0.957 -2.962 > 10E6 8.62
3 0.0000 -0.4898 -14.5530 0.0073 0.939 -15.186 > 10E6 124.90
4 0.0000 -0.7431 -30.1980 0.0000 0.815 -35.482 > 10E6 980136.94





Table 38: Three Bus Topology Identification Results in the Presence of Bad Data (V3=0.75) 
P(m1) Q3 θ3 P(m2) |V3| θ3 PI (bad data) PI (good data)
1 0.0134 2.1032 -7.7530 0.0958 0.965 -6.494 85.35 75.91
2 0.0000 1.9695 -2.9900 0.0069 0.957 -2.962 > 10E6 > 10E6
3 0.0001 1.0473 -18.1300 0.0968 0.939 -15.186 17155.75 > 10E6
4 0.0000 0.1537 -38.2970 0.0000 0.815 -35.482 > 10E6 > 10E6




Table 39: Randomly Generated Measurement Data for Three Bus Power System 
Case V2 θ2 V3 θ3 P1 Q1 P2 Q2 P3 Q3 Case V2 θ2 V3 θ3 P1 Q1 P2 Q2 P3 Q3 Case V2 θ2 V3 θ3 P1 Q1 P2 Q2 P3 Q3
1 0.986 6.368 1.002 -6.727 0.379 0.808 1.664 0.541 2.050 0.761 35 0.969 6.874 1.005 -6.268 0.377 0.912 1.588 0.478 2.041 0.811 68 0.929 6.091 0.917 -6.277 0.429 0.760 1.580 0.523 2.119 0.863
2 0.998 6.963 0.879 -5.728 0.379 0.822 1.565 0.421 1.976 0.761 36 0.911 6.499 0.871 -7.311 0.475 0.863 1.642 0.409 2.121 0.730 69 1.025 6.409 0.909 -6.682 0.410 0.839 1.653 0.396 2.014 0.882
3 0.979 6.725 0.849 -6.514 0.442 0.775 1.622 0.473 2.021 0.834 37 1.066 6.630 0.885 -6.428 0.415 0.861 1.665 0.482 1.970 0.707 70 0.896 6.068 0.886 -6.369 0.464 0.710 1.614 0.429 1.963 0.769
4 0.932 6.651 0.881 -6.988 0.455 0.814 1.620 0.445 1.956 0.658 38 0.959 5.831 0.995 -6.415 0.380 0.727 1.692 0.540 2.089 0.782 71 1.033 7.031 0.958 -7.124 0.419 0.797 1.750 0.509 2.004 0.768
5 0.979 6.557 0.920 -7.086 0.455 0.811 1.703 0.438 2.000 0.724 39 1.063 5.594 0.908 -5.232 0.387 0.803 1.611 0.530 1.967 0.753 72 0.981 7.112 0.937 -6.556 0.418 0.887 1.695 0.446 1.984 0.754
6 1.025 7.855 0.901 -6.251 0.322 0.763 1.536 0.459 1.934 0.716 40 1.054 6.537 0.908 -6.935 0.346 0.808 1.654 0.480 1.906 0.784 73 0.863 6.201 1.019 -6.769 0.492 0.850 1.667 0.458 1.998 0.700
7 1.047 7.244 0.930 -6.746 0.429 0.751 1.583 0.394 1.905 0.747 41 1.006 6.559 0.879 -6.984 0.405 0.863 1.720 0.397 2.019 0.749 74 1.043 7.505 0.879 -6.173 0.496 0.897 1.593 0.387 1.989 0.775
8 1.000 6.479 0.881 -5.523 0.409 0.719 1.615 0.436 1.994 0.730 42 0.950 5.967 0.923 -6.321 0.408 0.779 1.675 0.432 1.991 0.786 75 0.929 7.041 0.958 -6.220 0.483 0.820 1.653 0.393 1.954 0.678
9 0.978 5.695 0.904 -6.012 0.538 0.816 1.651 0.517 2.021 0.815 43 0.998 6.454 0.890 -6.743 0.467 0.724 1.615 0.334 2.039 0.780 76 0.989 6.310 0.941 -6.447 0.419 0.812 1.604 0.411 1.998 0.725
10 0.967 6.089 0.879 -6.060 0.423 0.698 1.721 0.497 1.923 0.731 44 0.997 6.510 0.821 -7.357 0.387 0.858 1.737 0.472 1.915 0.764 77 0.952 6.393 0.993 -5.688 0.367 0.795 1.643 0.576 2.016 0.850
11 0.995 6.638 0.961 -7.168 0.368 0.758 1.639 0.531 2.097 0.787 45 1.009 5.550 0.834 -6.056 0.408 0.708 1.614 0.424 2.035 0.748 78 1.072 6.432 0.891 -6.855 0.407 0.769 1.701 0.422 2.008 0.748
12 0.995 6.069 0.934 -5.847 0.485 0.776 1.641 0.496 1.973 0.761 46 0.949 6.519 0.903 -6.121 0.514 0.806 1.625 0.466 1.969 0.663 79 1.044 6.266 0.778 -6.950 0.448 0.828 1.601 0.522 1.985 0.750
13 0.969 7.142 0.958 -7.655 0.365 0.774 1.529 0.542 2.012 0.782 47 1.019 6.495 0.885 -6.344 0.456 0.798 1.637 0.414 2.065 0.810 80 1.007 5.561 0.770 -6.335 0.426 0.807 1.608 0.464 1.990 0.752
14 1.085 6.832 0.949 -6.164 0.417 0.735 1.737 0.396 2.023 0.770 48 1.019 6.038 0.847 -5.145 0.375 0.729 1.645 0.427 1.943 0.679 81 0.960 6.158 0.980 -7.508 0.422 0.789 1.602 0.406 2.005 0.774
15 1.073 6.218 0.919 -6.089 0.373 0.821 1.718 0.468 2.130 0.716 49 0.925 6.426 0.908 -6.639 0.469 0.822 1.776 0.402 2.008 0.789 82 0.954 6.470 0.941 -7.250 0.455 0.839 1.626 0.462 2.015 0.717
16 1.014 6.012 0.811 -6.625 0.449 0.831 1.546 0.368 1.978 0.752 50 1.084 6.869 0.953 -6.578 0.435 0.764 1.622 0.459 2.050 0.772 83 0.984 5.909 0.982 -6.261 0.477 0.819 1.584 0.549 1.999 0.712
17 1.009 6.943 0.883 -7.024 0.340 0.849 1.654 0.546 1.977 0.800 51 0.988 5.886 0.947 -5.884 0.369 0.875 1.605 0.473 2.018 0.738 84 1.032 6.661 0.879 -6.673 0.476 0.755 1.612 0.555 1.918 0.764
18 1.001 5.664 0.971 -6.124 0.381 0.817 1.737 0.482 2.012 0.814 52 0.999 6.778 1.002 -6.425 0.500 0.771 1.565 0.428 1.972 0.781 85 1.065 6.700 0.973 -6.944 0.480 0.770 1.600 0.556 1.952 0.730
19 0.972 6.847 0.863 -5.780 0.432 0.796 1.649 0.460 1.971 0.773 53 0.945 5.092 0.922 -6.895 0.477 0.775 1.688 0.516 2.106 0.717 86 1.015 6.860 0.929 -6.629 0.401 0.775 1.544 0.461 2.011 0.859
20 0.965 6.873 0.858 -5.819 0.421 0.801 1.716 0.360 2.006 0.696 54 0.980 6.277 0.933 -6.244 0.439 0.845 1.673 0.405 2.020 0.721 87 0.946 6.179 0.815 -6.007 0.393 0.760 1.631 0.477 2.037 0.742
21 0.980 6.267 0.913 -6.684 0.392 0.834 1.589 0.451 2.025 0.710 55 1.003 6.204 0.936 -6.125 0.447 0.764 1.564 0.433 1.972 0.754 88 1.003 5.605 0.945 -6.448 0.411 0.749 1.679 0.375 1.998 0.795
22 1.008 7.759 0.844 -5.954 0.459 0.748 1.601 0.467 1.999 0.746 56 1.000 6.424 0.896 -6.903 0.441 0.783 1.657 0.508 1.937 0.793 89 0.980 5.915 0.997 -6.826 0.409 0.819 1.639 0.439 2.060 0.744
23 0.977 6.516 0.923 -6.006 0.446 0.802 1.560 0.512 2.080 0.678 57 0.963 6.314 0.833 -6.053 0.389 0.838 1.729 0.479 1.980 0.779 90 0.934 5.928 0.917 -7.199 0.454 0.808 1.660 0.468 2.054 0.717
24 1.004 6.047 0.881 -6.480 0.358 0.827 1.633 0.471 2.080 0.711 58 1.001 6.385 0.875 -6.961 0.418 0.826 1.616 0.393 2.023 0.805 91 1.001 6.815 0.875 -6.488 0.343 0.736 1.619 0.380 1.915 0.745
25 0.992 6.626 0.980 -6.302 0.444 0.810 1.626 0.530 2.049 0.836 59 1.050 6.507 0.816 -6.773 0.478 0.761 1.617 0.464 1.998 0.725 92 1.037 6.267 0.952 -4.794 0.451 0.854 1.593 0.516 1.969 0.771
26 1.037 6.579 0.975 -6.151 0.365 0.768 1.594 0.482 1.975 0.645 60 1.036 6.902 1.031 -6.411 0.421 0.839 1.630 0.534 2.088 0.794 93 0.994 6.979 0.996 -5.972 0.399 0.773 1.587 0.425 2.073 0.805
27 0.984 7.820 0.827 -6.734 0.447 0.865 1.607 0.439 2.062 0.752 61 1.010 6.122 0.910 -7.019 0.515 0.782 1.593 0.414 2.045 0.772 94 1.031 7.580 0.844 -5.881 0.361 0.762 1.689 0.475 2.038 0.708
28 1.015 7.008 0.947 -7.126 0.395 0.818 1.532 0.426 1.878 0.717 62 0.995 7.243 0.917 -6.064 0.334 0.799 1.606 0.427 1.893 0.659 95 1.130 6.123 0.830 -6.771 0.439 0.854 1.600 0.576 1.999 0.787
29 0.971 4.932 0.987 -6.670 0.491 0.722 1.675 0.491 1.977 0.872 63 0.941 6.092 0.956 -6.557 0.417 0.835 1.703 0.408 2.091 0.758 96 0.942 6.812 0.946 -6.209 0.505 0.756 1.801 0.444 2.060 0.765
30 1.002 6.739 0.943 -6.761 0.407 0.866 1.680 0.479 1.959 0.725 64 1.033 6.296 0.896 -6.788 0.375 0.826 1.630 0.323 1.993 0.779 97 1.039 6.303 1.014 -6.272 0.387 0.787 1.651 0.460 2.039 0.743
31 0.996 6.844 0.819 -5.859 0.417 0.770 1.660 0.496 2.051 0.797 65 0.971 6.652 0.882 -6.177 0.322 0.816 1.710 0.501 2.028 0.709 98 0.998 6.627 1.008 -6.789 0.436 0.870 1.581 0.407 1.926 0.702
32 0.965 6.172 0.896 -5.845 0.343 0.771 1.644 0.505 1.951 0.745 66 0.976 5.593 0.863 -6.005 0.422 0.811 1.660 0.560 2.036 0.634 99 0.908 5.698 0.897 -5.866 0.418 0.763 1.627 0.577 2.011 0.759
33 1.019 6.417 0.874 -6.659 0.421 0.858 1.651 0.467 2.015 0.774 67 0.977 6.155 0.960 -6.711 0.400 0.860 1.644 0.558 1.960 0.722 100 0.881 5.453 0.970 -6.648 0.388 0.779 1.639 0.509 1.938 0.756
34 1.076 6.627 0.949 -6.176 0.509 0.743 1.584 0.483 2.045 0.758
Randomly Generated Measurement Data
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Table 40: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus System 
PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2)
1 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.059 0.240 0.000 0.106 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 51 33 121230 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.033 0.527 0.000 0.437 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000
2 58 435 333400 >10E6 1 0.018 0.645 0.002 0.697 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.000 52 18 2707000 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.072 0.251 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
3 22 181060 1502 >10E6 1 0.049 0.578 0.000 0.589 0.001 0.464 0.000 0.000 53 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.082 0.616 0.000 0.442 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.000
4 5 3 838 >10E6 2 0.283 0.874 0.445 0.860 0.001 0.532 0.000 0.000 54 15 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.074 0.669 0.000 0.514 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.000
5 40 375710 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.026 0.757 0.000 0.612 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.002 55 17 772750 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.064 0.721 0.000 0.583 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.000
6 14 137 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.082 0.759 0.007 0.735 0.000 0.302 0.000 0.000 56 10 2 >10E6 >10E6 2 0.114 0.821 0.899 0.908 0.000 0.243 0.000 0.000
7 3 4 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.618 0.903 0.382 0.857 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.000 57 22 >10E6 6 >10E6 3 0.050 0.470 0.000 0.498 0.207 0.744 0.000 0.119
8 87 532 185970 >10E6 1 0.012 0.624 0.002 0.701 0.000 0.397 0.000 0.036 58 15 367 2821200 >10E6 1 0.074 0.677 0.003 0.706 0.000 0.324 0.000 0.002
9 9 1184 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.122 0.831 0.001 0.691 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.000 59 20 >10E6 4 >10E6 3 0.076 0.138 0.000 0.118 0.440 0.814 0.000 0.000
10 14 3 9523 >10E6 2 0.080 0.789 0.457 0.863 0.000 0.449 0.000 0.000 60 20 162030 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.075 0.153 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.682
11 19 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.058 0.458 0.000 0.303 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 61 2 5 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.854 0.969 0.260 0.837 0.000 0.165 0.000 0.000
12 19 4608800 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.057 0.694 0.000 0.544 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 62 2 9 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.907 0.974 0.137 0.818 0.000 0.296 0.000 0.000
13 62 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.017 0.357 0.000 0.284 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.000 63 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.073 0.299 0.000 0.199 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000
14 3 35 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.517 0.946 0.030 0.776 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 64 19 97 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.056 0.698 0.011 0.737 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.000
15 39 56 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.026 0.718 0.018 0.759 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.000 65 17 3 167550 >10E6 2 0.063 0.801 0.446 0.861 0.000 0.398 0.000 0.000
16 26 7362200 4 >10E6 3 0.047 0.211 0.000 0.151 0.391 0.797 0.000 0.000 66 50 968560 19 >10E6 3 0.021 0.512 0.000 0.579 0.057 0.682 0.000 0.764
17 33 64 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.031 0.671 0.016 0.749 0.000 0.291 0.000 0.014 67 32 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.033 0.437 0.000 0.305 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.000
18 15 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.082 0.388 0.000 0.248 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 68 110 6876 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.009 0.430 0.000 0.338 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.000
19 36 399 1400 >10E6 1 0.029 0.628 0.003 0.702 0.001 0.493 0.000 0.000 69 2 10 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.910 0.971 0.112 0.807 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.000
20 37 7819 37 >10E6 3 0.028 0.561 0.000 0.645 0.028 0.638 0.000 0.000 70 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.070 0.724 0.000 0.532 0.000 0.326 0.000 0.000
21 6 249 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.211 0.894 0.004 0.726 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.000 71 119 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.009 0.580 0.000 0.463 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000
22 57 584100 14 >10E6 3 0.019 0.335 0.000 0.359 0.082 0.687 0.000 0.380 72 22 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.049 0.612 0.000 0.456 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.244
23 78 3949 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.013 0.728 0.000 0.640 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.000 73 30 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.051 0.097 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
24 29 1601 360120 >10E6 1 0.037 0.642 0.001 0.681 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.000 74 21 2469200 1583800 >10E6 1 0.051 0.531 0.000 0.518 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.016
25 19 654080 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.066 0.259 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 75 15 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.079 0.366 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.000
26 13 2241900 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.089 0.607 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.144 76 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.090 0.657 0.000 0.490 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.124
27 34 4267200 4 >10E6 3 0.033 0.344 0.000 0.328 0.369 0.793 0.000 0.000 77 41 88602 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.031 0.109 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
28 136 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.007 0.670 0.000 0.595 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.009 78 28 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.039 0.462 0.000 0.516 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.000
29 35 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.033 0.197 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 79 30 >10E6 328 >10E6 1 0.068 0.066 0.000 0.038 0.003 0.487 0.000 0.000
30 44 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.024 0.642 0.000 0.521 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.058 80 71 9972400 1197 >10E6 1 0.016 0.125 0.000 0.054 0.001 0.431 0.000 0.000
31 186 350770 4 >10E6 3 0.005 0.253 0.000 0.278 0.365 0.790 0.000 0.000 81 91 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.012 0.210 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000
32 2 20 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.873 0.953 0.054 0.781 0.000 0.304 0.000 0.000 82 37 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.028 0.483 0.000 0.371 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.000
33 13 227610 344450 >10E6 1 0.087 0.580 0.000 0.603 0.000 0.371 0.000 0.005 83 16 771880 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.077 0.317 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.008
34 5 33 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.263 0.883 0.031 0.776 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 84 28 >10E6 109000 >10E6 1 0.038 0.512 0.000 0.552 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.000
35 25 104390 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.058 0.122 0.000 0.075 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.542 85 63 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.016 0.615 0.000 0.533 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000
36 3 38 77992 >10E6 1 0.661 0.944 0.027 0.753 0.000 0.395 0.000 0.000 86 13 237870 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.086 0.758 0.000 0.614 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.000
37 17 >10E6 63260 >10E6 1 0.068 0.429 0.000 0.439 0.000 0.406 0.000 0.000 87 164 503360 3 >10E6 3 0.006 0.313 0.000 0.376 0.695 0.866 0.000 0.000
38 20 2545300 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.071 0.160 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 88 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.065 0.614 0.000 0.456 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.382
39 75 2091 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.014 0.634 0.000 0.682 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.000 89 20 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.064 0.239 0.000 0.123 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000
40 108 58 >10E6 >10E6 2 0.009 0.680 0.018 0.756 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.000 90 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.051 0.623 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.166 0.000 0.000
41 26 558 297650 >10E6 1 0.040 0.621 0.002 0.697 0.000 0.363 0.000 0.000 91 20 18365 4804 >10E6 1 0.055 0.593 0.000 0.637 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.000
42 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.090 0.606 0.000 0.418 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.000 92 234 1920 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.004 0.641 0.001 0.569 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.000
43 11 4 >10E6 >10E6 2 0.105 0.845 0.352 0.849 0.000 0.258 0.000 0.008 93 47 7642 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.025 0.171 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
44 177 >10E6 3 >10E6 3 0.006 0.204 0.000 0.270 0.730 0.874 0.000 0.000 94 61 3364500 8 >10E6 3 0.017 0.269 0.000 0.294 0.150 0.726 0.000 0.000
45 83 303290 6 >10E6 3 0.013 0.281 0.000 0.291 0.224 0.750 0.000 0.000 95 22 >10E6 6 89522 3 0.086 0.093 0.000 0.066 0.212 0.745 0.314 0.000
46 5 338 9228700 >10E6 1 0.259 0.888 0.003 0.718 0.000 0.348 0.000 0.000 96 15 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.082 0.381 0.000 0.223 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.000
47 28 91 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.038 0.695 0.011 0.736 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.000 97 15 1708500 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.091 0.279 0.000 0.162 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000
48 122 528840 3 >10E6 3 0.008 0.267 0.000 0.313 0.454 0.822 0.000 0.002 98 53 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.021 0.215 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000
49 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.051 0.609 0.000 0.413 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.000 99 55 481180 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.019 0.627 0.000 0.491 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.000
50 6 90 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.204 0.904 0.011 0.751 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 100 29 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.042 0.180 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000
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Table 41: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus System Filtered Results 
PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2)
1 6 4227884 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.653 0.241 0.000 0.106 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 51 2 404060 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.928 0.904 0.000 0.751 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.032
2 7 8241 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.195 0.645 0.000 0.697 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.000 52 5 11023 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.359 0.527 0.000 0.437 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.437
3 4 2404768 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.544 0.578 0.000 0.589 0.000 0.464 0.000 0.000 53 5 246098 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.790 0.251 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
4 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.455 0.874 0.000 0.861 0.000 0.532 0.000 0.000 54 3 6725012 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.904 0.616 0.000 0.442 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.000
5 6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.236 0.757 0.000 0.612 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.000 55 3 2955320 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.818 0.669 0.000 0.514 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.102
6 2 421603 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.896 0.759 0.000 0.735 0.000 0.302 0.000 0.000 56 3 78232 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.703 0.721 0.000 0.583 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.001
7 5 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.238 0.903 0.000 0.858 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.000 57 6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.233 0.821 0.000 0.908 0.000 0.243 0.000 0.000
8 9 9341 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.129 0.625 0.000 0.701 0.000 0.398 0.000 0.000 58 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.551 0.470 0.000 0.498 0.000 0.744 0.000 0.003
9 4 245306 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.415 0.831 0.000 0.691 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.000 59 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.819 0.677 0.000 0.706 0.000 0.324 0.000 0.000
10 2 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.823 0.789 0.000 0.863 0.000 0.450 0.000 0.000 60 8 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.834 0.138 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.814 0.000 0.000
11 4 5354729 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.636 0.458 0.000 0.303 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 61 8 14740 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.822 0.153 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
12 3 431248 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.621 0.694 0.000 0.544 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 62 2 4304030 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.785 0.969 0.000 0.837 0.000 0.165 0.000 0.009
13 8 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.185 0.357 0.000 0.284 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.000 63 2 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.794 0.974 0.000 0.818 0.000 0.296 0.000 0.000
14 2 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.871 0.946 0.000 0.776 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 64 5 1655654 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.802 0.299 0.000 0.199 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.038
15 5 32477 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.287 0.718 0.000 0.759 0.000 0.135 0.000 0.000 65 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.616 0.698 0.000 0.737 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.000
16 7 669301 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.518 0.211 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.797 0.000 0.001 66 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.582 0.801 0.000 0.861 0.000 0.398 0.000 0.000
17 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.344 0.671 0.000 0.749 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.000 67 6 206892 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.231 0.512 0.000 0.579 0.000 0.682 0.000 0.062
18 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.899 0.388 0.000 0.248 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.001 68 5 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.364 0.438 0.000 0.305 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.000
19 5 954008 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.322 0.628 0.000 0.702 0.000 0.493 0.000 0.000 69 12 628 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.103 0.430 0.002 0.338 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.017
20 5 6717661 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.309 0.561 0.000 0.645 0.000 0.638 0.000 0.000 70 2 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.742 0.971 0.000 0.807 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.000
21 2 907401 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.921 0.894 0.000 0.726 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.000 71 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.772 0.725 0.000 0.532 0.000 0.327 0.000 0.000
22 8 53102 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.205 0.335 0.000 0.359 0.000 0.687 0.000 0.753 72 12 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.094 0.580 0.000 0.463 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.001
23 10 393 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.111 0.728 0.003 0.640 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.084 73 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.535 0.612 0.000 0.456 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000
24 4 115521 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.407 0.642 0.000 0.681 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.000 74 12 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.562 0.097 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
25 5 59467 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.726 0.259 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 75 4 225621 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.563 0.531 0.000 0.518 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.000
26 3 203812 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.979 0.607 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.000 76 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.868 0.366 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.000
27 6 387929 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.358 0.344 0.000 0.328 0.000 0.793 0.000 0.019 77 3 1179949 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.988 0.657 0.000 0.491 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.000
28 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.082 0.670 0.000 0.595 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.001 78 12 8069 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.340 0.109 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.491
29 8 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.365 0.197 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 79 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.429 0.462 0.000 0.516 0.000 0.293 0.000 0.001
30 5 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.260 0.642 0.000 0.521 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.003 80 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.753 0.066 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.487 0.000 0.360
31 21 31891 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.060 0.253 0.000 0.279 0.000 0.790 0.000 0.000 81 14 906599 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.174 0.125 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.431 0.000 0.000
32 3 2656319 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.579 0.953 0.000 0.781 0.000 0.304 0.000 0.000 82 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.127 0.211 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000
33 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.962 0.581 0.000 0.603 0.000 0.371 0.000 0.000 83 5 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.312 0.483 0.000 0.371 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.000
34 3 7821 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.534 0.883 0.000 0.776 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.000 84 4 70175 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.846 0.317 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000
35 10 9502 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.639 0.122 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 85 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.423 0.512 0.000 0.552 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.003
36 2 6062800 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.756 0.944 0.000 0.753 0.000 0.395 0.000 0.000 86 7 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.180 0.615 0.000 0.533 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.001
37 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.752 0.429 0.000 0.439 0.000 0.406 0.000 0.000 87 2 130477 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.937 0.758 0.000 0.614 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.003
38 8 231400 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.779 0.161 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 88 18 45763 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.068 0.313 0.000 0.376 0.000 0.866 0.000 0.000
39 8 3848 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.150 0.634 0.000 0.682 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.037 89 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.711 0.614 0.000 0.456 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.000
40 11 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.101 0.680 0.000 0.756 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.000 90 6 1666916 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.703 0.239 0.000 0.123 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000
41 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.442 0.621 0.000 0.697 0.000 0.363 0.000 0.000 91 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.565 0.623 0.000 0.458 0.000 0.166 0.000 0.002
42 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.994 0.606 0.000 0.418 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.000 92 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.605 0.593 0.000 0.637 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.000
43 2 2804038 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.899 0.845 0.000 0.849 0.000 0.258 0.000 0.000 93 23 176 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.047 0.641 0.006 0.569 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.000
44 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.064 0.204 0.000 0.270 0.000 0.874 0.000 0.541 94 10 702 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.270 0.171 0.001 0.134 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
45 11 27575 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.139 0.281 0.000 0.291 0.000 0.750 0.000 0.000 95 9 305864 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.191 0.269 0.000 0.294 0.000 0.726 0.000 0.000
46 3 2345046 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.689 0.888 0.000 0.718 0.000 0.348 0.000 0.000 96 12 4421991 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.942 0.093 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.745 0.000 0.603
47 4 121260 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.416 0.695 0.000 0.736 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.000 97 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.899 0.381 0.000 0.223 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.000
48 14 48080 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.093 0.267 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.822 0.000 0.000 98 5 155328 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.996 0.279 0.000 0.162 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000
49 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.557 0.609 0.000 0.413 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.000 99 9 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.226 0.215 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000
50 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.069 0.453 0.000 0.326 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 100 6 43747 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.205 0.627 0.000 0.491 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.000
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Table 42: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus System with Input Noise (Cases 1 and 2) 
PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2)
1 21 75 7803 >10E6 1 0.059 0.239 0.015 0.105 0.000 0.007 0.733 0.000 51 18 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.071 0.246 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000
2 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.082 0.241 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 52 27 17086 29567 >10E6 1 0.044 0.235 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.008 0.051 0.000
3 19 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.069 0.200 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 53 22 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.066 0.143 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.011 0.099 0.000
4 22 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.064 0.162 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 54 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.059 0.223 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000
5 27 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.045 0.203 0.000 0.104 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.059 55 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.058 0.248 0.000 0.155 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000
6 22 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.053 0.305 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 56 37 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.031 0.195 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
7 47 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.023 0.320 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 57 22 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.066 0.145 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
8 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.077 0.248 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.653 58 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.084 0.243 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.192
9 18 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.077 0.194 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 59 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.071 0.358 0.000 0.263 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000
10 52 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.022 0.145 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 60 11 8 185 34 2 0.131 0.309 0.388 0.185 0.818 0.005 0.030 0.845
11 17 2469213 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.080 0.208 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.000 61 16 5698704 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.081 0.263 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000
12 29 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.041 0.215 0.000 0.123 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 62 52 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.021 0.232 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000
13 17 987372 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.090 0.179 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.007 0.029 0.000 63 18 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.090 0.144 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.007 0.427 0.000
14 35 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.031 0.417 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 64 20 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.062 0.296 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.001
15 15 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.079 0.458 0.000 0.304 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 65 18 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.074 0.211 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000
16 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.056 0.276 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 66 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.078 0.252 0.000 0.127 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.082
17 23 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.054 0.220 0.000 0.145 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 67 36 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.032 0.198 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.000
18 39 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.030 0.201 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 68 50 73646 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.029 0.065 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.002 0.571 0.000
19 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.066 0.172 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 69 20 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.063 0.235 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
20 19 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.072 0.196 0.000 0.094 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 70 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.075 0.134 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.011 0.211 0.000
21 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.088 0.241 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 71 45 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.024 0.275 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
22 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.078 0.261 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.002 72 34 >10E6 >10E6 352265 1 0.035 0.193 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.045
23 24 202297 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.052 0.202 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 73 28 >10E6 98 >10E6 1 0.055 0.106 0.000 0.016 0.035 0.014 0.000 0.000
24 21 6893640 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.057 0.261 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 74 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.076 0.323 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
25 19 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.073 0.204 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.005 0.019 0.000 75 36 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.034 0.146 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.018 0.477 0.000
26 28 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.039 0.364 0.000 0.272 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.064 76 20 >10E6 >10E6 1420087 1 0.062 0.240 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.017
27 36 4049387 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.032 0.215 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 77 23 28 1499649 >10E6 1 0.058 0.172 0.112 0.052 0.000 0.005 0.085 0.000
28 50 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.022 0.270 0.000 0.194 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.001 78 23 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.049 0.400 0.000 0.296 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
29 41 27046 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.029 0.147 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.005 0.474 0.000 79 24 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.048 0.331 0.000 0.243 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000
30 44 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.026 0.222 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.007 80 30 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.038 0.251 0.000 0.157 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
31 25 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.047 0.242 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 81 22 826507 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.061 0.193 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.008 0.895 0.000
32 29 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.044 0.163 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 82 19 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.071 0.198 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.013 0.039 0.000
33 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.081 0.263 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 83 21 >10E6 >10E6 320 1 0.058 0.244 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.013 0.055 0.003
34 15 2721420 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.080 0.450 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 84 33 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.035 0.278 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000
35 14 14 2610 8 4 0.128 0.168 0.413 0.085 0.000 0.006 0.160 0.568 85 39 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.027 0.397 0.000 0.304 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000
36 56 1066239 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.023 0.077 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.007 0.101 0.000 86 16 2778759 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.087 0.251 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
37 26 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.042 0.402 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 87 32 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.038 0.168 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
38 18 22 93564 >10E6 1 0.082 0.158 0.165 0.063 0.000 0.006 0.054 0.000 88 29 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.040 0.216 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.099
39 25 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.045 0.385 0.000 0.285 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 89 18 348 79247 >10E6 1 0.074 0.221 0.003 0.103 0.000 0.008 0.898 0.000
40 65 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.016 0.309 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 90 18 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.084 0.156 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.012 0.116 0.000
41 20 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.062 0.233 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 91 33 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.036 0.212 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000
42 26 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.051 0.156 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.007 0.003 0.000 92 28 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.041 0.305 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000
43 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.080 0.247 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 93 16 78502 88605 >10E6 1 0.088 0.203 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.005 0.218 0.000
44 38 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.031 0.182 0.000 0.118 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 94 15 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.083 0.321 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000
45 22 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.054 0.277 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 95 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.081 0.585 0.000 0.501 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000
46 23 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.059 0.180 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 96 27 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.050 0.158 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.007 0.701 0.000
47 18 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.071 0.265 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 97 24 94945 163 >10E6 1 0.048 0.334 0.000 0.229 0.014 0.011 0.000 0.000
48 23 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.052 0.286 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 98 46 180 6268 >10E6 1 0.024 0.234 0.006 0.162 0.000 0.017 0.066 0.000
49 32 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.043 0.115 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.007 0.069 0.000 99 19 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.087 0.126 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.011 0.278 0.000
50 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.069 0.453 0.000 0.326 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 100 28 44 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.055 0.104 0.627 0.024 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000
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Table 43: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus System (Case 1 only) 
Topology 1 Topology2 Topology 3 Topology 4 Topology 1 Topology2 Topology 3 Topology 4
PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m1) P(m1) P(m1) P(m1) PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m1) P(m1) P(m1) P(m1)
1 17 65 7666 1 4 0.059 0.015 0.000 0.733 51 14 >10E6 >10E6 84300 1 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 12 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 52 23 17079 29442 20 4 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.051
3 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 53 15 >10E6 >10E6 10 4 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.099
4 16 >10E6 >10E6 84627 1 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.000 54 17 >10E6 >10E6 247008 1 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 22 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 55 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 19 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 56 32 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 44 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 57 15 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 58 12 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 59 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 45 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 60 8 3 1 33 3 0.131 0.388 0.818 0.030
11 12 2469204 >10E6 1137 1 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.001 61 12 5698698 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000
12 24 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 62 48 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000
13 11 987362 >10E6 34 1 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.029 63 11 >10E6 >10E6 2 4 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.427
14 33 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 64 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000
15 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 65 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000
16 18 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 66 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000
17 18 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 67 31 >10E6 >10E6 442 1 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.002
18 34 >10E6 >10E6 9216 1 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 68 34 73615 >10E6 2 4 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.571
19 15 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 69 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000
20 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000 70 13 >10E6 >10E6 5 4 0.075 0.000 0.000 0.211
21 11 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 71 42 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000
22 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 72 28 >10E6 >10E6 352243 1 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000
23 19 202288 >10E6 90789 1 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 73 18 >10E6 28 >10E6 1 0.055 0.000 0.035 0.000
24 17 6893634 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 74 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000
25 14 >10E6 >10E6 52 1 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.019 75 29 >10E6 >10E6 2 4 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.477
26 26 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 76 16 >10E6 >10E6 1420028 1 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000
27 31 4049378 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 77 17 9 1499446 12 2 0.058 0.112 0.000 0.085
28 46 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.000 78 20 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000
29 34 27030 >10E6 2 4 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.474 79 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000
30 39 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 80 26 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000
31 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 81 16 826495 >10E6 1 4 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.895
32 23 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 82 14 >10E6 >10E6 25 1 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.039
33 12 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 83 17 >10E6 >10E6 18 1 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.055
34 13 2721417 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 84 29 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000
35 8 2 2429 6 2 0.128 0.413 0.000 0.160 85 37 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000
36 43 1066210 >10E6 10 4 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.101 86 12 2778752 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.000
37 24 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000 87 26 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000
38 12 6 93390 19 2 0.082 0.165 0.000 0.054 88 25 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000
39 22 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 89 14 338 79122 1 4 0.074 0.003 0.000 0.898
40 62 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 90 12 >10E6 >10E6 9 4 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.116
41 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 91 28 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000
42 20 >10E6 >10E6 394 1 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.003 92 24 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000
43 12 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.000 93 11 78493 88417 5 4 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.218
44 33 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 94 12 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000
45 18 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 95 12 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000
46 17 >10E6 >10E6 76472 1 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 96 20 >10E6 >10E6 1 4 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.701
47 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000 97 21 94940 72 17250 1 0.048 0.000 0.014 0.000
48 19 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 98 42 174 6208 15 4 0.024 0.006 0.000 0.066
49 23 >10E6 >10E6 15 4 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.069 99 11 >10E6 >10E6 4 4 0.087 0.000 0.000 0.278
50 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 100 18 2 >10E6 9966214 2 0.055 0.627 0.000 0.000
Performance Indices Correct 
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Table 44: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus System (Case 2 only) 
Topology 1 Topology2 Topology 3 Topology 4 Topology 1 Topology2 Topology 3 Topology 4
PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m2) P(m2) P(m2) P(m2) PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m2) P(m2) P(m2) P(m2)
1 4 10 138 >10E6 1 0.239 0.105 0.007 0.000 51 4 8 86 >10E6 1 0.246 0.120 0.012 0.000
2 4 7 88 >10E6 1 0.241 0.146 0.011 0.000 52 4 7 126 >10E6 1 0.235 0.143 0.008 0.000
3 5 11 193 >10E6 1 0.200 0.088 0.005 0.000 53 7 16 91 >10E6 1 0.143 0.061 0.011 0.000
4 6 15 41 >10E6 1 0.162 0.068 0.024 0.000 54 4 9 81 >10E6 1 0.223 0.108 0.012 0.000
5 5 10 79 17 1 0.203 0.104 0.013 0.059 55 4 6 86 >10E6 1 0.248 0.155 0.012 0.000
6 3 4 67 >10E6 1 0.305 0.229 0.015 0.000 56 5 8 124 >10E6 1 0.195 0.121 0.008 0.000
7 3 4 74 1874207 1 0.320 0.257 0.013 0.000 57 7 15 127 9498 1 0.145 0.068 0.008 0.000
8 4 7 81 2 4 0.248 0.152 0.012 0.653 58 4 8 170 5 1 0.243 0.119 0.006 0.192
9 5 11 178 >10E6 1 0.194 0.088 0.006 0.000 59 3 4 79 >10E6 1 0.358 0.263 0.013 0.000
10 7 11 71 >10E6 1 0.145 0.091 0.014 0.000 60 3 5 184 1 4 0.309 0.185 0.005 0.845
11 5 9 181 >10E6 1 0.208 0.110 0.006 0.000 61 4 6 147 >10E6 1 0.263 0.154 0.007 0.000
12 5 8 88 >10E6 1 0.215 0.123 0.011 0.000 62 4 6 38 >10E6 1 0.232 0.170 0.026 0.000
13 6 11 143 >10E6 1 0.179 0.092 0.007 0.000 63 7 19 152 >10E6 1 0.144 0.053 0.007 0.000
14 2 3 135 >10E6 1 0.417 0.315 0.007 0.000 64 3 5 132 1479 1 0.296 0.190 0.008 0.001
15 2 3 126 >10E6 1 0.458 0.304 0.008 0.000 65 5 10 78 >10E6 1 0.211 0.097 0.013 0.000
16 4 6 86 >10E6 1 0.276 0.173 0.012 0.000 66 4 8 42 12 1 0.252 0.127 0.024 0.082
17 5 7 147 27649 1 0.220 0.145 0.007 0.000 67 5 9 73 >10E6 1 0.198 0.108 0.014 0.000
18 5 9 174 >10E6 1 0.201 0.107 0.006 0.000 68 15 31 422 >10E6 1 0.065 0.032 0.002 0.000
19 6 11 91 >10E6 1 0.172 0.091 0.011 0.000 69 4 7 355 >10E6 1 0.235 0.144 0.003 0.000
20 5 11 70 >10E6 1 0.196 0.094 0.014 0.000 70 7 36 89 >10E6 1 0.134 0.027 0.011 0.000
21 4 9 78 >10E6 1 0.241 0.117 0.013 0.000 71 4 6 126 >10E6 1 0.275 0.180 0.008 0.000
22 4 6 87 428 1 0.261 0.160 0.012 0.002 72 5 10 87 22 1 0.193 0.101 0.011 0.045
23 5 8 75 >10E6 1 0.202 0.122 0.013 0.000 73 9 62 70 >10E6 1 0.106 0.016 0.014 0.000
24 4 6 86 7920473 1 0.261 0.158 0.012 0.000 74 3 4 127 28547 1 0.323 0.233 0.008 0.000
25 5 10 203 >10E6 1 0.204 0.098 0.005 0.000 75 7 17 55 >10E6 1 0.146 0.060 0.018 0.000
26 3 4 41 16 1 0.364 0.272 0.025 0.064 76 4 8 79 59 1 0.240 0.126 0.013 0.017
27 5 9 134 >10E6 1 0.215 0.108 0.007 0.000 77 6 19 203 >10E6 1 0.172 0.052 0.005 0.000
28 4 5 59 1207 1 0.270 0.194 0.017 0.001 78 3 3 88 >10E6 1 0.400 0.296 0.011 0.000
29 7 16 207 >10E6 1 0.147 0.062 0.005 0.000 79 3 4 86 >10E6 1 0.331 0.243 0.012 0.000
30 5 7 74 152 1 0.222 0.152 0.014 0.007 80 4 6 87 >10E6 1 0.251 0.157 0.011 0.000
31 4 9 173 >10E6 1 0.242 0.109 0.006 0.000 81 5 12 132 >10E6 1 0.193 0.084 0.008 0.000
32 6 11 80 >10E6 1 0.163 0.091 0.013 0.000 82 5 12 79 >10E6 1 0.198 0.086 0.013 0.000
33 4 6 136 123139 1 0.263 0.163 0.007 0.000 83 4 8 75 302 1 0.244 0.124 0.013 0.003
34 2 3 133 >10E6 1 0.450 0.315 0.008 0.000 84 4 5 82 >10E6 1 0.278 0.200 0.012 0.000
35 6 12 182 2 4 0.168 0.085 0.006 0.568 85 3 3 75 1846919 1 0.397 0.304 0.013 0.000
36 13 29 137 >10E6 1 0.077 0.035 0.007 0.000 86 4 7 288 >10E6 1 0.251 0.144 0.003 0.000
37 2 3 69 >10E6 1 0.402 0.309 0.015 0.000 87 6 16 90 >10E6 1 0.168 0.063 0.011 0.000
38 6 16 174 >10E6 1 0.158 0.063 0.006 0.000 88 5 8 150 10 1 0.216 0.120 0.007 0.099
39 3 4 85 >10E6 1 0.385 0.285 0.012 0.000 89 5 10 125 >10E6 1 0.221 0.103 0.008 0.000
40 3 4 87 6983306 1 0.309 0.249 0.012 0.000 90 6 18 85 >10E6 1 0.156 0.056 0.012 0.000
41 4 7 90 7211758 1 0.233 0.147 0.011 0.000 91 5 7 75 >10E6 1 0.212 0.152 0.013 0.000
42 6 17 138 >10E6 1 0.156 0.058 0.007 0.000 92 3 5 90 >10E6 1 0.305 0.208 0.011 0.000
43 4 8 152 31393 1 0.247 0.121 0.007 0.000 93 5 9 188 >10E6 1 0.203 0.109 0.005 0.000
44 5 8 82 >10E6 1 0.182 0.118 0.012 0.000 94 3 5 79 >10E6 1 0.321 0.205 0.013 0.000
45 4 6 91 >10E6 1 0.277 0.158 0.011 0.000 95 2 2 143 >10E6 1 0.585 0.501 0.007 0.000
46 6 11 43 >10E6 1 0.180 0.091 0.023 0.000 96 6 20 146 >10E6 1 0.158 0.049 0.007 0.000
47 4 7 189 >10E6 1 0.265 0.153 0.005 0.000 97 3 4 90 >10E6 1 0.334 0.229 0.011 0.000
48 3 5 43 6188564 1 0.286 0.202 0.023 0.000 98 4 6 60 >10E6 1 0.234 0.162 0.017 0.000
49 9 31 148 >10E6 1 0.115 0.032 0.007 0.000 99 8 31 92 >10E6 1 0.126 0.032 0.011 0.000
50 2 3 149 >10E6 1 0.453 0.326 0.007 0.000 100 10 42 82 >10E6 1 0.104 0.024 0.012 0.000
Performance Indices Correct 
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Table 45: Topology Identification Results for Three Bus System with Input and Output Noise 
PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2) P(m1) P(m2)
1 29 174458 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.886 0.035 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 51 11 41720 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.103 0.817 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.000
2 79 12264 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.013 0.255 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.484 0.000 0.000 52 5 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.483 0.345 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000
3 4 1433159 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.604 0.447 0.000 0.855 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.000 53 3 1060613 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.811 0.593 0.000 0.391 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.000
4 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.342 0.909 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.490 0.000 0.000 54 5 61164 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.334 0.485 0.000 0.487 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.000
5 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.708 0.362 0.000 0.875 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.024 55 3 1247430 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.970 0.580 0.000 0.466 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000
6 4 398332 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.477 0.611 0.000 0.374 0.000 0.680 0.000 0.000 56 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.461 0.764 0.000 0.863 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.000
7 27 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.043 0.275 0.000 0.651 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.000 57 2 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.744 0.917 0.000 0.711 0.000 0.694 0.000 0.065
8 10 1325 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.123 0.624 0.001 0.151 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.144 58 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.628 0.715 0.000 0.893 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.001
9 5 29218 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.560 0.332 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.000 59 20 25780 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.823 0.052 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.624 0.000 0.000
10 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.728 0.883 0.000 0.312 0.000 0.843 0.000 0.000 60 18 491748 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.795 0.060 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.126
11 4 8027286 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.733 0.467 0.000 0.906 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.000 61 3 133433 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.785 0.521 0.000 0.879 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000
12 5 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.985 0.249 0.000 0.228 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 62 4 2924590 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.971 0.330 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.397 0.000 0.000
13 6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.363 0.325 0.000 0.749 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 63 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.601 0.777 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000
14 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.088 0.336 0.000 0.786 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 64 4 3958140 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.410 0.731 0.000 0.478 0.000 0.316 0.000 0.000
15 6 6004887 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.246 0.696 0.000 0.347 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000 65 3 3166116 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.805 0.517 0.000 0.311 0.000 0.565 0.000 0.000
16 11 1693 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.571 0.109 0.001 0.621 0.000 0.574 0.000 0.000 66 5 40005 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.573 0.360 0.000 0.721 0.000 0.443 0.000 0.558
17 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.089 0.687 0.000 0.850 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.002 67 9 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.154 0.368 0.000 0.726 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.000
18 3 3056222 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.866 0.451 0.000 0.367 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 68 7 767 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.221 0.354 0.001 0.192 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000
19 8 494640 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.290 0.208 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.534 0.000 0.000 69 2 919886 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.720 0.927 0.000 0.719 0.000 0.281 0.000 0.000
20 11 6887244 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.108 0.702 0.000 0.080 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.000 70 3 198562 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.851 0.710 0.000 0.795 0.000 0.657 0.000 0.000
21 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.913 0.701 0.000 0.384 0.000 0.194 0.000 0.000 71 28 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.038 0.805 0.000 0.275 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.000
22 41 6068 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.027 0.250 0.000 0.404 0.000 0.693 0.000 0.284 72 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.660 0.461 0.000 0.439 0.000 0.529 0.000 0.225
23 6 86 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.277 0.468 0.012 0.282 0.000 0.387 0.000 0.000 73 4 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.754 0.333 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.000
24 3 60149 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.750 0.797 0.000 0.724 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.001 74 5 4703 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.431 0.451 0.000 0.678 0.000 0.494 0.000 0.016
25 15 55578 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.401 0.079 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 75 4 7532183 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.381 0.535 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.238 0.000 0.000
26 4 531793 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.561 0.558 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.291 76 2 580520 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.880 0.843 0.000 0.807 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.093
27 6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.973 0.194 0.000 0.525 0.000 0.386 0.000 0.000 77 8 20100 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.384 0.193 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
28 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.539 0.614 0.000 0.835 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.293 78 5 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.311 0.581 0.000 0.587 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.000
29 8 428742 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.910 0.139 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 79 6 1573847 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.480 0.274 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.290 0.000 0.000
30 10 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.126 0.456 0.000 0.452 0.000 0.165 0.000 0.054 80 14 191963 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.108 0.210 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.405 0.000 0.000
31 40 462492 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.031 0.134 0.000 0.630 0.000 0.555 0.000 0.000 81 26 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.049 0.176 0.000 0.127 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.000
32 2 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.947 0.928 0.000 0.668 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.000 82 10 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.115 0.942 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.796 0.000 0.000
33 5 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.533 0.349 0.000 0.770 0.000 0.538 0.000 0.001 83 5 148083 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.637 0.314 0.000 0.303 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.000
34 2 20401 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.906 0.742 0.000 0.701 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.000 84 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.920 0.604 0.000 0.499 0.000 0.691 0.000 0.000
35 6 1502 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.658 0.206 0.001 0.172 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.784 85 9 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.136 0.578 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.149 0.000 0.000
36 3 3458383 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.872 0.471 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.393 0.000 0.000 86 4 27469 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.929 0.368 0.000 0.280 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.000
37 6 31400 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.247 0.495 0.000 0.617 0.000 0.756 0.000 0.000 87 90 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.011 0.849 0.000 0.503 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.000
38 37 1215265 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.258 0.031 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.000 88 5 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.877 0.263 0.000 0.706 0.000 0.324 0.000 0.367
39 9 5333 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.146 0.506 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.019 89 14 26655 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.252 0.102 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
40 9 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.126 0.657 0.000 0.574 0.000 0.427 0.000 0.001 90 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.629 0.714 0.000 0.610 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.000
41 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.715 0.837 0.000 0.142 0.000 0.191 0.000 0.000 91 6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.428 0.252 0.000 0.649 0.000 0.321 0.000 0.000
42 2 575974 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.850 0.897 0.000 0.439 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.000 92 25 420 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.054 0.149 0.002 0.884 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.000
43 5 2344215 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.382 0.461 0.000 0.866 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.029 93 14 1893 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.121 0.191 0.001 0.068 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000
44 249 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.004 0.055 0.000 0.730 0.000 0.255 0.000 0.000 94 16 1762 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.088 0.199 0.001 0.575 0.000 0.660 0.000 0.000
45 26 10227 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.040 0.853 0.000 0.191 0.000 0.898 0.000 0.000 95 8 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.809 0.156 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.888 0.000 0.000
46 4 388645 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.979 0.382 0.000 0.388 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.000 96 5 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.424 0.354 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.000
47 9 107851 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.510 0.144 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.106 0.000 0.000 97 3 20505 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.585 0.770 0.000 0.538 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000
48 85 27845 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.020 0.029 0.000 0.557 0.000 0.871 0.000 0.017 98 54 1656660 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.107 0.022 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.000
49 7 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.344 0.255 0.000 0.324 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.000 99 17 24691 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.065 0.767 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.686 0.000 0.000
50 3 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.961 0.474 0.000 0.419 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.000 100 6 4527537 >10E6 >10E6 1 0.585 0.245 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
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Table 46: Three Bus System Analog Security Assessment Results for Line Three 
Contingency 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.534 2.165 0.000 0.000
2 0.986 21.280 1.664 0.089 0.000 0.000




Table 47: Three Bus System Numerical Integration Results for Line Three Contingency 
(True Values) 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.510 2.017 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 20.833 1.630 0.134 0.000 0.000
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Figure 69: Three Bus System Generator Two Angle for Line Three Contingency 
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Figure 70: Three Bus System Load Voltage Magnitude for Line Three Contingency 
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Figure 71: Three Bus System Load Voltage Angle for Line Three Contingency 
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Table 48: Topology Identification Results for Nine Bus System 
PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 PI top 5 PI top 6 PI top 4 PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 PI top 5 PI top 6 PI top 4
1 12 89 >10E6 616179 26 >10E6 >10E6 1 51 9 2907 >10E6 280475 2399 >10E6 9316 1
2 10 1409 >10E6 705547 2184 >10E6 >10E6 1 52 10 747 >10E6 659251 1660 >10E6 >10E6 1
3 17 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 30 >10E6 >10E6 1 53 11 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 3021 >10E6 >10E6 1
4 10 >10E6 >10E6 2425209 3496 >10E6 >10E6 1 54 9 796 >10E6 954064 631 >10E6 >10E6 1
5 10 >10E6 >10E6 4952810 764 >10E6 >10E6 1 55 11 63 >10E6 203661 32 >10E6 >10E6 1
6 14 22203 >10E6 35553 22 708 1492 1 56 9 2222 >10E6 1981973 949 >10E6 >10E6 1
7 12 >10E6 >10E6 3494347 27 >10E6 >10E6 1 57 9 67 >10E6 287568 27 >10E6 21247 1
8 10 2079 >10E6 1828127 31 >10E6 >10E6 1 58 9 992 >10E6 910319 32 >10E6 12607 1
9 22 >10E6 >10E6 3746727 18 >10E6 2828 5 59 11 >10E6 >10E6 4378937 480 >10E6 >10E6 1
10 9 1092 >10E6 518603 28 >10E6 1156382 1 60 15 >10E6 >10E6 8569675 26 >10E6 >10E6 1
11 9 1734 >10E6 6766438 5260 >10E6 >10E6 1 61 8 3531 >10E6 2854258 28 >10E6 >10E6 1
12 8 1045 >10E6 1321280 1430 >10E6 >10E6 1 62 10 52 >10E6 118226 808 2036 1859 1
13 10 2030 >10E6 542459 27 >10E6 4032 1 63 12 80 >10E6 547446 27 >10E6 30 1
14 12 >10E6 >10E6 7818012 1227 >10E6 >10E6 1 64 10 1786 >10E6 2210188 24 >10E6 >10E6 1
15 13 >10E6 >10E6 4783400 27 >10E6 199950 1 65 10 2126 >10E6 1505725 1498778 >10E6 >10E6 1
16 8 1027 >10E6 905505 837568 >10E6 >10E6 1 66 12 >10E6 >10E6 9669259 29 >10E6 >10E6 1
17 8 965 >10E6 610362 1524 >10E6 >10E6 1 67 10 >10E6 >10E6 1721377 2926 >10E6 >10E6 1
18 16 >10E6 >10E6 2012071 20 >10E6 >10E6 1 68 9 >10E6 >10E6 4669550 30 >10E6 >10E6 1
19 10 >10E6 >10E6 2308670 4949 >10E6 >10E6 1 69 14 >10E6 >10E6 1853773 25483 >10E6 >10E6 1
20 13 103 >10E6 819309 24 >10E6 276648 1 70 10 1651 >10E6 1071711 21 >10E6 >10E6 1
21 11 >10E6 >10E6 9467234 27 >10E6 >10E6 1 71 9 84 >10E6 509437 26 >10E6 >10E6 1
22 9 82 >10E6 571878 467 >10E6 >10E6 1 72 9 >10E6 >10E6 3225767 32 >10E6 49796 1
23 13 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 23 >10E6 >10E6 1 73 11 >10E6 >10E6 3460591 714 >10E6 344403 1
24 9 >10E6 >10E6 1288403 27 >10E6 2216593 1 74 14 >10E6 >10E6 5169755 20 >10E6 1185920 1
25 9 >10E6 >10E6 445491 1503 >10E6 8600846 1 75 11 51 >10E6 46978 806 1662 >10E6 1
26 9 1487 >10E6 516449 29 >10E6 9693 1 76 10 79 >10E6 483137 25 >10E6 >10E6 1
27 11 2195 >10E6 6212023 28 >10E6 2315 1 77 10 >10E6 >10E6 1081918 2865 >10E6 4950 1
28 12 110 >10E6 1282118 22 >10E6 >10E6 1 78 10 464 >10E6 2621122 21 >10E6 >10E6 1
29 9 3282 >10E6 883380 26 >10E6 >10E6 1 79 11 >10E6 >10E6 6162791 818 >10E6 37229 1
30 12 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 80 14 >10E6 >10E6 9297992 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
31 11 >10E6 >10E6 5148317 32 >10E6 >10E6 1 81 11 828 >10E6 1917212 28 >10E6 >10E6 1
32 12 >10E6 >10E6 1634864 25 >10E6 319706 1 82 8 1628 >10E6 938815 6623 >10E6 >10E6 1
33 10 51 >10E6 108925 25 57219 123419 1 83 10 338 >10E6 977279 4542 >10E6 >10E6 1
34 9 1456 >10E6 635742 8663 >10E6 >10E6 1 84 8 2887 >10E6 1679970 30 >10E6 >10E6 1
35 8 913 >10E6 1421853 7554 >10E6 >10E6 1 85 10 74 >10E6 401054 31 >10E6 10531 1
36 12 3259 >10E6 2480189 1060 >10E6 >10E6 1 86 9 422 >10E6 469746 2433 >10E6 >10E6 1
37 10 >10E6 >10E6 7435301 1212 >10E6 >10E6 1 87 9 123 >10E6 1841973 26 >10E6 >10E6 1
38 10 >10E6 >10E6 7589346 832 >10E6 1695527 1 88 11 >10E6 >10E6 4744928 2015 >10E6 977664 1
39 15 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 29 >10E6 98 1 89 8 5157 >10E6 1819690 39 >10E6 >10E6 1
40 10 >10E6 >10E6 2777548 27 >10E6 >10E6 1 90 14 67541 >10E6 130833 18 >10E6 >10E6 1
41 12 7688 >10E6 619904 61 >10E6 1653214 1 91 10 66 >10E6 218948 30 >10E6 116203 1
42 9 907 >10E6 503406 29 >10E6 98094 1 92 12 85 >10E6 482367 25 >10E6 >10E6 1
43 9 512 >10E6 2356047 26 >10E6 >10E6 1 93 9 76 >10E6 422549 1647 >10E6 >10E6 1
44 8 1138 >10E6 1052621 27 >10E6 766550 1 94 12 >10E6 >10E6 6558207 2525 >10E6 4725 1
45 9 100 >10E6 1050576 1668 >10E6 1146537 1 95 9 >10E6 >10E6 4563738 3607 >10E6 >10E6 1
46 10 2994 >10E6 591821 19 >10E6 >10E6 1 96 12 97 >10E6 770000 20 >10E6 >10E6 1
47 8 342 >10E6 385095 1462 >10E6 >10E6 1 97 9 325 >10E6 563027 28 >10E6 >10E6 1
48 13 >10E6 >10E6 7883307 22 >10E6 >10E6 1 98 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1401233 1
49 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 27 >10E6 >10E6 1 99 8 59 >10E6 167107 2580 >10E6 >10E6 1
50 8 1080 >10E6 554957 773 >10E6 114121 1 100 8 >10E6 >10E6 1783161 3523 >10E6 >10E6 1
Performance Indices Correct 
TopologyCase





Table 49: Topology Identification Results for Nine Bus System with Input and Output Noise 
PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 PI top 5 PI top 6 PI top 4 PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 PI top 5 PI top 6 PI top 4
1 13 616016 >10E6 615941 35 228241 >10E6 1 51 11 2582 >10E6 280085 2217 >10E6 10373 1
2 12 1206 >10E6 685080 1385 >10E6 >10E6 1 52 10 814 >10E6 659212 1653 >10E6 >10E6 1
3 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 30 >10E6 >10E6 1 53 11 3823 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
4 12 >10E6 >10E6 2425206 3244 >10E6 >10E6 1 54 10 >10E6 >10E6 953641 411 >10E6 >10E6 1
5 10 1171 >10E6 4952857 198 >10E6 >10E6 1 55 14 66 >10E6 203678 31 >10E6 >10E6 1
6 17 53 >10E6 35557 21 >10E6 >10E6 1 56 12 2226 >10E6 1981936 1062 >10E6 >10E6 1
7 14 >10E6 >10E6 3494313 43 >10E6 >10E6 1 57 10 1438 >10E6 287575 30 >10E6 2621911 1
8 11 1825089 >10E6 1724913 31 >10E6 >10E6 1 58 10 995 >10E6 910289 38 >10E6 24368 1
9 19 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 23 >10E6 5389794 1 59 11 >10E6 >10E6 4379283 708 >10E6 36362 1
10 11 1093 >10E6 518643 29 >10E6 57793 1 60 19 >10E6 >10E6 8569672 712 >10E6 >10E6 1
11 10 >10E6 >10E6 6766455 3180 >10E6 >10E6 1 61 10 3531 >10E6 2854270 550 >10E6 >10E6 1
12 10 975320 >10E6 1321183 1449 >10E6 357685 1 62 13 87609 >10E6 118230 1067 >10E6 910848 1
13 12 >10E6 >10E6 542090 45 >10E6 >10E6 1 63 17 525821 >10E6 545846 2073 >10E6 192 1
14 14 >10E6 >10E6 7817992 1060 >10E6 >10E6 1 64 11 2322 >10E6 2210189 24 >10E6 >10E6 1
15 14 >10E6 >10E6 4783402 30 >10E6 34148 1 65 12 2124 >10E6 1506610 1501604 >10E6 6185 1
16 11 >10E6 >10E6 905369 455 >10E6 >10E6 1 66 14 >10E6 >10E6 9669271 30 >10E6 >10E6 1
17 9 1165 >10E6 610269 712 >10E6 >10E6 1 67 12 687 >10E6 1720255 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
18 14 >10E6 >10E6 2011896 20 >10E6 >10E6 1 68 13 >10E6 >10E6 4669588 32 >10E6 >10E6 1
19 12 707 >10E6 2307966 6497 >10E6 >10E6 1 69 14 >10E6 >10E6 1853769 25411 >10E6 >10E6 1
20 39 9098 >10E6 819331 24 >10E6 9417 5 70 12 101 >10E6 1071700 27 >10E6 >10E6 1
21 13 >10E6 >10E6 9467217 127 >10E6 >10E6 1 71 11 108 >10E6 509070 132 >10E6 >10E6 1
22 10 85 >10E6 571616 655 >10E6 >10E6 1 72 11 3102076 >10E6 3225718 31 >10E6 26886 1
23 16 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 40 >10E6 >10E6 1 73 12 >10E6 >10E6 3460527 141 >10E6 2513747 1
24 11 >10E6 >10E6 1288408 31 >10E6 >10E6 1 74 16 >10E6 >10E6 5169835 27 >10E6 9010115 1
25 11 444751 >10E6 445764 1302 >10E6 89609 1 75 12 28937 >10E6 46908 589 1611 2201717 1
26 11 1516 >10E6 516466 7990 >10E6 1150 1 76 11 75 >10E6 483106 159 >10E6 >10E6 1
27 14 2211 >10E6 6202785 26 >10E6 1155 1 77 12 >10E6 >10E6 1081546 3046 >10E6 9657 1
28 12 1054310 >10E6 1282174 21 >10E6 >10E6 1 78 12 318 >10E6 2703616 33 >10E6 >10E6 1
29 10 3279 >10E6 883399 651 >10E6 >10E6 1 79 12 >10E6 >10E6 6162613 223 >10E6 3237327 1
30 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 80 17 >10E6 >10E6 9298027 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
31 14 >10E6 >10E6 5148297 55 >10E6 >10E6 1 81 11 1857617 >10E6 1917238 27 >10E6 >10E6 1
32 16 >10E6 >10E6 1634877 29 >10E6 9577912 1 82 10 1638 >10E6 938764 32 >10E6 >10E6 1
33 12 82515 >10E6 108952 140 57209 520678 1 83 11 341 >10E6 977252 4588 >10E6 >10E6 1
34 10 1455 >10E6 635469 8521 >10E6 >10E6 1 84 10 1681802 >10E6 1679654 28 >10E6 >10E6 1
35 10 >10E6 >10E6 1421754 1024 >10E6 >10E6 1 85 11 398317 >10E6 >10E6 38 >10E6 >10E6 1
36 13 3254 >10E6 2479522 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 86 11 446431 >10E6 469745 4074 >10E6 >10E6 1
37 11 1194 >10E6 7416594 1223 >10E6 >10E6 1 87 10 1103 >10E6 1842006 27 >10E6 779555 1
38 18 >10E6 >10E6 7589414 27 >10E6 >10E6 1 88 11 >10E6 >10E6 4744935 1910 >10E6 >10E6 1
39 18 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 4205 >10E6 8529744 1 89 10 2964 >10E6 1819666 4497 >10E6 >10E6 1
40 11 669 >10E6 2777544 25 >10E6 >10E6 1 90 18 100148 >10E6 >10E6 31 >10E6 329863 1
41 12 579669 >10E6 619015 28 >10E6 >10E6 1 91 11 4384 >10E6 218678 30 >10E6 >10E6 1
42 10 910 >10E6 503393 978 >10E6 475742 1 92 11 94 >10E6 482390 25 >10E6 >10E6 1
43 12 1165 >10E6 2354672 29 >10E6 >10E6 1 93 10 419836 >10E6 >10E6 1128 >10E6 >10E6 1
44 12 98 >10E6 1052466 1382 >10E6 >10E6 1 94 13 >10E6 >10E6 6555807 2520 >10E6 >10E6 1
45 12 103 >10E6 >10E6 1514 >10E6 2215734 1 95 11 >10E6 >10E6 4563741 1884 >10E6 >10E6 1
46 13 3108 >10E6 >10E6 29 >10E6 >10E6 1 96 14 763325 >10E6 770000 24 >10E6 >10E6 1
47 11 81 >10E6 385089 1263 >10E6 >10E6 1 97 13 8462369 >10E6 562837 43 >10E6 >10E6 1
48 17 >10E6 >10E6 6266407 21 >10E6 >10E6 1 98 14 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1289 >10E6 1189 1
49 29 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 29 >10E6 >10E6 1 99 11 168424 >10E6 167083 3203 >10E6 >10E6 1
50 10 424310 >10E6 554999 1029 >10E6 405496 1 100 11 >10E6 >10E6 1782998 1459 >10E6 >10E6 1
Performance Indices Correct 
TopologyCase




Table 50: Topology Identification Results for Nine Bus System with Output Noise 
PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 PI top 5 PI top 6 PI top 7 PI top 1 PI top 2 PI top 3 PI top 4 PI top 5 PI top 6 PI top 7
1 21 29929 >10E6 333257 133 >10E6 >10E6 1 51 17 >10E6 >10E6 21 501 >10E6 >10E6 1
2 31 >10E6 >10E6 139 104 >10E6 72116 1 52 15 >10E6 >10E6 6205 30 >10E6 119596 1
3 22 >10E6 >10E6 67 406 >10E6 >10E6 1 53 25 350 >10E6 >10E6 1649 >10E6 45216 1
4 29 >10E6 4065310 >10E6 63205 >10E6 44 1 54 30 >10E6 >10E6 1865782 41 >10E6 >10E6 1
5 21 6217251 >10E6 8611 61 >10E6 132103 1 55 21 627940 >10E6 17130 1603 >10E6 >10E6 1
6 55 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 2652 1254 >10E6 1 56 56 203 >10E6 3427 >10E6 462 >10E6 1
7 27 2816 >10E6 >10E6 1218 >10E6 >10E6 1 57 75 >10E6 48 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 322 3
8 11 >10E6 >10E6 330 23 >10E6 88312 1 58 56 183 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
9 26 >10E6 >10E6 38496 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 59 28 415 >10E6 4687770 13885 >10E6 >10E6 1
10 69 >10E6 >10E6 402304 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 60 56 443 >10E6 5032 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
11 18 >10E6 466889 >10E6 133 >10E6 >10E6 1 61 30 212 >10E6 2577811 >10E6 4694 >10E6 1
12 32 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 152 >10E6 594 1 62 55 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1296757 >10E6 1084 1
13 22 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 37 >10E6 248 1 63 22 >10E6 >10E6 7062973 331 1750 >10E6 1
14 235501 >10E6 86 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 654 3 64 69 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 630 >10E6 >10E6 1
15 21 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 8183 >10E6 387521 1 65 26 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
16 15 >10E6 >10E6 2318757 31 >10E6 28863 1 66 28 >10E6 >10E6 207 24 >10E6 5679 5
17 40 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 67 21 674871 >10E6 48515 477 >10E6 2560 1
18 266 >10E6 >10E6 110455 >10E6 13116 >10E6 1 68 29 2108 >10E6 387 >10E6 878 >10E6 1
19 44 >10E6 >10E6 62435 >10E6 200 >10E6 1 69 20 >10E6 >10E6 1417 1198 >10E6 >10E6 1
20 31 >10E6 >10E6 72422 >10E6 2742 >10E6 1 70 23 >10E6 >10E6 41 25 459 >10E6 1
21 53 >10E6 >10E6 9822583 >10E6 >10E6 51521 1 71 19 492 >10E6 >10E6 7853 >10E6 258343 1
22 34 418 >10E6 2507 1244 >10E6 >10E6 1 72 21451 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 34712 311 >10E6 6
23 46 7755 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 746594 >10E6 1 73 22 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 735 >10E6 208058 1
24 20 244764 >10E6 12552 151 >10E6 1542196 1 74 15 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 30 >10E6 75018 1
25 79 28 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 53914 2 75 31 55 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
26 2256 >10E6 >10E6 7443110 86 >10E6 905338 5 76 26 28 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
27 57 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 192807 >10E6 >10E6 1 77 42 2983 >10E6 18184 >10E6 >10E6 905571 1
28 36 155399 >10E6 >10E6 97 >10E6 137046 1 78 29 173 >10E6 >10E6 124 >10E6 >10E6 1
29 24 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 79 66 >10E6 >10E6 25 21 >10E6 >10E6 5
30 25 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 29 >10E6 34956 1 80 24 >10E6 3952 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 53549 1
31 94 >10E6 50 >10E6 1940 >10E6 32946 3 81 548 54 >10E6 >10E6 70 >10E6 85700 2
32 25 >10E6 >10E6 453 65 >10E6 >10E6 1 82 24993 >10E6 1239 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 91 7
33 27 114 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 162089 >10E6 1 83 19 >10E6 >10E6 580371 2680 >10E6 329 1
34 21 >10E6 >10E6 63 45 >10E6 >10E6 1 84 25 1141 >10E6 74 >10E6 33793 >10E6 1
35 22 501 >10E6 5311145 16 >10E6 131060 5 85 17 >10E6 >10E6 5270 17 >10E6 >10E6 5
36 35 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 162 >10E6 6373 1 86 320 >10E6 28 >10E6 44 >10E6 11561 3
37 37 >10E6 740 >10E6 9991 >10E6 11796 1 87 36 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 20845 >10E6 216 1
38 43 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 21584 >10E6 1546 1 88 24 51 >10E6 >10E6 37899 >10E6 >10E6 1
39 47 33 >10E6 >10E6 3620 >10E6 1281086 2 89 20 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 3081 >10E6 >10E6 1
40 24 >10E6 >10E6 364 116 >10E6 12510 1 90 28 93 >10E6 >10E6 4638 >10E6 324431 1
41 33 >10E6 395826 >10E6 48 >10E6 264 1 91 19 >10E6 >10E6 788 80927 >10E6 6712 1
42 16 >10E6 >10E6 5614 2664 >10E6 >10E6 1 92 23 4171321 >10E6 >10E6 859 >10E6 2366105 1
43 171 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1 93 51 >10E6 >10E6 3634 >10E6 203 >10E6 1
44 23 >10E6 >10E6 1707 49 1630746 >10E6 1 94 28 >10E6 >10E6 3320164 >10E6 2949 >10E6 1
45 71545 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 8315 7 95 35 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 2440590 1
46 94041813 3686 >10E6 53 >10E6 505 >10E6 4 96 32 35 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
47 12 >10E6 >10E6 162 1146 >10E6 7461 1 97 81 >10E6 105972 >10E6 >10E6 233 >10E6 1
48 16 >10E6 2598 >10E6 62 >10E6 >10E6 1 98 36 >10E6 68 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
49 17 4379 >10E6 6235 20 >10E6 387 1 99 40 >10E6 >10E6 98 >10E6 >10E6 >10E6 1
50 53 >10E6 >10E6 63848 202 >10E6 334849 1 100 36 >10E6 >10E6 2639 47 136 >10E6 1






Table 51: Input Identification Steps for Nine Bus System 
V1 θ1 V2 P2 V3 P3 P5 Q5 V7 P7 P9 Q9
1 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2841 0.9801 0.9960 1.2629 0.5067
2 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2843 0.9803 0.9958 1.2627 0.5069
3 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2845 0.9805 0.9956 1.2625 0.5071
4 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2847 0.9807 0.9954 1.2623 0.5073
5 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2849 0.9809 0.9952 1.2621 0.5075
6 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2851 0.9811 0.9950 1.2619 0.5077
7 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2853 0.9813 0.9948 1.2617 0.5079
8 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2855 0.9815 0.9946 1.2615 0.5081
9 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2857 0.9817 0.9944 1.2613 0.5083
10 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2859 0.9819 0.9942 1.2611 0.5085
11 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2861 0.9821 0.9940 1.2609 0.5087
12 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2863 0.9823 0.9938 1.2607 0.5089
13 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2865 0.9825 0.9936 1.2605 0.5091
14 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2867 0.9827 0.9934 1.2603 0.5093
15 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2869 0.9829 0.9932 1.2601 0.5095
16 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2871 0.9831 0.9930 1.2599 0.5097
17 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2873 0.9833 0.9928 1.2597 0.5099
18 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2875 0.9835 0.9926 1.2595 0.5101
19 1.0000 0.0000 1.0013 1.6329 0.9885 0.8571 0.9125 0.2877 0.9837 0.9924 1.2593 0.5103




Table 52: Input Identification Data and Results for Nine Bus System 
V5 θ5 Q7 θ7 V9 θ9
1 0.9720 -4.0959 0.3676 0.6894 0.9551 -4.4248 0.9052
2 0.9720 -4.0938 0.3648 0.6919 0.9551 -4.4219 0.9123
3 0.9721 -4.0917 0.3621 0.6944 0.9551 -4.4191 0.9049
4 0.9721 -4.0896 0.3593 0.6969 0.9552 -4.4162 0.9133
5 0.9721 -4.0875 0.3566 0.6994 0.9552 -4.4134 0.9192
6 0.9721 -4.0854 0.3538 0.7019 0.9552 -4.4105 0.9092
7 0.9721 -4.0833 0.3511 0.7044 0.9552 -4.4077 0.9014
8 0.9721 -4.0812 0.3483 0.7069 0.9553 -4.4048 0.8959
9 0.9722 -4.0791 0.3455 0.7094 0.9553 -4.4020 0.8923
10 0.9722 -4.0770 0.3428 0.7119 0.9553 -4.3992 0.8653
11 0.9722 -4.0750 0.3400 0.7144 0.9554 -4.3963 0.8585
12 0.9722 -4.0729 0.3373 0.7169 0.9554 -4.3935 0.8539
13 0.9722 -4.0708 0.3345 0.7194 0.9554 -4.3906 0.8511
14 0.9723 -4.0687 0.3317 0.7218 0.9554 -4.3878 0.8487
15 0.9723 -4.0666 0.3290 0.7243 0.9555 -4.3850 0.8467
16 0.9723 -4.0645 0.3262 0.7268 0.9555 -4.3821 0.8449
17 0.9723 -4.0624 0.3234 0.7293 0.9555 -4.3793 0.8433
18 0.9723 -4.0603 0.3207 0.7318 0.9556 -4.3764 0.8311
19 0.9724 -4.0583 0.3179 0.7343 0.9556 -4.3736 0.8286




Table 53: Nine Bus System Analog Security Assessment Results for Line Two 
Contingency 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.751 0.238 0.000 0.000
2 0.996 4.755 1.634 0.228 0.000 0.000
3 0.988 -3.330 0.855 0.201 0.000 0.000
4 0.987 -2.510 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.897 -16.391 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.285
6 0.977 -6.579 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.968 -5.910 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.354
8 0.987 -1.226 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000




Table 54: Nine Bus System Numerical Integration Results for Line Two Contingency 
(True Values) 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.736 0.212 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 4.809 1.630 0.201 0.000 0.000
3 1.000 -3.132 0.850 0.223 0.000 0.000
4 0.989 -2.458 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.908 -15.850 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.300
6 0.988 -6.413 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.976 -5.786 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.350
8 0.993 -1.167 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure 72: Nine Bus System Generator Two Angle for Line Two Contingency 
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Figure 73: Nine Bus System Generator Three Angle for Line Two Contingency 
 
Table 55: Nine Bus System Analog Security Assessment Results for Line Three 
Contingency 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.787 0.684 0.000 0.000
2 0.996 19.430 1.634 0.347 0.000 0.000
3 0.988 20.663 0.855 0.060 0.000 0.000
4 0.962 -2.702 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.919 -7.902 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.285
6 0.986 17.720 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.967 12.618 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.354
8 0.980 13.196 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000





Table 56: Nine Bus System Numerical Integration Results for Line Three Contingency 
(True Values) 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.772 0.664 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 19.122 1.630 0.317 0.000 0.000
3 1.000 21.236 0.850 0.081 0.000 0.000
4 0.963 -2.648 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.919 -7.760 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.300
6 0.997 17.267 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.976 12.311 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.350
8 0.985 12.936 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure 74: Nine Bus System Generator Two Angle for Line Three Contingency 
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Figure 75: Nine Bus System Generator Three Angle for Line Three Contingency 
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Table 57: Nine Bus System Analog Security Assessment Results for Line Four 
Contingency 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 1.570 0.268 0.000 0.000
2 0.996 2.049 1.634 0.151 0.000 0.000
3 X X X X 0.000 0.000
4 0.989 -5.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.977 -9.828 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.285
6 0.997 -9.168 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.979 -8.517 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.354
8 0.992 -3.905 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000





Table 58: Nine Bus System Numerical Integration Results for Line Four Contingency 
(True Values) 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 1.559 0.250 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 2.059 1.630 0.158 0.000 0.000
3 X X X X 0.000 0.000
4 0.990 -5.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.977 -9.705 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.300
6 0.999 -9.097 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.982 -8.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.350
8 0.995 -3.887 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure 76: Nine Bus System Generator Two Angle for Line Four Contingency 
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Table 59: Nine Bus System Analog Security Assessment Results for Line Five 
Contingency 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.741 0.344 0.000 0.000
2 0.996 6.162 1.634 0.415 0.000 0.000
3 0.988 8.911 0.855 -0.099 0.000 0.000
4 0.981 -2.492 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.967 -2.824 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.285
6 0.995 5.786 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.942 -3.925 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.354
8 0.975 0.400 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000





Table 60: Nine Bus System Numerical Integration Results for Line Five Contingency 
(True Values) 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.727 0.301 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 6.495 1.630 0.409 0.000 0.000
3 1.000 8.849 0.850 -0.072 0.000 0.000
4 0.984 -2.440 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.972 -2.756 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.300
6 1.005 5.597 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.946 -3.945 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.350
8 0.980 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure 77: Nine Bus System Generator Two Angle for Line Five Contingency 
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Figure 78: Nine Bus System Generator Three Angle for Line Five Contingency 
 
Table 61: Nine Bus System Analog Security Assessment Results for Line Six 
Contingency 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.814 0.481 0.000 0.000
2 0.996 22.215 1.634 0.265 0.000 0.000
3 0.988 -7.757 0.855 0.301 0.000 0.000
4 0.973 -2.760 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.956 -8.900 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.285
6 0.971 -10.845 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.924 -17.063 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.354
8 0.985 15.276 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000





Table 62: Nine Bus System Numerical Integration Results for Line Six Contingency 
(True Values) 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.801 0.437 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 22.896 1.630 0.261 0.000 0.000
3 1.000 -7.808 0.850 0.323 0.000 0.000
4 0.976 -2.708 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.961 -8.816 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.300
6 0.982 -10.909 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.936 -17.009 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.350
8 0.989 15.183 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure 79: Nine Bus System Generator Two Angle for Line Six Contingency 
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Table 63: Nine Bus System Analog Security Assessment Results for Line Seven 
Contingency 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 2.366 0.545 0.000 0.000
2 X X X X 0.000 0.000
3 0.988 -10.224 0.855 0.094 0.000 0.000
4 0.978 -8.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.964 -13.091 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.285
6 0.984 -13.197 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.955 -18.213 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.354
8 0.961 -17.501 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000





Table 64: Nine Bus System Numerical Integration Results for Line Seven Contingency 
(True Values) 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 2.349 0.484 0.000 0.000
2 X X X X 0.000 0.000
3 1.000 -10.180 0.850 0.124 0.000 0.000
4 0.981 -7.925 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.970 -12.947 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.300
6 0.994 -13.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.965 -18.079 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.350
8 0.970 -17.356 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure 81: Nine Bus System Generator Two Angle for Line Seven Contingency 
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Table 65: Nine Bus System Analog Security Assessment Results for Line Eight 
Contingency 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.828 0.892 0.000 0.000
2 0.996 32.811 1.634 0.287 0.000 0.000
3 0.988 19.029 0.855 0.176 0.000 0.000
4 0.950 -2.878 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.928 0.228 0.000 0.000 0.911 0.285
6 0.979 15.741 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.963 19.655 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.354
8 0.983 26.696 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000





Table 66: Nine Bus System Numerical Integration Results for Line Eight Contingency 
(True Values) 
Bus #
Mag (p.u.) Ang(deg) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.) P (p.u.) Q (p.u.)
1 1.000 0.000 0.812 0.845 0.000 0.000
2 1.000 32.138 1.630 0.254 0.000 0.000
3 1.000 18.618 0.850 0.212 0.000 0.000
4 0.952 -2.813 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.933 0.248 0.000 0.000 0.900 0.300
6 0.989 15.313 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.971 19.123 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.350
8 0.989 26.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure 82: Nine Bus System Generator Two Angle for Line Eight Contingency 
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